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Abstract 
Between 1990-2007, Vietnam achieved good macroeconomic performance.  Gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rates averaged 8% per annum, a level ranked second 
only to China in Asia. However, since 2007, the country has experienced instability 
in macroeconomic conditions. GDP growth rates reduced sharply while inflation 
rates increased to double-digit figures. Recent research has provided preliminary 
evidence suggesting that poor operation of monetary policy might have contributed 
to the downturn. Vietnam‘s government and central bank appear to have maintained 
a traditional approach to managing monetary policy while external liberalisation was 
occurring.  Conceptual developments and more robust empirical analysis can provide 
insights into the effectiveness of policy responses in dealing with external shocks.   
The operation and macroeconomic impacts of monetary policies are investigated  
empirically using quantitative analysis of the Trilemma rule and structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) estimation in the analytical framework of monetary 
transmissions. Each analysis suggests that the inflation phenomenon reflects less 
effective management of monetary policy as regards foreign capital flows. The 
Trilemma rule was violated by maintaining the usual policies of exchange rate 
stability and interest rate independence while suddenly easing the restrictions on 
capital inflows. Consequently, the exchange rate and interest rate policies became 
less effective and failed to stabilise the economy. 
This dissertation also provides a qualitative analysis and extension of the monetary 
channel framework underlying monetary policies in Vietnam. More comprehensive 
monitoring and analysis of monetary channels would improve the information 
available to decision makers. Repositioning of monetary objectives and operation 
might, at various times, involve greater attention to price stability; more 
comprehensive monitoring of fund flows and their impacts; more flexibility in the 
exchange rate scheme; greater concerns with financial system stability; a less 
controlled interest rate policy; more gradual, cautious financial liberalisation; and 
greater central bank autonomy.   
While this study focuses on Vietnam for the period between 1995 and 2013, the 
approaches and methods used can be applied more broadly and further developed. 
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New time periods and different external exposures bring new challenges, not only in 
Vietnam but also in economies around the world, developing and developed. The 
reported research can help policy makers adjust their monetary policies to regain 
successful economic development pathways. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
Vietnam has one of the largest populations among developing countries in the world.  
With continuing strong growth, the population was approximately 93 million people 
in July 2014 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). The economic system the 
government has pursued is termed a ―socialist-oriented market‖, with the country 
politically governed by a sole Party. The economy has been dominated by state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) that have received great assistance from the government in 
the form of direct subsidies and considerable capital support from the national 
budget.  
Vietnam started to slowly open the domestic economy to global markets in 1986. 
From 1986 to 2006, the country attained remarkable macroeconomic performance. 
This dragged the country out of the list of poorest nations and it gradually reached 
the low-end of the middle-income group. 
Since 2007, however, the events of joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and impacts from the global financial crisis have exposed many weaknesses in 
Vietnam‘s economy, particularly in monetary areas. Initially, openness and financial 
liberalisation were considered to be beneficial, as the economy could attract more 
foreign capital flows from overseas investors. To keep the exchange rate under 
control, the government tried to issue money to buy the foreign currencies in the 
financial market. However, due to inefficient open market operation (Vietnam‘s 
government bonds are still illiquid in financial markets) the central bank could not 
sterilise the increased money (Leung, 2009). This resulted in higher foreign reserves 
but a large increase in money supply. Comparing between January and December 
2007, foreign reserves increased by over 100% (from 12 to 25 billion USD), while 
M2 increased by 50% (See Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2). Prior to this, M2 grew at an 
average annual rate of 30% between 1995 and 2006 with modest inflation (World 
 2 Chapter 1: Introduction 
Bank, 2011). From 2007-2013, M2 growth‘s pace was reduced to 20%/year on 
average. Increasing inflation may have then been a surprise.
1
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The development of M0, M1, M2 in 1995-2014 (unit: billion VND) 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on IMF e-Library Database (Accessed on 15/1/2015) 
 
It was estimated that the amount of foreign investment coming into the 
manufacturing sectors kept decreasing, while more capital was put into the property 
market. For example, in 2009, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the property market 
reached 2.5 billion USD, accounting for more than 21% of new FDI in Vietnam 
(Vietnam Investment Review, 2010). Housing prices were boosted in a bubble, even 
when housing supply was boosted dramatically (Jehan & Luong, 2010). The early 
emergence of a price bubble in the property market is often a direct indicator of a 
                                                 
1
 There is an initial explanation for the relatively low inflation in the period 1999-2001: the money 
circulation velocity decreased for some time due to the effect of monetisation. But when it (V) is 
stationary, the increasing money supply (M) will, according to the quantity theory, lead to higher 
inflation (ΔP). Certainly, the effects from the higher international price of energy, food, materials, and 
other inputs must contribute significantly to the drama. 
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later crisis to the whole financial system. For example, by early 1997 in Thailand, it 
was estimated that there were 365,000 unoccupied apartment units in Bangkok (Hill, 
1998).  
Since 2009, the ratio of total economy investment to GDP reached nearly 50%.  
Given the GDP growth rate of 6%, the incremental capital output ratio would exceed 
8, which is very high compared with neighbouring countries and the region
2
. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Key financial indicators for the period 2001-2010 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on World Development Indicators Database (World Bank) and 
Global Development Finance (IMF) (Accessed on 10/5/2012) 
 
The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) responded to increasing inflation by setting a 
higher refinancing rate for commercial banks. Between 2007-2008, as the rates 
doubled from 7.5% to 15%, inflation was brought down quickly from its peak of 
over 28% and fell to below 5% in mid-2009. When the refinancing rate was reduced 
to 7% to stimulate the economy in 2010, inflation rose again and peaked at 23% in 
8/2011 (see Figure 1.3). 
                                                 
2
 Incremental Capital Output Ratio = 
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High inflation and high interest rates caused severe damage to the domestic 
economy. The banking system was frozen as a consequence of illiquidity. Increasing 
non-performing loans were estimated to reach 250 trillion VND (equivalent to 12 
billion USD or 10% GDP) in 2012 (K. Vu, 2012). The number of firms that went 
bankrupt kept rising (Tuoi Tre News, 2012). In comparison, in Korea between 1994-
1995, before the Asian crisis, the Chaebols built up massive debts that were 
equivalent, on average, to four times their equity (Hill, 1998).  
 
 
Figure 1.3: Reactions from SBV 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on data from SBV and GSO 
 
Although the exchange rate depreciated by 25% between 2007 and 2011 (as shown 
in Figure 1.2), the deficit in the current account grew each year. Imports kept 
increasing, while exports could not catch up. Public debt to GDP increased from 30% 
in 2001 to over 50% in 2010, rapidly approaching the dangerous zone. The 
International Monetary Fund‘s (IMF) analysis based on cross-country comparison 
even pointed out that Vietnam had already broken the safe debt level, which should 
be at the most, 45% of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2014). 
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Foreign reserves reached 25 billion USD in 2007 but fell to 12 billion USD in 2010. 
The stock market index reached 1,100 in 2007, fell to 240 in 2009 and fluctuated 
within a range of 400-450 over 2010-2011. 
In South East Asia, the worsening of financial indicators seem to be a particular 
problem in Vietnam. Neighbouring economies experienced only a slight increase in 
inflation during the same period (see Figure 1.4). 
The ongoing global crisis has had significant negative effects on the economy.  
However, since other countries in the area with the same external conditions suffered 
much less impact at the same time, it seems monetary arrangements may be 
significant contributors to the deteriorating situation. This is the central problem 
investigated in this dissertation. Many experts consider that the ―dreaming time‖ for 
Vietnam may be over, and the economy will not revert to the high growth period of a 
decade ago without substantial reforms to the current monetary policy framework. 
This research investigates these issues. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: ASEAN inflation rate between 2002-2011 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on World Development Indicators Database (World Bank) and 
Global Development Finance (IMF) (Accessed on 10/1/2013) 
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1.2 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
The well-known statement ―Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon‖ by Friedman (1963) suggests that current problems are related to 
limitations in controlling the (growth of the) money supply and managing monetary 
policy. The concern is that the monetary policy might have been poorly structured 
and implemented when the economy was further opened in 2007 and subsequently 
remained so. 
Conventionally, the explanation seems straightforward: the central or other banks 
may put too much money into circulation (increasing inflation) while the exchange 
rate adjusts only slightly. The domestic economy effectively becomes more 
expensive. Exports lose competitiveness as exporters face low profits or losses (due 
to domestic inflation), while consumers continue to demand more imports (perhaps 
due to a money illusion). While the bubble from the property market absorbs more 
and more investment from domestic and foreign investors, few people care about the 
real production sector anymore, as a wealth illusion builds. Both unemployment and 
a crisis in the banking system may well follow.  
While the government and the SBV still maintain the previous policies, new 
challenges from further opening of the economy will surely go unaddressed. 
Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the nature, effectiveness, and appropriateness of 
the current monetary policy framework, and to investigate adjustments that may help 
the country overcome the hard times and restore the long-run development path. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis evaluates the links between economic performance and monetary policies 
of a small, opening economy in an era of financial liberalisation. A critical 
appreciation of potential policies that might be developed in times of rising concern 
with national debt, external imbalance, and reforms to the international financial 
architecture is sought.  
Three questions are central to the research: 
Research Question 1: How are changes in Vietnam's international policy 
configurations and its inflation performance empirically related?  
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Research Question 2: Do current monetary policies support sustainable 
economic growth?  
Research Question 3: How could Vietnam make adjustments to its monetary 
policy framework to sustain economic growth in the new international context? 
In answering the research questions, this study: 
- Discusses economic developments since Doi Moi in 1986 to understand 
relevant characteristics of the Vietnamese economy.  
- Reviews the basis of monetary thinking and discusses the evolution of the 
implementation of monetary policy; including the arrangements, objectives, and 
instruments that were and are in use.  
- Reviews the nature of current and potential challenges. 
- Reviews the financial liberalisation process of Vietnam and its economic 
impacts. 
- Examines the interrelations among monetary policy and other 
macroeconomic policies (such as fiscal policy, investment policy, trade policy) and 
how these might work together to achieve development objectives.  
- Empirically analyses the impacts of monetary policies on inflation between 
1995-2006 and 2007-2013, and compares the impacts between the two periods. 
- Empirically analyses the impacts from monetary policies on economic growth 
between 1995-2006 and 2007-2013, and compares the impacts between the two 
periods. 
- Outlines a more suitable monetary policy framework to achieve the overall 
objectives of the economy and intermediate objectives of monetary policy.  
How government agencies, financial institutions, financial tools, and 
instruments might be better designed and conducted is a central concern. Key 
features of an optimal monetary policy framework are assessed, with their 
applicability to developing countries considered.  Improving specifications of goals, 
objectives, instruments, mechanisms, the role of government agencies, and the 
positions of financial institutions is the challenge. 
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1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
The thesis consists of seven chapters:  
Chapter 1 briefly discusses the problems that need to be addressed and the research 
direction. Chapter 2 provides background information regarding Vietnam‘s economy 
and its monetary policy framework. Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive review of 
the literature related to the research direction in general, and specifically for the case 
of Vietnam. 
Chapter 4 provides a review of the methodology in assessing and analysing the 
research questions. The final section in the chapter presents the chosen methods and 
their rationality. 
Chapter 5 covers the first empirical method of the study: the Trilemma analysis. It 
provides the description of models, data, and findings from estimations. Chapter 6 
contains the second empirical method, which is a structural vector autoregression 
(SVAR) analysis of the channel of monetary transmission. Similar to the previous 
chapter, it provides a description of the models and data, and presents findings from 
estimations. The outcomes of those two chapters are expected to answer research 
questions #1 and #2. 
Chapter 7 reviews the results from the two previous empirical chapters, discusses 
their interactions and presents the policy implications from the findings. This chapter 
also provides a comprehensive qualitative analysis with arguments and evidence to 
answer research question #3. Chapter 8 summarises the key points from the thesis, 
the main findings and policy implications, as well as the limitations and other issues 
for future studies. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS  
An immediate objective of this thesis was to investigate the causes of the dramatic 
increase of inflation in Vietnam between 2007-2011 and why the SBV‘s monetary 
policy seemed ineffective in controlling it. An empirical quantitative analysis of the 
combination of Trilemma policies (interest rate, exchange rate, and capital flow 
policies) suggests that the rule may have been suddenly violated between 2006-2008, 
triggering the downturn. In detail, the country tried to further open the capital 
account, while still maintaining a relatively fixed exchange rate and independent 
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interest rate policies. As a result, the SBV failed to sterilise the incoming external 
inflows, which put substantial pressure on the domestic money supply and the 
exchange rate. 
In the second empirical study, the dissertation further investigated the failure of 
SBV‘s sterilisation3 efforts using a SVAR model. The model examined three main 
channels of Vietnam‘s monetary mechanism transmission (namely the interest rate 
channel, exchange rate channel, and credit channel) and their linkages with key 
macroeconomic indicators. It found that the SBV leaned on quantitative monetary 
instruments to fulfil its goals prior to the opening of the economy. However, after 
Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007, the surge of capital inflows with the entry of 
foreign banks dramatically increased domestic money supply out of the SBV‘s 
control. The SBV tried to use qualitative monetary instruments to dampen the rise in 
money supply but their efficiency was limited. Therefore, its sterilisation efforts 
failed as a result. 
Based on the research presented, some changes to the SBV‘s current policy 
framework to restore its efficiency and get the economy back on track are suggested. 
First, the SBV should make price stability a key goal and recognise inter-
relationships with other goals. Second, the exchange rate policy should be made 
more flexible to avoid the trilemma situation. Third, the SBV should review their use 
of key intermediate monetary instruments and recognise situations where qualitative 
instruments may be more efficient than quantitative ones. Fourth, the changing roles 
of various monetary channels and external policy positions should be monitored and 
analysed as part of policy formulation. Fifth, public policy makers need to explicitly 
recognise the limitations of monetary policy and other policies, as well as the 
problems associated with trying to achieve too many objectives at the same time. 
Sixth, there will be a need for changes in policy settings and instrument use as the 
economy of Vietnam develops further. Finally, the impacts of external organisations 
                                                 
3
 Sterilisation refers to the central bank's operations to counter the effects on domestic money supply 
caused by the surplus or deficit of balance of payments. Typically, sterilisation involves the open 
market operations undertaken by central bank to neutralize the impact of associated foreign exchange 
operations such as the inflows of foreign capital (Krugman, Obstfeld, & Melitz, 2012) 
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and conditions need to be more fully appreciated and considered in monetary 
analysis and policy.   
The concepts, analysis, and frameworks used in this work provide the basis for such 
suggestions. The hope is that those responsible for monetary policies in other 
nations, as well as researchers, may also find them of use. Further efforts and 
research will be required as we seek to meet current and future macroeconomic 
challenges. 
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Chapter 2: Vietnam’s Development and 
Monetary Policy Framework 
2.1 VIETNAM’S EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPMENT 
Prior to 1986, Vietnam was a closed central-planned economy in which all decisions 
regarding production and investment were embodied in a plan formulated by the 
central government (Nove, 1987). The economy consistently suffered from persistent 
product shortages, with low levels of per capita consumption and inefficient 
investments (Vo, Dinh, Do, Hoang, & Pham, 2002). Under the planned economy, 
SOEs were fully provided with capital, machineries, equipment, materials, labourers, 
market, etc., for their operation. In turn, SOEs produced and provided most of the 
goods and services required by the government. Towards the end of the 1980s, many 
SOEs suffered from financial difficulties due to mismanagement of resources and 
inefficient production. 
2.1.1 INITIAL YEARS OF TRANSITION (1986-1990) 
In 1986, the government initiated ―Doi Moi‖ (Renovation), with a series of policies 
to shift the central-planned economy to a market-oriented one. Markets for money, 
labour, goods and land, and so on were gradually created. With the establishment of 
more banks and other types of financial institutions, the society began to use more 
money in daily exchange. As a consequence of the rapidly monetised economy, the 
country suffered remarkable inflation (about 320% annually between 1986-1989), 
while GDP growth was just 3.9% annually (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 
2011) (see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: Macroeconomic statistics for the period 1980-1989 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on World Development Indicators Database (World Bank) and 
Global Development Finance (IMF) (Accessed on 10/5/2012) 
 
2.1.2 TAKE-OFF PERIOD (1990-2006) 
During this period, Vietnam had shifted to more extensive and competitive markets. 
Export-oriented policies replaced import-substitution ones. As tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade had been reduced and steadily removed, the majority of goods could 
be freely imported into and exported from the country by 2006. The banking system 
was reformed by differentiating the central bank from commercial banks, allowing 
the entry of private and foreign banks. In addition, stock markets were established in 
2000 to mobilise more capital for investment. The state budget was decentralised and 
restructured to eliminate many subsidies. The tax system was renewed with a broader 
tax base and the introduction of modern taxes such as value added tax (VAT) and 
business income tax (replacing turnover tax and profit tax, respectively).  
Starting from a nearly zero base at the outset of Doi Moi, the private sector quickly 
emerged and accounted for over half of Vietnam‘s GDP in 1995 (see Figure 2.2). 
Prior to Doi Moi, Vietnam‘s economy was largely dominated by the state sector and 
a significant contribution from an unrecorded-but-important informal private sector. 
The private enterprise system in Vietnam was officially created in 1990 with the 
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introduction of the Enterprise Law. As a result, the number of private enterprises 
increased substantially each year. For example, in 1994, the number of private 
enterprises increased by 60% compared to 1993, and one year later, in 1995, the 
figure increased by 41% compared to 1994 (Webster & Taussig, 1999). 
The next important turning-point for private sector development occurred in 2000 
when the newly amended Enterprise Law came into effect. The Law significantly 
simplified business registration and resulted in a massive increase in the number of 
registered private enterprises in the following years. It led to the elimination of over 
one hundred business license requirements and considerably reduced the time and 
costs associated with registering a business. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Total GDP proportion of all sectors (1995-2011) 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on GSO data 
 
Despite its higher proportion in terms of GDP contribution, the private sector 
requires a smaller proportion in total investment outlays compared to the state sector 
(see Figure 2.3). Although the gap has recently tended to narrow, this inadequate 
allocation reflects one of the weaknesses of the domestic economy that is dominated 
by inefficient SOEs. 
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Figure 2.3: Total investment proportion in all sectors (1995-2011) 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on GSO data 
 
Given the mounting debts, inefficiency, and low productivity of SOEs, the 
government began undertaking SOE reforms through equitisation in 1992. These 
reforms reduced the number of SOEs from 12,000 in 1988 to 6,000 in 1992 after 
being merged and/or consolidated (International Monetary Fund, 1998). However, 
since then, the reform progress has been delayed, as the government is still officially 
deciding on a leading role for SOEs in the economy (K. N. Le, 2003). This 
contributes to an explanation as to why the share of the state-owned sector in 
Vietnam‘s GDP has stayed as high as 40% between 1995-2006. As of 1996, SOEs 
employed two million people; their output accounted for 25% of GDP; their revenues 
reached VND 25.2 trillion, comprising 41.4% of the total revenues (Shimomoto, 
1999).  
The country experienced the Asian crisis in 1997 without severe impacts (Figure 
2.4), due to the fact that at that time Vietnam‘s economy, and financial markets in 
particular, were less globally integrated, and domestic businesses were not as highly 
leveraged as in those economies more severely hit by this crisis (Meyer, Tran, & 
Nguyen, 2006). 
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Figure 2.4: Devaluation of ASEAN‘s currencies with USD during the financial crisis of 1997 
Source: Historical Data on Currency Exchange Rate, OANDA - Forex Trading and Exchange Rates 
Services. Retrieved from: www.oanda.com  
 
After the first few tough years of transition, economic reforms started to yield 
encouraging results. From 1990, the GDP growth rate was sustained at 
approximately 7 to 8% annually, with stronger industrialisation and higher 
integration with the world and regional economies. Vietnam experienced sharp rises 
in trade volumes (especially in exports), foreign investment, and national income 
(see Figure 2.5). According to official statistics, the FDI sector accounted for over 
50% of Vietnam‘s export between 2003-2009 (N. A. Nguyen, Nguyen, & Nguyen, 
2010). 
The economic structure also experienced remarkable changes. Comparing between 
1990 and 2005, the contribution of the agriculture sector dropped from 38.7% to 
20.9% of GDP, whilst that of the industry and construction sector grew from 22.7% 
to 41.1%. The services sector stayed relatively constant, being 38.6% in 1990 and 
38.08% in 2005.  
In addition, there were changes in the structure of each sector. In agriculture, the 
proportion of agriculture and forestry declined from 84.4% to 77.7% between 1990-
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2003, while fishery gained a higher share. The proportion of manufacturing by the 
industrial sector rose from 12.3% in 1990 to 20.8% in 2003. In the services sector, 
the share of high value-added services such as finance, banking, insurance, and 
tourism, etc., increased significantly (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2006). 
 
Figure 2.5: Changes of total exports, imports, FDI and GDP per capital between 1990-2010 
(1990=100%) 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on World Development Indicators Database (World Bank) and 
Global Development Finance (IMF) (Accessed on 10/5/2012) 
 
During this time, Vietnam emerged as a new export platform in Asia. The country 
gained advantages in labour-intensive production processes aided by a young and 
cheap labour force that was considered hard working and ambitious (Meyer et al., 
2006). Several major export-oriented manufacturing sectors were established, 
notably in the garment, footwear, and furniture industries, contributing the major 
share in export volume growth. In addition, the country was also endowed with 
favourable conditions for many agricultural commodities, including rice, coffee, 
spices, seafood, and fruits, which soon developed into major export crops (Meyer et 
al., 2006). At the same time, imports went up rapidly, providing the domestic market 
with machines, equipment, materials, and fuel for manufacturing industries and 
consumer goods. Since import volumes grew faster than exports, the trade account 
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went slightly into deficit (Figure 2.1). However, with increasing reserves and 
investment-driven imports, the deficit should not have been a concern during this 
period (Meyer et al., 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Macroeconomic statistics for the period 1990-2006 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on World Development Indicators Database (World Bank) and 
Global Development Finance (IMF) (Accessed on 10/5/2012) 
 
Aiming to bolster economic growth through bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements, Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
1995, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum in 1998, signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United 
States in 2000, and became a member of World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2006. 
The World Bank considered Vietnam to be the most successful example of poverty 
alleviation in the developing world, while many scholars saw the country as the new 
Tiger of Asia (Plummer, 1995; Sepehri & Akram-Lodhi, 2002; Venard, 1998). 
2.1.3 SLOWDOWN TIMES (2007-NOW) 
Since 2007, the economy has struggled with hard times. GDP growth slowed to 5-6% 
annually. The inflation rate climbed to 23% in 2008, and then remained over 10% 
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between 2009-2011. The soaring of commodity prices, together with the dramatic 
surge in oil prices contributed to a steep rise in the consumer price index (CPI) (H. 
M. Nguyen, Cavoli, & Wilson, 2012). 
The current account, which used to be slightly in deficit, began to deteriorate quickly 
as a consequence of weak performance from exports. Foreign capital flows were 
increasingly withdrawn and the stock market index dropped by 50% between 2007-
2010. The current banking system was carrying a large proportion of doubtful debts 
which could climb to 10% (K. Vu, 2012). Nearly 20% of private enterprises had 
disappeared due to high borrowing costs between 2009 and 2011 (Tuoi Tre News, 
2012). While external concessional loans remained a large share of the debt 
portfolio, domestic debt accounted for most of the increase. Domestic bond market 
development provided the government with additional financing sources, but 
vulnerabilities were building. The maturity structure shortened greatly, with 
maturities of less than seven years comprising 94% of total annual domestic bond 
issuance in the 2008–2013 period (International Monetary Fund, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Macroeconomic statistics for the period 2006-2010 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on World Development Indicators Database (World Bank) and 
Global Development Finance (IMF) (Accessed on 10/5/2012) 
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Although able to obtain more advantages than private enterprises in terms of credit 
assessing, land use rights, trade protection, etc., SOEs‘ performances still 
deteriorated over time. Inventories built up due to a fall in domestic, as well as 
foreign demand; contributions to the state budget reduced; while overdue loans to the 
banking system rose dramatically. As of 2011, it was estimated that around one-half 
of the SOEs were only loss-making or marginally profitable (Matheson, 2013). 
Realising the issue of poor financial conditions and weak performance, reform of 
SOEs became the biggest concern of the government from 2001. 
 
Figure 2.8: GNI vs GDP from 1994-2013 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on World Development Indicators Database (World Bank) and 
Global Development Finance (IMF) (Accessed on 15/1/2014) 
 
As a result, the gap between GDP and GNI has further widened each year since 2007 
(see Figure 2.8), reflecting the fact that an increasing share of added value to the 
economy belongs to foreign investors rather than domestic workers. After a long 
period of striving for a high rate of economic growth in 2008, for the first time, the 
government publicly admitted the trade-off between economic growth and 
macroeconomic stability (Decree 11/NQ-CP). 
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The financial recession exposed some crucial weaknesses of the economy, including 
the serious inefficiency of SOEs and the declining competitiveness of the economy. 
The SOEs, although absorbing a large proportion of labour and capital, were 
performing more poorly than the private and FDI sectors, regardless of the fact that 
SOEs‘ productivity had improved slowly (Ministry of Planning and Investment, 
2011; Q. N. Vu, 2002). For the exports sector, the contribution from manufacturing 
industries remained limited and the biggest shares came from oil drilling, mineral 
mining, agriculture products, and then garments, textile, and footwear (General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2011). In addition, a recent analysis raised the prospect 
that due to rising production costs, Vietnam might lose garments, textile and 
footware production to Bangladesh and Cambodia. This is one facet of a concern that 
Vietnam might not overcome the ―middle income trap‖4 due to inadequate 
development models (Cao, 2010). 
The ongoing global crisis has had some negative effects on Vietnam‘s economy. 
However, at the same time, other countries in the area with similar conditions 
suffered much less impact. This raises the hypothesis that the government‘s policies 
are significant contributors to its problems. As many problems appear to relate to 
monetary aspects, it is crucial to evaluate the efficiency and appropriateness of the 
current monetary policy framework and to investigate whether another framework 
might help the country overcome the hard times and maintain development in the 
long run. 
2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK 
2.2.1 STATE BANK OF VIETNAM (SBV) 
According to the Law of the State Bank of Vietnam passed in 1997 (and further 
amended in 2010), the SBV operates like a ministry under the government.  
                                                 
4
 ―The Middle Income Trap occurs when a country's growth plateaus and eventually stagnates after 
reaching middle income levels. The problem usually arises when developing economies find 
themselves stuck in the middle, with rising wages and declining cost competitiveness, unable to 
compete with advanced economies in high-skill innovations, or with low income, low wage 
economies in the cheap production of manufactured goods‖ (Rajat, 2011). 
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―The State Bank of Vietnam (below referred to as the State Bank) is a ministerial-
level agency of the Government and the central bank of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam‖ (Article 2: Position and functions of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV, 
2010)). 
Most important monetary decisions are jointly regulated by the National Assembly, 
the government, the National Monetary Policy Advisory Council, and the SBV. 
Specifically, the SBV must prepare the annual report of monetary policy operation in 
the past, as well as the outlook of the economy in the future. A projection of 
monetary policy operation is then submitted to the government for assessment and 
approval. After consulting with National Monetary Policy Advisory Council (and 
probably with National Financial Supervisory Commission, a supervising agent 
under the Prime Minister), the government submits the projection to the National 
Assembly for official approval. The National Assembly approves the projection in 
accordance with other targets, such as the state budget and economic growth 
objectives (Vietnam National Assembly, 1997). 
Upon receiving approval for the projection from the National Assembly, the SBV 
begins to monitor and conduct the monetary policy operation and periodically reports 
the progress to the government and National Assembly. The SBV can implement the 
necessary adjustments to the projection in regards to the development of the financial 
markets. 
As legislated, the SBV is in charge of preparing the plan for monetary policy but has 
to implement monetary policy as designed by the government (Camen, 2006; 
Vietnam National Assembly, 1997). Therefore, at least legally, the strong 
involvement of the government in the implementation of monetary policy suggests 
the SBV has a limited role and no independence.  
2.2.2 OBJECTIVES OF MONETARY POLICY     
Overall, the monetary policy strategy in Vietnam is derived from the Social and 
Economic Development Strategy, the state development plan formulated at the 
Conference of the Communist Party every five years. 
There are three target areas for monetary policy: inflation, state budget balance, and 
economic growth. In detail, the government organises the implementation of the 
monetary policy and determines the amount of liquidity to be injected into the 
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economy on a regular basis. The National Assembly supervises the process of 
monetary policy and the government has the duty to periodically report on the 
progress of policy implementation to a standing committee of the National 
Assembly.  
Other goals of monetary policy are also legislated. These goals include stabilising the 
value of the currency, facilitating socio-economic development, ensuring national 
defence, security, and improving the living standards of the people (article 2 of Law 
of State Bank 1997 and article 4 of Law of State Bank 2010) (Vietnam National 
Assembly, 1997, 2010). In comparison to the narrow goals of inflation targeting or 
price stabilisation adopted in many other nations, the goals of monetary policy in 
Vietnam are broad, with a primary objective that is not clearly defined. As a result, 
the multiple objectives policy may become problematic when the government has to 
make a trade-off among objectives, such as inflation and growth (To, Bui, Pham, 
Duong, & Tran, 2012, p. 96). 
Observation of actual economic policies in Vietnam suggests that economic growth 
has been the primary goal of the government (To et al., 2012). As part of this, the 
SBV is in charge of formulating the monetary policies required to achieve the set 
objectives, monitoring the injection of liquidity, providing credits to the economy, 
and controlling the nominal exchange rate. The SBV targets are often announced 
annually at the same time as the economic targets of government. For example, in 
2010, the government set a target for economic growth of 6.5% and a target inflation 
rate of 8%. At the same time, the SBV set a target for money supply to increase at a 
rate of 20%. Both the role and target setting of the SBV and government were 
controversial and were argued by some to reflect a conflict of interests (Pham, 2011). 
The IMF characterises Vietnamese monetary policy as ―a combination of exchange 
rate targeting and monetary targeting regimes, made possible by existing capital 
controls‖. From outside, this looks relatively like a fixed exchange rate regime over 
normal periods, such that when the shocks come, the effects from the balance of 
payments will spill over onto the domestic money supply (International Monetary 
Fund, 2010, p. 38). 
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2.2.3 INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY  
In general, the SBV does not follow the standard one-instrument scheme that 
advanced economies adopt. Instead, it uses multiple instruments, including 
unconventional administrative measures, to achieve various objectives. This section 
summarises all of the key instruments the SBV uses to implement monetary policy. 
Reserve Requirements 
Reserve requirement may have been the most active monetary instrument in the early 
days of the SBV‘s operation. Since being put into practice in 1990, the reserve 
requirement policy has been used by the SBV to manage the availability of credit. 
Controlling the reserve requirement ratio for deposits used to be an effective 
instrument of monetary policy in the 1990s. However, the role of this tool has faded 
as the SBV has stepped up to utilise other ―modern‖ instruments, such as open 
market operations and the discounting policy. 
Reserve requirement levels are classified according to criteria, such as maturity, the 
denominated currency (domestic or foreign) of the deposits, or the sectorial focus of 
banks. Generally, reserve requirement ratios for deposits of shorter terms (less than 
one year in maturity) are higher than those for deposits of longer terms (more than 
one year); and lower for banks that actively engage in the agricultural sector and for 
People‘s Credit Funds, who mainly provide credit to rural areas (V. H. Le & Pfau 
2009). 
Table 2.1: Information About Key Monetary Policy Instruments 
Type of Instrument Introduction date Implementer Type of Interest Rate 
Open Market Operation July 2000 SBV Market Interest Rate 
Government Bond 
Auction 
June 1994 SBV (according to 
Ministry of Finance‘s 
requests) 
Market Interest Rate or 
SBV 
Foreign Currency Swap July 2001 Financial Institution Decided by SBV 
Over-night Lending and 
Overdraft 
October 2002 Financial Institution/SBV Decided by SBV 
Commercial Papers 
Discount 
2003 Financial Institution Decided by SBV 
Source: Information on Monetary Policy Tools, State Bank of Vietnam. Retrieved from: 
http://www.sbv.gov.vn/  
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Until February 1994, the SBV maintained a formal reserve requirement ratio of 10% 
for all types of deposits, both domestic and foreign currency. In March 1994, the 
SBV made the first adjustment to both domestic and foreign currency deposits: 7% 
for time and savings deposits and 13% for demand deposits (K. N. Le, 2003). At the 
same time, credit ceilings were also introduced to replace the credit plan policy. The 
credit ceilings were actively used by the SBV between 1994-1996 (Vo et al., 2002). 
From 1995-1998, the reserve requirement was set back to 10% of total deposits, with 
3% in cash in vault and 7% in deposits without interest. The policy was considered 
undesirable for state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), which experienced 
shrinking profits due to increasing non-performing loans and maturity mismatches, 
as the negative effects from the Asian Crisis 1997 (Shimomoto, 1999, p. 66). 
Consequently, the SBV made noticeable adjustments to reserve requirement ratios 
during 1999. In February 1999, the ratio was reduced from 10% to 7% for short-term 
deposits. It was reduced further to 6% in June and 5% in July (K. N. Le, 2003, p. 46). 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Reserves Requirement Ratios for VND in 1998-2014 
Source: Author‘s compilation from various sources 
 
The reserve requirement ratio for commercial banks‘ foreign currency holdings was 
adjusted from 8% to 12% in December 2000 and increased further to 15% in May 
2001. In contrast, the ratio for VND was cut down further from 5% to 3% at the same 
time. The movement was intended as an incentive to turn USD deposits into VND, to 
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prevent the growing dollarisation in the economy. Local banks were expected to cut 
the interest they paid on their USD deposits because they had to deal with the rising 
cost of their currency holdings as the reserve requirement ratio increased. In addition, 
the reduction in USD deposit interest rates reduced the incentive of local banks in 
depositing foreign currency in foreign banks to take advantage of the interest rate 
gaps between local and foreign markets (Asian Development Bank, 2001). 
The required ratio on foreign currency deposits was back on a downward trend from 
the end of 2001. From December 2001 to August 2003, there were four adjustments 
to the ratio, bringing it down from 15% to 4%. As of August 2003, the required ratio 
on VND deposits was reduced to 2%. Those were the lowest levels ever for both 
VND and foreign currency deposits. 
The recorded low ratios were maintained for a year, until July 2004 when the SBV 
again increased them as tightening money policy to manage the increasing inflation 
rate. Specifically, the reserve requirement ratio was raised from 2% to 5% on VND 
deposits, and from 4% to 8% on foreign currency deposits, for the maturity of less 
than a year. The ratios for deposits (both VND and foreign currency) with maturity 
from one to two years were increased from 1% to 2%. However, the effect of this 
change on the inflation rate did not meet the expectation of the SBV, therefore, from 
2004, there has been a move to use discount and refinance rates (Camen, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Reserves Requirement Ratios for Foreign Currency Deposits in 1998-2014 
Source: Author‘s compilation from various sources 
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After joining the WTO in 2007, Vietnam experienced a massive credit expansion in 
the same year, and this together with rising international energy and food prices led 
to increasing inflationary pressures. On 1 June 2007, the reserve requirement for 
VND deposits with maturity under one year increased from 5% to 10%, and for VND 
deposits with maturity from one to two years, it increased from 2% to 4%. For 
foreign currency deposits with maturity under a year, the ratio rose from 8% to 10%. 
As a consequence of the adjustment, commercial banks raised rates on overnight 
VND loans to bridge the shortfall caused by the hike in compulsory reserves. 
According to the SBV, the movement helped the central bank obtain more funds, 
which would be used to purchase USD in the market to weaken the VND. 
In January 2008, the SBV continued to raise reserve requirement ratios to 11% for 
both VND and foreign currency deposits. This record level, the highest ratio since 
1990, was maintained until the end of 2008. From November 2008 until February 
2009, with five adjustments, the required rate for VND deposits was quickly brought 
down from 11% to 3%. Since 2012, reserve requirement ratios have been stably 
maintained at 4% for VND deposits and 8% for foreign currency deposits. VND 
deposits with a duration of more than 12 months have also liberalised since 2012 
(Circular, 19/2012). 
Interest Rate Controlling 
Base Rate: Prior to the 1990s, deposit and lending rates were set in a rigid manner by 
the SBV. Starting in 1992, the SBV began to regulate the implicit targets for interest 
rates applied by commercial banks and gradually removed interest rates control 
(Table 2.2). In 1995, new interest rate ceilings were set by Decision 381/QĐ-NH1 
(28 December 1995). Short-term lending rates could not exceed 1.75%/month (or 
21%/year), while medium and long-term lending rates could not exceed 1.7%/month 
(or 20.4%/year). In addition, the Decision required that the gap between the lending 
rate and the deposit rate not exceed 0.35%/month (or equivalent to 4.2%/year). 
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Table 2.2: Interest rate control policy between 1992-2012 
Date Changes 
Prior to 6/1992 Specified controlling 
6/1992-1995 Introduce the mechanism of positive real interest rate, pattern of 
floor and ceiling rates 
1996-6/2002 Remove ceiling rate; introduce the mechanism of base rates + 
bands  
6/2002-5/2008 Negotiated rates 
5/2008-2/2010 Set ceiling rate again 
2/2010-4/2010 Base rates for short term; negotiated rates for medium and long 
term 
4/2010-now Negotiated rates 
Source: To et al. (2012) 
 
In the third quarter of 1996, the SBV issued Decision 191-QD/NH1 (15 July 1996) 
continuing to adjust the interest rates applied in the banking system. Short-term 
lending rates could now not exceed 1.6%/month (or 19.2%/year), while medium and 
long-term lending rate could not exceed 1.65%/month (or 19.8%/year). The gap 
between the lending rate and the deposit rate was still required to not exceed 
0.35%/month. The interest-rate ceiling mechanism was removed on 5 August 2000 
when the SBV introduced the new base interest-rate mechanism regarding domestic 
currency denominated lending. In this new mechanism, the SBV set a base rate and 
margins above this rate served as limits for the lending interest rates charged by 
commercial banks. The mechanism was considered to provide more flexibility to 
credit institutions, as they could grant specified loans based on specified credit risks. 
In November 2001, the interest rate ceilings on foreign currency loans were 
removed, allowing Vietnamese lenders the opportunity to negotiate the rate for their 
foreign currency loans with both foreign and domestic banks. The government 
introduced a new market interest rate mechanism for foreign currency-based lending 
activities that said, that from 2000, the interest on USD deposits would be based on 
the Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (K. N. Le, 2003). One year later, banks were 
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permitted to set interest rates for loans through individual assessment with individual 
customers. In 2007, the SBV specified the cap rate on deposit activities. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Base Rate, Market Interest Rate, and Policy Rates  
Source: State Bank of Vietnam Database on Interest Rates. Retrieved from: http://sbv.gov.vn/  
 
The ceiling on the interest rate for VND denominated deposits was removed in 2002 
but reintroduced in 2008. Monetary stimulus was applied in 2009 as the SBV cut 
interest rates, reduced reserve requirements, and injected liquidity through open 
market operations (International Monetary Fund, 2010). In 2010, Circular 
07/2010/TT-NHNN, dated 26 February 2010, liberalised interest rate loans on 
medium and long-term loans, and Circular 12/2010/TT-NHNN liberalised interest 
rate on short-term loans. Since then, the SBV has again specified the cap rate on 
deposit activities, which constantly increased from 11% to 14% between 2007-2011. 
Refinancing and Discount Policy: During the first half of the 1990s, the government 
still took direct control of all types of interest rates set by commercial banks. From 
2000, the SBV began to use indirect measures by providing two lending facilities to 
the commercial banking system, the refinancing facility and discount facility.  
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The discount facility is a form of credit extension by the SBV, aimed at providing 
short-term loans and payment facilities for credit institutions. The SBV stipulates and 
performs the discount facility for credit institutions in the form of granting valuable 
paper—mortgaged loans, discounting valuable papers, and other forms of re-
financing. 
The operation of refinancing is almost the same with the discount facility, except that 
it could be applied to a wider range of valuable papers. Compared to the discount 
rate, the refinancing rate is normally set at higher value, as it is used to discount 
higher risk papers.  
There is limited access (a quota is applied) to the discount facility and both the 
discount facility and the refinancing require collateralised assets. In addition, 
discount operations can be conducted either through outright purchasing of securities 
or a repurchasing agreement, which has a maximum maturity of 91 days. The 
refinancing rate is considered the upper level and the discount rate the lower level for 
lending rates from the State Bank (V. H. Le & Pfau 2009). 
Open Market Operation 
The implementation of open market operations (OMO) was put into effect in July 
2000. OMO takes the form of outright sales and purchases of securities or repurchase 
agreements. The purchase or sale of securities may be conducted at auctions by 
volume or by interest rate. Securities eligible for OMO are primarily government 
securities, State Bank bills, or securities that have been chosen by the SBV. Initially, 
only short-term securities were available for OMO transactions, but since the 2003 
amendment of the Law on the State Bank of Vietnam, longer term securities with a 
maturity of more than one year may also be selected (V. H. Le & Pfau 2009).  
Initially, there were only 21 financial institutions participating in OMO sessions, 
which were held every ten days. As of 2008, the number of financial institutions had 
expanded to 58, and the number of sessions increased to three per week (see Table 
2.3). The instrument has gained influence and has now become the most important 
monetary instrument in controlling liquidity. Since 2004, OMO has accounted for 
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over 80% (compared to approximately 39% in 2002)
5
 of the annual total liquidity 
injected into the financial system by the SBV. 
 
Table 2.3: Frequency, volume, and turnover of Open Market Operation 
Year 
Turnover 
Frequency 
Total 
Bid Ask 
Turnover/session 
Spot Forward Spot Forward 
2000 1,904 480 874 550 0 112 1 per 10 days 
2001 3,934 60 3,254 570 50 82 1 per week 
2002 9,146 0 7,246 1,900 0 108 2 per week 
2003 21,184 0 9,844 11,340 0 198 2 per week 
2004 61,936 0 60,986 0 950 504 3 per week 
2005 102,479 0 100,679 1,100 700 649 3 per week 
2006 125,935 0 36,833 89,102 0 777 3 per week 
2007 415,861 0 59,011 356,850 0 1,171 3 per week 
2008 1,024,179 0 947,207 76,972 0 2,600 5-12/week 
Source: Information on Monetary Policy Tools, State Bank of Vietnam. Retrieved from: 
http://www.sbv.gov.vn  
Exchange Rate Regulation 
Vietnam‘s exchange rate policy is implemented and administered by SBV, targeted 
at a nominal, bilateral exchange rate between the USD and VND. Since 1986, the 
exchange rate regime has developed from a system of multiple exchange rates to a 
single announced fixed rate, then to the current system of a narrow adjustable band 
around the official rate (T. P. Nguyen & Nguyen, 2009). 
In 1991, the first two foreign exchange trading floors were established in Ho Chi 
Minh City and Hanoi. Between 1991-1995, the government occasionally informed 
the public that the exchange rate was used as both a monetary policy instrument and 
sometimes a target of monetary policy (Vo et al., 2002). Inter-bank markets for 
domestic funds were established in 1993 and for foreign exchange in 1994. 
                                                 
5
 SBV annual reports 2003-2011. 
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In November 1996, by adjusting the fluctuation band to 1%, the government began to 
manage the exchange rate in a more floating manner. Between 1997-1998, Vietnam 
had to manage the impact of Asian financial crisis, as did other regional countries. 
While not directly attacked by speculators, the VND became overvalued relative to 
the regional currencies that fell dramatically. At the same time, the government had 
to widen the exchange rate bands continuously, from 1% to 5% (February 1997), and 
from 5% to 10% (October 1997) to reduce the pressure to finance current account 
deficits as a result of the drop in capital inflows  (Vo et al., 2002). In 1998, two 
devaluations were implemented to cope with pressure from soaring rates in the 
parallel free market: the official exchange rate of the USD/VND was increased from 
11,175 to 11,800 on 16 February 1998 and then to 12,998 on 7 August 1998 resulting 
in a total devaluation of 16.3%. In August 1998, the band was narrowed to 7%, as the 
crisis was over. 
In February 1999, the SBV announced that the official rates scheme was eliminated; 
in future, the government would influence the exchange rate through the inter-bank 
markets only (Kovsted et al., 2003). This means SBV would determine the average 
USD/VND exchange rate on the inter-bank market after each working day and 
announce it as the official exchange rate at the beginning of the next working day. 
This determination process has not been transparent and still appears to reflect, to a 
noticeable extent, the will of the SBV (T. P. Nguyen & D. T. Nguyen, 2010, p. 9). 
The government and the SBV considered this new arrangement a turning point in 
exchange rate policy, a movement closer to a flexible regime (Vo et al., 2002). 
Between 2004-2005, the SBV occasionally announced that the VND would not be 
allowed to depreciate by more than 1% per annum (Camen, 2006). The interbank 
trading band widened from ± 0.1% to ± 0.25% mid-2002. The exchange rate 
remained stable between 2002-2007, even when the current account deficit 
deteriorated. In 2007, surplus on the financial account again exceeded deficit on the 
current account, while international reserves accumulated to accommodate inflows of 
foreign investment. 
Conducting USD/VND transactions through a third currency was explicitly banned 
in June 2008 in an effort to prevent arbitrage and enforce the official exchange rate 
(T. P. Nguyen & D. T. Nguyen, 2010). This was due to the fact that VND was under 
pressure to be devalued as the consequence of high inflation. 
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Currently, the SBV regulates the exchange rate target by using a nominal anchor 
with the USD. This functions like a fixed peg system with a narrowed band
6
. 
Empirically, studies have also proven that the SBV tried to stabilise only the 
USD/VND exchange rate, rather than the effective exchange (Camen, 2006)
7
.  
Foreign Capital Control 
In 1996, the Law on Foreign Investment was first introduced to streamline the 
procedures for the approval of investment projects. Under the new Law, local 
governments were in charge of issuing licenses for small and medium size projects. 
For investments in so-called priority sectors, the tax holiday period was extended to 
eight years, after that a rate of 10% was applied. Compared to the previous flat rate 
of 10%, a three-tiered withholding tax of 5%, 7%, and 10%, based on the ―priority 
status‖ of the investment was introduced.  
Prior to 2005, capital controls were strictly in force in Vietnam, particularly for short 
and medium term capital inflows. Other than official transfers, the noticeable inflows 
were from FDI and remittances from Vietnamese people living overseas.  
In effect from 8 November 2005, Vietnam has accepted the obligations under IMF 
Article VIII, which means the government accepted not to impose restrictions on the 
making of payments and transfers for current international transactions, and not to 
engage in any discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices, 
except with IMF approval (International Monetary Fund, 2006). 
                                                 
6
 Effective since 1/1/2005, the International Monetary Fund has classified the exchange rate regime of 
Vietnam to the category of a conventional pegged arrangement. 
7
 This hypothesis is tested by regressing daily changes in VND/USD rate on daily changes in the 
JPY/USD and the EUR/USD exchange rate (the daily change in the RMB/USD was included in 
regression for estimation periods starting after 21 July 2005). The regressions, which were estimated 
for various sample periods, showed insignificant coefficients, indicating that movements in the 
VND/USD exchange rate were not systematically related to other dollar exchange rates and 
Vietnamese authorities did not stabilise the effective exchange rate. (Camen, 2006) 
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However, the new monetary policy framework
8
 has been widely criticised by 
economists, as it would put the country in the situation of  the ―Impossibility 
Trinity‖: the maintenance of exchange rate stability and free capital flows being 
incompatible with monetary independence (Leung, 2009; T. T. H. Nguyen & D. T. 
Nguyen, 2010). 
2.3 OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
2.3.1 BANKING SYSTEM 
Money markets and financial markets in Vietnam are small and under-developed. 
The banking services market is dominated (in domestic currency) by four state-
owned banks (partly equitised) (Leung, 2009), and the economy suffers dollarisation 
at a moderate scale (To et al., 2012). Statistics shows that, in June 2005, the 
Vietnamese bond market—including government and corporate bonds—accounted 
for 3.8% of country‘s total GDP. In comparison, the same figure for South Korea 
was 26% and for Thailand was 13.5% (Camen, 2006, p. 238). 
As of 2010, the banking sector consisted of 101 banks and foreign bank branches 
including four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), 38 joint stock commercial 
banks, 53 foreign-owned banks and foreign bank branches, and five joint venture 
banks (Quach, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 In this study, monetary policy framework is defined as the set of policies government use to deal 
with monetary issues such as money supply policy, interest rate policy, exchange rate policy and the 
like. 
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Deposits market share Credit market share 
  
Figure 2.12: Market Shares in Banking Sector 
Source: Quach (2011, p. 5). 
 
As shown in Figure 2.12, the SOCBs still control approximately half of the banking 
sector assets, both in terms of credits and deposits, although these market shares have 
fallen from over 74% in 2005. SOCBs have advantages of large capital size, funded 
by government—the largest shareholder, reflecting in averaged chartered capital of 
16,000 billion VND in 2010. Their primary customers are the SOEs, who have 
higher exposure to non-performing loans than other enterprises. According to the 
SBV‘s statistics, 60% of 2010‘s non-performing loans were from SOEs (Quach, 
2011). In 2011, with the increase in bad debts, the SBV required commercial banks 
to maintain non-manufacturing deposits at 22% in June 2011, and at 16% in 
December 2011. 
While joint stock commercial banks have diversified shareholder composition and 
focussed on retail banking and lending to SMEs, their market shares have grown 
dramatically in recent years, reaching 37.1% for credits and 43.4% for deposits in 
2010. Compared with SOCBs, most joint stock commercial banks have a much 
smaller chartered capital of around 2000-3000 billion VND (100-150 million USD), 
for which they regularly face liquidity problems (Quach, 2011). 
Foreign bank branches were allowed to be established from 1991. As of August 
1993, there were 28 foreign banks operating in Vietnam, and the number increased to 
39 in June 1994 (K. N. Le, 2003). Initially, the regulation for foreign bank activities 
was relatively restrictive. For example, those branches were granted their licenses for 
a maximum of 20 years. The requirement for local capitalisation was that they must 
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hold at least USD15 million. Foreign banks were allowed to mobilise VND deposits, 
but the total value could not exceed USD 1.5 million. In addition, they were not 
allowed to lend more than 10% of their total capital in a single project. In June 1993, 
this loan cap was removed, together with the requirement that total loans to any ten 
borrowers must be less than 30% of a bank‘s total loans  (K. N. Le, 2003). In 1997, 
the outstanding loans of foreign banks accounted for 28% of total outstanding loans 
of the whole banking system; this figure dropped slightly to around 25.7% in 1999, 
and further reduced to 15% as of November 2002 (K. N. Le, 2003). 
In 2008, the SBV granted licenses to the first 100% foreign-owned banks. In January 
2014, the ownership limit for a single foreign investor was raised from 15 to 20%, 
with a maximum ownership for all foreign investors to be capped at 30%. 
Two noticeable new laws regarding the banking system were announced to the 
public in 1998. The first was the Law on the State Bank, which further stipulates the 
degree of the SBV‘s independence; and the second was the Law on Credit 
Institutions (effective from 1 October 1998), which provides a wide range of 
products that credit institutions are allowed to offer. However, experts still 
considered the new Law a step backwards, particularly in terms of the central bank 
independence (Vo et al., 2002).  
According to the new law, a credit institution, either foreign or domestic, is allowed 
to lend to a single client a maximum amount of 15% of its registered capital (equity), 
increased from 10% as previously ruled by the Ordinance on Banks, credit 
cooperatives, and finance companies. As foreign bank branches in Vietnam have 
registered capital between USD 15 and 20 million, this would mean that they are 
allowed to lend no more than USD 3 million per customer (K. N. Le, 2003). On 1 
January 1999, the income tax rate for the banking system was reduced from 45% to 
32%. 
Regarding banking supervision, on 1 January 2000, the SBV issued Decision No. 
415, requiring commercial banks to periodically provide information about their 
clients. Specifically, this decision requires commercial banks to give details about a 
client to the SBV within three days after a ―credit relationship‖ is established; 
commercial banks are also required to provide the SBV with the details of client‘s 
financial health (derived from balance sheet data) on a quarterly basis. According to 
the SBV, these measures are important to enhance the prudential supervision of 
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commercial banks (K. N. Le, 2003). In 2000, the SBV implemented an assessment of 
48 JSCBs to investigate their financial condition. The result was that 13 of the 48 
JSCBs were placed under special supervision/control, two had their licenses revoked, 
and one bank was required to be merged (International Monetary Fund, 2001, p. 15). 
In March 2001, an overall SOCB reform framework was approved by the 
government. The goal of the reform was to enforce better lending discipline, 
particularly on policy induced lending. The government stressed that those kinds of 
lending might be phased out ―except under limited and explicitly identified 
circumstances with government guarantees”. The phasing out of policy lending later 
became the condition on the establishment of a policy bank, which was projected to 
issue new policy loans (Kovsted et al., 2003). On 25 August 2001, the SBV issued 
Decision 284, which officially brought loan classification and loan-loss provisioning 
in line with international standards. Furthermore, since November 2001, it has been 
possible for private enterprises to collateralise land to receive loans from foreign 
banks (K. N. Le, 2003). 
Since 2006, the increasing openness due to the WTO commitment, and particularly 
the incident of the global financial crisis in 2008, caused the government to be more 
cautious in supervising risks in banking system activities. In 2009, Decision 
83/2009/QĐ-TTg was issued to enhance the legal framework for the SBV in 
conducting regulatory and supervisory measures on the rights and obligations of the 
bank regulatory commission. In addition, the SBV has issued legal documents 
specifying prudential ratios to manage credit risk (Decision 18/2007/QĐ-NHNN), 
liquidity risk, operation risk, interest rate risk (Decision 437/2006/QĐ-NHNN), and 
which credit institutions are obliged to adhere to. 
2.3.2 SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Financial services in Vietnam are still in development to meet international 
standards. Unlike immovable assets (land and buildings), prior to 2000, movable 
assets (such as inventories, equipment, etc.) were generally not accepted as collateral 
in Vietnam. Although land was used as a popular collateral, but many as 90% of land 
users do not have possession certificates. In early December 2000, SBV issued the 
Resolution 11/2000/NQ-CP which allows all credit institutions to make unsecured, or 
collateral-free, loans. The Resolution stipulates that the total value of the collateral, 
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plus own capital (equity), must be over 30% of the amount of loans an enterprise 
applies for (K. N. Le, 2003). 
The State Securities Commission (SSC) was established by the Decree 75/CP (28 
November 1996), with the principal task of organising and regulating the securities 
market operations. The decree also states that the SSC‘s mission is to ―raise capital 
for development investment; to ensure the orderly, safe, transparent, equitable and 
efficient operation of the securities market; and to protect investors’ rights and 
interests”. 
In 2007, the Law on Securities Market was issued with the specific aim of 
developing corporate bonds and equity markets. At the end of 2007, to prevent a 
burst of the stock market bubble, the government put a cap of 3% of bank lending on 
securities acquiring. This cap was later changed to 20% of a bank‘s chartered capital 
(Leung, 2009). At the same time, the SBV issued legal documents specifying 
liquidity risk, operation risk, interest rate risk (Decision 437/2006/QĐ-NHNN), and 
legal documents specifying prudential ratios to manage credit risk (Decision 
18/2007/QĐ-NHNN). 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Comparison of M2/GDP ratio between Vietnam and other Asian countries 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on data from World Development Indicator Database 
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In an effort to prevent the collapse of the securities markets, in early 2009, the 
government announced its first bailout package, and expanded leverage in the sector. 
Taxes on securities investors were brought in practice (0.1% on value of each 
transaction, or 20% on the total year end value). The quota on investments from 
foreign investors is stipulated on Article 2, Decision No.55/2009/QĐ-TTg (at 
maximum 49% for listed companies and 30% for non-listed companies in specific 
sectors). The reversal of the portfolio capital flows due to the repatriation by foreign 
participants affected the stock market significantly, with the VN index to a record 
low of around 300 points in 2009 compared to its peak at over 1000 points in early 
2007 (N. A. Nguyen et al., 2010). Financial leasing has been allowed since 2010 in 
Law on Credit Institutions (articles 108,112,103). However, foreign branches were 
not yet allowed to conduct financial leasing (article 123). 
2.3.3 FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION PROGRESS 
On 28 July 1995, Vietnam officially became a member of the ASEAN, and was 
admitted to ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in December 1995. Since then, 
domestic markets have gradually begun to integrate more and more into international 
markets. The country did not suffer a significant negative impact from the Asian 
financial crisis due to the absence of a liberalised capital account in combination with 
an inconvertible currency, and this spared the domestic banking system from the 
detrimental impact of volatile capital flows and institutional distress (Kovsted et al., 
2003). 
The Vietnam-United States bilateral trade agreement was signed on 13 July 2000, 
coming into effect from 10 December 2001. There were some more open policies as 
a result of the agreement. The Law on Insurance Business was passed on 9 December 
2000. In November 2000, the requirement of foreign balancing for foreign invested 
companies was lifted. One year later, in December 2001, the requirement that 
companies have to deposit 50% of their foreign currency earnings into the domestic 
banking sector was reduced to 40% (Kovsted et al., 2003) 
Investment Law and Enterprises Law were revamped in 2005, marking a turning 
point in terms of foreign investment policy in Vietnam. Since then, restrictions on 
capital account transactions of foreign investors and foreign borrowing have 
gradually been lifted (Ordinance No.28/2005/PL-UBTVQH11 on foreign exchange 
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control). At the same time, restrictions on current account transactions have been 
removed in compliance with Article 8 of the Regulation of the IMF. 
In 2006-2007, there was a bubble in the share market when the capitalisation ratio 
grew from about 6% (over GDP) in 2005 to 43% in 2007 before falling back to 15% 
at the end of 2008.
9
 
On 5 September 2007, the government issued Decree 139/2007, which provided 
guidance for the implementation of a number of articles of the Enterprise Law. The 
Decree was considered a critical reform, which officially allowed merger and 
acquisition operation by FDI inflows. Until then, foreign investors (or foreign owned 
companies in Vietnam) were not allowed to acquire more than 49% of the capital of 
companies listed on the stock exchange, and no more than 30% of the capital of 
unlisted Vietnamese companies. 
Regarding foreign finance companies, the key legal amendment in conformity with 
WTO commitments is the promulgation of Decree No.81/2008/NĐ-CP, article 8 
specifying 10 billion USD as the required charter capital for the parent company to 
conduct business in Vietnam. Business licenses to the two first 100% foreign owned 
banks, HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank, were issued in 2007. 
The legal framework for the SBV to implement regulatory and supervising measures 
is Decision 83/2009/QĐ-TTg on rights and obligations of the bank regulatory 
commission at the SBV. In 2010, the National Assembly ratified two new versions: 
the Law on Credit Institutions No.47/2010/QH12 and the Law on the State Bank of 
Vietnam No.46/2010/QH12. From 2011, according to the WTO commitment 
schedule, there should be no difference of treatment in the mobilisation of VND 
deposits between domestic commercial banks and foreign bank branches. In 2012, 
branches and 100% foreign owned securities service suppliers were allowed to be 
established. 
2.3.4 FISCAL POLICY 
State Budget Law was first introduced in 1996 and came into effect in 1998. This 
Law is effectively seen as a fiscal constitution for budget management in Vietnam. 
                                                 
9
 For comparison, at the end of 2006, stock market capitalisations as a percentage of GDP were 288% 
for Singapore, 68% for Thailand, 57% for the Philippines, and 44% for China (Leung, 2009). 
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The Law was further revised in 2002 to grant more budget authority to local 
governments. Before the revised Law came into effect in 2004, the budget for all 
government levels had to be approved by the central government. 
 
Table 2.4: State Budget Revenues and Expenditures, 1996-2012 (percentage of GDP) 
 
Total 
Revenue 
Domestic 
Revenue 
Oil 
Revenue 
Tax 
Total 
Expenditures 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Current 
Expenditures 
Deficit 
1996 22.93 n/a n/a 19.40 25.93 6.25 15.59 -3.00 
1997 20.84 n/a n/a 17.06 24.89 6.21 15.71 -4.05 
1998 20.21 n/a n/a 16.45 22.71 5.68 13.85 -2.50 
1999 19.63 n/a n/a 16.33 24.00 7.43 13.02 -4.37 
2000 20.55 10.47 5.33 14.76 24.67 6.71 14.00 -4.12 
2001 20.12 10.94 5.46 17.68 25.53 7.51 14.99 -5.41 
2002 23.12 11.86 4.95 17.75 27.66 8.44 14.57 -4.54 
2003 24.82 12.83 5.99 18.34 32.21 9.72 15.59 -7.38 
2004 26.69 14.62 6.79 19.50 31.01 9.24 16.95 -4.31 
2005 24.98 13.11 7.28 17.28 28.74 8.67 14.48 -3.76 
2006 26.33 13.70 7.85 17.73 29.02 8.32 15.25 -2.69 
2007 25.34 13.98 6.17 18.82 32.03 9.00 17.00 -6.70 
2008 25.79 14.22 5.49 19.85 28.02 7.39 15.62 -2.23 
2009 24.45 14.91 3.34 20.75 31.02 10.02 16.77 -6.57 
2010 25.87 16.38 3.21 22.41 30.07 8.49 17.45 -4.20 
2011 25.97 15.96 3.96 21.57 28.33 7.49 16.80 -2.37 
2012 22.64 14.70 4.32 18.01 27.91 6.01 18.82 -5.27 
Source: Author‘s calculations from various sources 
 
Table 2.4 summarises the key indicators of the state budget revenues and 
expenditures between 1996-2012. The government has run a deficit budget in the 
past 15 years, while domestic revenues (from tax) only covered about one-half of 
total expenditure, and always fell short of covering current expenditure. Nearly 50% 
of the total budget revenue came from crude oil export turnover, export, and import 
tax, differences in the price of export and import commodities, and aid. These 
components of revenue heavily depend on the performance of world market and 
world price, which in turn impact significantly on the state budget. 
In addition, the accession to the WTO and other FTAs (such as BTA, AFTA, 
ASEAN) with many commitments of tariff reduction affect the government‘s budget 
revenue severely. Therefore, restructuring of fiscal policy revenue and expenditure in 
Vietnam is urgently required. However, thus far the process has been implemented 
with minimal steps and future directions being debated (T. T. H. Vu, 2010). 
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Chapter 3: Review of Monetary Policies 
Money, and the policies that affect its use, are a central feature of an economy. Many 
aspects are involved, and these are first considered. The influences of attributes from 
the basis of different theories, mechanisms, and channels are built from such things. 
This chapter reviews the fundamental theories of monetary policy in conventional 
economics, the evolution in the understanding of its objectives, targets, and the 
mechanisms from which monetary policy exerts impacts on the economy. A brief 
review of studies on Vietnamese monetary policy is also provided to identify the 
research gap for the country.     
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Monetary policy can be defined as the process by which monetary authorities 
(specifically, central banks) use monetary settings in an effort to attain several 
specified objectives for an economy. Such a simple definition encompasses a range 
of possibilities and choices. Objectives might refer to economic growth, 
employment, price stability, or some other attributes. Collectively, monetary 
components seek to condition the supply of money, and less often, the demand in a 
structural market. For example, the below statement about monetary policy was 
found on the website of Reserve Bank of Australia: 
The Reserve Bank is responsible for Australia's monetary policy. Monetary 
policy involves setting the interest rate on overnight loans in the money 
market (‗the cash rate‘). The cash rate influences other interest rates in the 
economy, affecting the behaviour of borrowers and lenders, economic 
activity and ultimately the rate of inflation. 
In determining monetary policy, the Bank has a duty to maintain price 
stability, full employment, and the economic prosperity and welfare of the 
Australian people. To achieve these statutory objectives, the Bank has an 
‗inflation target‘ and seeks to keep consumer price inflation in the economy 
to 2–3 per cent, on average, over the medium term. Controlling inflation 
preserves the value of money and encourages strong and sustainable growth 
in the economy over the longer term. 
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(Statement from Reserve Bank of Australia website about monetary policy
10
) 
Policy makers must make choices when setting monetary policy. They may take into 
account a wide range of factors, such as: (1) short-term and long-term interest rates; 
(2) quantities and velocity of money in circulation; (3) inward and outward capital 
flows; (4) exchange rates; (5) government versus private sector spending/savings of 
firms, households; and (6) quantities and quality of credit supply. Perceptions as to 
the significance and interrelations of each will guide thinking. 
Monetary theories variously focus on different factors and associated policies will 
reflect profound theories. Alternative insights suggest alternate optimal monetary 
policies. In order to decide how to use various policy instruments, policy makers are 
required to make an assessment of the timing and effect of the policies on the real 
economy. To conduct the assessment, they are required to understand the 
mechanisms through which monetary policy impacts real economic activity and 
inflation (Boivin, Kiley, & Mishkin, 2010, p. 1). 
In this dissertation, studies of monetary policy are particularly reviewed in focusing 
on its two most important linkages: (i) monetary policy-economic growth, and (ii) 
monetary policy-inflation (price level). 
3.2 THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION OF MONETARY POLICIES 
Discussion of monetary theories in the economy has regularly been controversial. 
For example, some theories address the impacts of monetary issues on real economic 
growth, while others try to refute their significance. There has also been a long-
running debate regarding the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies.  
3.2.1 FISHER’S THEORY OF MONEY QUANTITY 
The role of monetary policy began to attract attention from economists in the late 
19
th
 century when industrialised nations set up central banking systems in Europe. 
The famous Theory of Money Quantity by Fisher and Brown (1912) might be the 
first widely-recognised theory demonstrating how monetary policy affects the price 
level through changes in money supply.   
                                                 
10
 Information on Monetary Policy, Reserve Bank of Australia. Retrieved from:  
http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/ (Accessed on 1/9/2015) 
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Fisher‘s theory states that: If M is the total stock of money, P the price level, T the 
amount of transactions carried out using money, and V the velocity of circulation of 
money then:   
      
Later economists replaced T with the real output Y (or Q), usually quantified by the 
real gross domestic product (GDP). According to Fisher‘s equation, if V and T were 
constant or growing at equal fixed rates, then the inflation rate would exactly equal 
the growth rate of the money supply.  
The power of quantity theory holds if V and T are stable, at least in the short run. 
However, Keynesians argue that this is an incorrect assumption because these 
variables are highly sensitive to interest rates in the short run, which in turn are 
functionally related to changes in the money supply. Therefore, they are unstable and 
volatile. Since then, economics statistics seem to support Keynesian rather than 
quantity theorists, as it approved that almost no any linear relationship was found 
between changes in money supplies and prices (Munro, 2013). 
Nevertheless, Fisher‘s simple equation offers a clear explanation regarding the role 
of monetary policy and development of his approach still influences modern studies.  
3.2.2 TRADITIONAL KEYNESIAN AND IS-LM MODEL 
In the 1930s, Keynes was concerned with trying to develop a framework to evaluate 
the real impacts of monetary positions on an economy. His well-known contribution 
can be found in the book ―The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” 
(Keynes, 1936). The central argument of the theory is that the level of employment is 
mainly determined by the spending of money (aggregate demand). This is entirely 
different from the argument of neoclassical economics that price of labour is the key 
factor influencing employment.  
Hicks (1937) and Hansen (1953) visualised the explanation of the impact of 
monetary adjustment in traditional Keynesian macroeconomic theory in their well-
known IS-LM model. The model demonstrates the specified combination of interest 
rates and real output (Y, r), given the equilibrium achieved in the goods and services 
market (I=S) and the money market (L=M). Figure 3.1 depicts the case where the 
central bank implements expansion monetary policy by increasing the money supply 
in the IS-LM model. As a result, the real money balance M/P will increase (given 
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that P is unchanged in the short run), the LM curve will shift to the right (from LM0 
to LM1), which implies that the demand for money is lower than the supply. As 
bonds would now be preferred to cash, the market interest rate will be lower (from r0 
to r1). This in turn reduces the capital cost of production, which bolsters investment 
and later expands total output (Y0 to Y1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Monetary Expansion in IS-LM Model 
 
However, the role of monetary policy was restricted through a contrary stance that 
money supply has no impact on real output in the long run. Fiscal policy was seen as 
the more powerful tool in boosting the aggregate demand of the whole economy. The 
sole objective of the monetary authority should then be to use its influence over the 
interest rate to raise the economy out of its long-period equilibrium position 
characterised by unemployment and propel it toward a long-period equilibrium 
position characterised by full employment (Dickens, 2011). As an explanation for 
this bias, in the 1930s, few central banks were independent of government and there 
was an associated assumption that a central bank had to be independent for monetary 
policy to function properly. 
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3.2.3 MUNDELL FLEMING MODEL AND IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY 
The downside of the traditional IS-LM model is that it only describes the economy 
under autarky (or a closed economy). Acknowledging this issue, Mundell (1963) and 
Fleming (1962) developed the Mundell–Fleming model to deal with the case of an 
open economy. The model, also known as the IS-LM-BoP model, describes the 
short-run relationship between a nominal exchange rate, interest rate, and output in a 
small open economy. This is in contrast to the IS-LM model of a closed-economy, 
which mainly focuses on the relationship between the interest rate and output.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: The IS-LM-BoP model 
 
In the Mundell–Fleming model (as shown in Figure 3.2), the economy is also 
influenced by the exchange rate level other than the interest rate, as in IS-LM model. 
An economy under a fixed exchange rate scheme has a BoP curve denoted as a 
horizontal FE line. In this case, any shift-to-right force on the IS curve (such as an 
increase in government spending) requires the central bank to supply the market with 
domestic currency to keep the exchange rate unchanged. Therefore, an IS shift to IS1 
would eventually lead to an LM shift to LM1.  
The Mundell–Fleming model is well-known for its argument that an economy cannot 
simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement, and an 
independent monetary policy. This principle has been called various names: 
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―impossible trinity‖, ―unholy trinity‖, ―irreconcilable trinity‖, ―inconsistent trinity‖ 
or the ―Mundell–Fleming Trilemma‖. 
Being one of the most important ideas in international macroeconomics (Feenstra & 
Taylor, 2011), the Trilemma is the fundamental rule in deciding the combination of 
monetary policy settings. Thus, any central bank can only obtain a maximum of two 
objectives, and forgo the other one, which would ultimately form three different 
policy combination options (also shown in Figure 3.3): 
i) Fixed exchange rate and free capital flow; 
ii) Independent monetary policy and free capital flow; 
iii) Fixed exchange rate and independent monetary policy. 
 
  
Figure 3.3: An Illustration of the Trilemma 
Source: Feenstra and Taylor (2008) 
 
3.2.4 PHILLIPS’S CURVE  
Keynesian economics was the dominant economic model during the Great 
Depression aftermath, World War II, and the post-war economic expansion (1945–
1973). However, the failure of demand-driven fiscal policies to restrain inflation and 
produce growth in the 1970s put the approach in doubt, paving the way for 
monetarist economics to become the new approach in policy-making. 
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It should be noted that, during this earlier time, Phillips (1958) found the inverse 
relationship between rate of changes in wages and the unemployment rate in the 
United Kingdom. His idea was later developed by Samuelson and Solow (1960) for 
the case of the United States with the relationship between inflation rate and 
unemployment rate. Samuelson and Solow suggested that a 3-4% rise of inflation 
was effective to keep unemployment stable at 3%. The relationship was graphed into 
the famous Phillips curve, which implied the motivation in keeping the inflation rate 
at reasonable value in order to bolster the employment status.  
Under the light of quantity monetary theory, the relationship could be explained as 
the following: Any increase in money supply M or money velocity V, or an increase 
in both variables, would lead to higher aggregate demand. It is then expected to find 
rising output and incomes on the one hand (i.e., increasing Y); rising prices (P) on 
the other: and as the economy approaches closer to full employment, more increased 
spending will become more inflationary pressure. Conversely, if an economy is 
under heavy unemployment with much of its resources staying idle or being 
unutilised, an increasing M, which leads to rising aggregate demand, will produce 
increased real output and incomes (in Y), without any significant increase of price 
level. Therefore, the extent of inflation, or price increases, depends as much on these 
real factors as on the purely monetary factors. 
However, the Phillips curve has lately been criticised, as empirical studies have 
shown no long-run trade-off between inflation and growth in the data of various 
countries. In 1990s, the Phillips relationship even proved to be negative, with more 
inflation associated with lower growth in studies such as Barro (1995), Fischer 
(1993), and Fry (1995). 
3.2.5 MONETARISM   
Back to the main issue, in the 1970s the influence of monetarists increased, most 
notably that of Milton Friedman, who hailed the importance of monetary policy over 
fiscal policy. Following Fisher, monetarists argue that variations in the money supply 
have major influences on national output in the short run and the price level over 
longer periods. Therefore, the objectives of monetary policy are best met by targeting 
the growth rate of the money supply (Friedman, 1948). Monetarists strongly 
emphasise the necessity to control the amount of money in circulation. 
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Monetarism was considered to be successfully applied in controlling the high levels 
of inflation seen in the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s. Paul Volcker 
applied the theory in managing US monetary policy when he was the Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve from August 1979 to August 1987. However, the theory and 
position were criticised as causing highly unstable relationships between monetary 
aggregates and other macroeconomic variables (Bernanke, 2006). A modified 
monetarism theory became the central position in the monetary policy of western 
governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and this focused more on the interest 
rate than on the quantity of money. 
3.2.6 LATEST STUDIES   
Most recent empirical studies about ―pure‖ monetary policy would agree that, in the 
long run, output (GDP) remains unaffected; thus, any changes in the money supply 
only cause prices to fluctuate. However, in the short run, as prices and wages can 
hardly be adjusted immediately, changes in the money supply can impact on the real 
production of goods and services. Therefore, monetary policy has been seen as the 
efficient tool to achieve important macro-economic objectives, such as inflation and 
growth. Going into the new millennium, the role of monetary policy was summarised 
into these six conclusions (Mishkin & Savastano, 2000): (1) There is no long-run 
trade-off between output (employment) and inflation; (2) Expectations are critical to 
monetary policy outcomes; (3) Inflation might incur high costs to the economy; (4) 
Time-inconsistency is a crucial issue of monetary policy; (5) Central bank 
independence is correlated with the efficacy of monetary policy; and (6) Strong 
commitment of a nominal anchor is the key to producing good monetary policy 
outcomes. 
Such was the mindset within which the global financial crisis developed.  Of course, 
monetary policy is only one of several macro-economic policies in play. It is the mix 
of policies and their effective impacts that ultimately matter. Policy combinations are 
considered later, along with the analysis of the contributions of each element. 
3.3 OBJECTIVES OF MODERN MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
A monetary policy framework is defined as the set of policies governments use to 
deal with monetary issues, such as money supply policy, interest rate policy, 
exchange rate policy, and the like. Frameworks can be differentiated in terms of their 
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specified objectives, as well as the interrelationships or mechanisms presumed in 
models analysis and underlying theories. 
Monetary policy frameworks have been modified around the world as conditions 
have evolved. The choice of framework reflects the goals and objectives that each 
government aims for. The popular objective of monetary policy in the 1970s was 
economic growth; thus, most central banks used monetary aggregates as the 
preferable framework. The high inflation of the 1970s saw many preoccupied with its 
control, and price stability was therefore considered the primary objective, with 
central banks shifting to inflation targeting via interest rate ―controls‖. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Monetary objectives other than price stability 
Source: Mahadeva and Sterne (2000), page 4. 
 
In 2000, a comprehensive survey of 94 central banks, conducted by the Bank of 
England, showed inflation targeting and a desired level of exchange rate to be the 
most important goals of their monetary policies (see Figure 3.4) (Mahadeva & 
Sterne, 2000). Five other objectives were identified to be financial stability, money 
targeting, balance of payment, output growth, and interest rate. Each of these 
objectives is now considered. 
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In practice, different objectives might clash with each other. Therefore, it is 
important for a central bank to choose an appropriate objective for the monetary 
policy and leave other objectives to other policy institutions. Normally, objectives of 
monetary policy are selected by the monetary authority, keeping in view the specific 
conditions and requirements of the economy. Some of the most important objectives 
are discussed below.   
3.3.1 OUTPUT GROWTH (ECONOMIC GROWTH) 
This is the ultimate objective of every monetary policy framework. Monetary policy 
can influence economic growth by controlling real interest rates, which in turn 
affects the aggregate level of investment. For some emerging economies where the 
financial system is still under-developed, economic growth can be achieved by 
expanding total investment, so that the framework of money targeting proves to be 
useful. In the more advanced economies where a financial system is already 
comprehensively developed, the central bank might consider economic growth to be 
the implied objective after success in maintaining income and price stability. Hence, 
inflation targeting is more appropriate for these economies. 
3.3.2 PRICE STABILITY 
The emergence of inflation and deflation are both harmful to the economy. Thus, 
monetary policy has an objective of price stability, which aims to keep the value of 
the currency stable. It also helps reduce income and wealth inequalities. When the 
economy suffers from recession, the monetary policy should be an expansionary one; 
while in an inflationary situation, there should be a contractionary policy. 
3.3.3 EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY 
If the exchange rate is very volatile leading to frequent ups and downs in the value of 
the currency, this complements the business condition; however, the international 
markets might also lose confidence in the domestic economy. Therefore, monetary 
policy aims to maintain the relative stability of the exchange rate. This is even more 
crucial for economies that depend significantly on imports and exports; in that case, 
exchange rate targeting might be the most appropriate approach. 
3.3.4 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (BOP) EQUILIBRIUM 
The BOP has three positions: balance, surplus, and deficit. A surplus reflects an 
excess money supply in the domestic economy, while a deficit reflects stringency of 
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money. The persistence of surplus or deficit in the long term both cause negative 
impacts on the economy. Therefore, it is important for the monetary policy to aim to 
maintain BOP equilibrium. 
3.3.5 FULL EMPLOYMENT 
In a simple definition, full employment is a situation in which everybody who wants 
to work gets a job. An economy in full employment is considered able to achieve its 
potential development. In theory, expansionary monetary policy will increase credit 
supply and total investment, and this helps create more jobs in different sectors of the 
economy. Full employment was referred to in Keynes‘s (1936) ―General Theory‖. 
However, this objective did not receive much attention from monetary policy makers 
until very recently, when both the Federal Reserve (FED) and European Central 
Bank found their current monetary stances insufficient to recover economic growth 
and reduce the unemployment rate. A country that considers employment status the 
prior objective would choose unemployment targeting in its monetary policy 
framework. 
Trying to attain these objectives is a considerable challenge, as economic history 
attests. Policy makers and analysts use preferred theories or other ―explanations‖, 
explicitly or implicitly, to frame their thinking and actions. Many may develop only a 
limited understanding of such supports and rely upon conventional or organisational 
wisdoms rather than any critical appreciation.   
3.4 PREFERRED TARGETS AND MONETARY POLICY 
Targeting a particular measure is a popular organisational means, both of expressing 
a specific desire (such as ―inflation at 3% pa‖), and of assessing performance (as in 
―inflation was close to our target value‖, or not). Clearly, there is an assumption in 
any ―joined up policy‖ that attaining the target assists in meeting one, some, or all of 
the chosen objectives.  However, the basis for such an assumption may be unclear, or 
even unknown to many. One goal in this research is to highlight the linkages between 
target choices and objectives. Five targets used in the monetary policy area are 
discussed below.    
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3.4.1 MONEY TARGETING (MONETARY AGGREGATES) 
In the 1980s, many countries applied a money targeting approach, based on the 
perception that a small constant growth in the money supply would be best for the 
economy. The approach was adjusted further to account for different classes of 
money and credit (M0, M1, etc.). While the majority of monetary policies focus on a 
price signal of one form or another, a money targeting approach focuses on changes 
in monetary quantities in the economy. 
3.4.2 EXCHANGE RATE TARGETING 
Under an exchange rate targeting framework, a central bank tries to ensure nominal 
exchange rate stability in relation to a currency or a group of currencies of so-called 
anchor countries (normally advanced economies). Interest rate changes and direct 
foreign exchange interventions are used. The outcome is to import price stability 
from the anchor countries. To maintain the implied exchange rate requires an 
appropriate economic policy mix ensuring a low inflation differential with the anchor 
countries and a sufficient level of international reserves.  
For its nature, exchange rate targeting is appropriate for economies that depend 
significantly on international trade. Exchange rate targeting would seem an obvious 
choice in the case of Singapore. A high import content of approximately 60% in 
domestic consumption, as well as being a price taker in the international markets, 
implies that Singapore is highly susceptible to imported inflation (Hwee Kwan  
Chow, 2008). This is why Singapore considers exchange rate management to be the 
most effective way to stabilise inflation. To maintain the exchange rate at a desired 
level, the central bank manages the currency (Singapore dollar) against a trade-
weighted basket of its major trading partners with an undisclosed target band. The 
band is reviewed periodically to ensure that it is consistent with other 
macroeconomic objectives (growth, price stability). If the exchange rate gets away 
from the band, the central bank intervenes in foreign exchange markets, either 
buying or selling the currency to steer the rate back into the target zone. 
3.4.3 INFLATION TARGETING 
Since the 1980s, price stability had become the most important objective of many 
governments around the world. Inflation targeting, together with more independence 
of central banks, was then considered necessary in monetary policy frameworks in 
many developed nations.  
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The first country to apply inflation targeting for its monetary policy framework was 
New Zealand in 1990. Under this framework, the central bank estimates and 
announces to the public a projected, or ―target‖, inflation rate and then attempts to 
steer actual inflation towards the target through the use of various monetary tools 
(Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, & Posen, 2001). As of 2012, there were 27 central 
banks around the globe embracing inflation targeting, including the European Union, 
United Kingdom, Korea, Brazil, and Canada (Hammond, 2012b). 
However, inflation targeting is also criticised for the following major weaknesses: 
(1) it is too rigid; (2) it allows too much discretion; (3) it might cause output 
instability; (4) it might lower economic growth; (5) it might cause weak central bank 
accountability because inflation is sometimes hard to control; (6) it could not prevent 
fiscal dominance; and (7) the requirement of exchange rate flexibility might cause 
financial instability. 
Mishkin (2007) provided a comprehensive discussion about those points. He argued 
for the invalidity of the first four disadvantages, but expressed concern about the 
later three, which according to him, might become serious obstacles in emerging 
economies.  
3.4.4 PRICE LEVEL TARGETING 
Price level targeting is similar to inflation targeting, in that both establish targets for 
a price level, such as using CPI. The difference is that while inflation targeting only 
looks forward (such as target inflation at 2% annually), price level targeting also 
takes past values into account when conducting the operations. That said, if the price 
level rose by 2% in the previous year (i.e., from 100 to 102), the price level would 
have to drop the following year in order to bring the price level back down to the 
100-target level. Price level targeting would help to remove much of the uncertainty 
about the price level in the future. However, this could mean that in order to fulfil 
price level targeting, it would require more forceful action than the case of inflation 
targeting. 
Price level targeting also has the advantage in generating greater stability of both 
output and inflation. Especially in the case of the low-inflation environment, where 
nominal policy rates have fallen to zero bound, price-level targeting would 
significantly improve the expectations of a positive inflation rate. Inflation 
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expectations would, in turn, keep real interest rates at a negative value, thereby 
stimulating more spending, contribute to economic recovery (Kahn, 2009). 
3.4.5 UNEMPLOYMENT TARGETING 
For the last two decades, in advanced countries, inflation targeting and the 
independence from the fiscal agencies have become the core features of monetary 
policy, and were emphasised as the requirement to achieve macroeconomic stability 
and sustained economic growth. However, as the global crisis of 2008 struck quite 
hard in such economies as the US and many countries in the EU, the limited 
efficiency of monetary instruments in accelerating the recovery of their economies 
raised a need for framework changes. 
On 12 December 2012, the FED became the first central bank in the world to apply 
that new monetary policy framework. To stimulate the economy, the FED announced 
that they would ―keep short-term interest rates near zero, continue the policy of 
quantitative easing at a rate of $85 billion a month, until the unemployment rate falls 
to 6.5%, or inflation exceeds 2.5% a year‖ (Federal Reserve Board, 2012). The 
movement signalled that the FED would consider the unemployment rate the 
important objective of their monetary policy, at least equal to the inflation target. 
Having to cope with macroeconomic instability and persistent unemployment, the 
European Central Bank stated that they would also consider the FED‘s new policy 
for their situation. 
Thus far, there has been no official or theoretical explanation for the emergence of 
unemployment targeting. However, this targeting approach is referred to as the next 
generation of monetary policy.  
3.5 CHANNELS OF MONETARY MECHANISM TRANSMISSION11  
The transmission mechanisms approach describes how policy decisions are translated 
into effects on the real economy. In literature, there are four main channels through 
which money stock can influence economic output and price level: 
3.5.1 INTEREST RATE CHANNEL 
M↑⇒ i↓⇒ C↑(I↑)⇒Yd↑⇒ y↑⇒ π↑ 
                                                 
11
 This section was mainly adapted from Mishkin (2007). 
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The interest rate channel is the primary monetary transmission mechanism in 
conventional macroeconomics models, such as the IS-LM model of the Keynesians. 
The model states that an expansion of money (M) will reduce interest rates (i); which 
reduces the cost of borrowing for firms (and consumers) and leads to increased 
consumption (C), as well as investment (I), and therefore higher demand (Y
d
), a 
bigger output gap (y), and finally higher prices and inflation (π).  
However, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) were concerned that it is difficult for 
empirical studies to quantitatively identify the effects of interest rates through the 
cost of capital. The reason is that the macroeconomic response to policy-induced 
interest rate changes is considerably larger than implied by conventional estimates of 
interest elasticities of consumption and investment. This finding suggests that 
mechanisms other than the interest rate channel may also join in the transmission of 
monetary policy. 
3.5.2 EXCHANGE RATE CHANNEL 
M↑⇒ i↓⇒ e↓⇒ NX↑⇒ y↑⇒ π↑  (Export Prices) 
M↑⇒ i↓⇒ e↓⇒ PM↑⇒ π↑   (Import Prices) 
In this channel, monetary expansion leads to lower interest rates (i); which leads to a 
depreciation of the exchange rate (e), an increase in competitiveness, an improved 
trade balance (due to higher net exports, NX), and increased demand, a larger output 
gap, and finally higher inflation (π). In addition, exchange rate (e) depreciation also 
raises import prices (Pm), which are important determinants of firms‘ costs and the 
retail price of many goods and services. This directly affects the price level and 
inflation (π). 
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Figure 3.5: Channels of monetary transmission 
Source: Author‘s adaptation from Mosser and Kuttner (2002) 
 
3.5.3 ASSET PRICE CHANNEL 
These operate mainly through two effects: Tobin‘s q theory of investment and wealth 
effects on consumption.  
M↑⇒ i↓⇒ Pe↑⇒ q↑⇒ I↑⇒ y↑⇒ π↑ (Investment) 
Tobin (1969) defined q as the market value of a firm divided by the replacement cost 
of capital. If q is greater than 1, the replacement cost of capital is lower than the 
market value of the firm. This encourages firms to buy more plants and equipment 
with their now higher-value equity. Thus, investment spending increases. 
Conversely, when q is lower than 1, investment should decrease. 
In Miskin‘s argument, monetary expansion (M) will reduce interest rates (i), which 
encourages the public to take money out of the banks to invest in the stock market, 
thus, increasing the demand for and the price of equities (Pe). As new investment 
projects become relatively cheaper to finance and therefore more attractive, 
investment increases (I), leading to higher output (y) and inflation (π). 
M↑⇒ i↓⇒ Pe↑⇒ TW↑⇒ C↑⇒ y↑⇒ π↑ (Consumption) 
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The wealth effect on consumption is based on the life-cycle model of Modigliani 
(1971). In his model, consumers determine their consumption spending based on 
their lifetime resources, including human capital, real capital, and financial wealth. 
Common stocks are considered a major component of consumers‘ financial wealth. 
When stock prices increase, consumers‘ wealth also increases and they increase their 
consumption. Therefore, monetary expansion (M) can result in a higher price of 
equities (Pe), increased consumption (C), higher output (y), and higher inflation (π). 
3.5.4 CREDIT CHANNEL 
The credit channel is not a different alternative to the traditional interest rate channel, 
but rather a setting that amplifies interest rate effects. The credit channel operates via 
two main channels: the bank lending channel and the balance-sheet channel. 
M↑⇒ BD↑⇒ BL↑⇒ I↑⇒ y↑⇒ π↑ (Bank Lending) 
The bank lending channel, also known as the narrow credit channel, arises from a 
market failure related to information asymmetries between individual borrowers and 
lenders. Therefore, banks become crucial financial intermediaries: the lenders only 
need to know about the viability of the bank where they put their money, as banks 
have better ability to evaluate borrowers. 
In this channel, an expansionary money policy leads to more bank deposits (BD) 
with, in turn, more bank loans (BL) available. The increased supply of loans implies 
more investment projects, which leads to higher output (y) and inflation (π). 
M↑⇒ Pe↑⇒ AS&MH↓⇒ I↑⇒ y↑⇒ π↑ (Balance Sheet) 
The balance sheet channel is similar to the bank lending channel in that it refers to 
the problem of information asymmetries, specifically adverse selection and moral 
hazards in financial markets. The argument is that lenders are always concerned that 
borrowers may not pay their loans. Therefore, an increase in the firm‘s net worth 
means that lenders can rely on higher collateral for their loans, which reduces the 
problem of adverse selection and increases lending for investment spending. Higher 
net worth also decreases the problem of moral hazards, because when owners have a 
higher equity stake in the firm they have an incentive to take part in less risky 
projects.  
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In this channel, an expansionary money policy can affect the balance sheets of firms 
in various ways: lower interest rates increase equity prices (Pe) and reduce the value 
of liabilities. Enhanced balance sheets reduce adverse selection and moral hazards 
(AS&MH), leading to more access to funds for borrowing firms, thus increasing 
investment (I) and output (y). 
It is necessary to clarify that the channels of monetary transmission in a specific 
economy depend closely on its financial system characteristics, such as the level of 
restrictions to international capital flows, type of exchange rate regime, or financial 
structure (Mishra & Montiel, 2013).  
Mishra, Montiel, and Spilimbergo (2010) found that in developing countries with an 
underdeveloped financial system, the transmission mechanism is likely to be 
dominated by the bank lending channel. Furthermore, institutional deficiencies and 
high levels of bank concentration might strongly restrict bank lending efficiency, as 
well as making the transmission from central bank monetary policy actions to bank 
lending rates weaker and unreliable. 
3.6 STUDIES OF VIETNAM’S MONETARY POLICY 
Prior to 2000, there were several studies of monetary policy in Vietnam, both 
theoretical and empirical. Most studies were conducted in descriptive economic 
terms, with data used for various past-against-present comparisons, as well as 
analysis of gaps between goals and actual realisations (T. D. Tran & Vuong, 2009). 
It is interesting to realise that the majority of studies concerning Vietnam‘s monetary 
policy at this time were from foreign scholars, such as Lipworth, Spitãller, and 
Krueger (1993), Fforde and De Vylder (1996), Riedel and Turley (1999), and 
Shimomoto (1999). However, these studies mainly aimed to provide an overall 
understanding of the macro-economic situation of Vietnam, an infant transitional and 
export-oriented economy. Monetary policy was not the central theme of these works. 
Specifically, these studies only suggested positions about: (i) the importance of the 
collaboration between monetary policy and fiscal policy; (ii) the necessity of an 
independent central bank; and (iii) the importance of a more developed bond market. 
Since 2000, as the country opened to the global economy, the degree of adversity 
caused by monetary problems has been increasing in Vietnam. As a result, there has 
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been increased critical awareness by the public, experts, and policy makers regarding 
these issues. More and more empirical studies have attempted to explain the 
interrelated issues of monetary policy. Methods of modelling and general theoretical 
approaches have also been investigated; however, such studies have mainly dealt 
with specific issues of monetary policy, such as exchange rate regimes, inflation 
control, dollarisation, or anomalies in credit flows to economic sectors of the 
economy. 
Issues related to the exchange rate have attracted the most concern. Several studies 
have criticised the ―non-dynamic characteristics‖ of the nearly fixed exchange rate 
regime. Mai (2007) undertook a comprehensive study of the current exchange rate 
regime using optimum currency area  theory and concluded a flexible exchange rate 
is better than a fixed one, based on current macroeconomic characteristics. A study 
by T. P. Nguyen and Nguyen (2009) argued that the poor functioning of the foreign 
exchange market has stemmed from the stickiness of the exchange rate. Using VAR 
Co-integration Test and Engle-Granger Test, the study by Vuong and Ngo (2002) 
argued that the parallel exchange rate system might play some role in saving local 
currency from significant depreciation during the Asian crisis 1997. Goujon (2006) 
supported a more flexible exchange rate when he analysed the inflation of the 1990s. 
This author concluded that for the Vietnamese authorities to succeed in fighting 
inflation, it was essential to focus on the management of exchange rate fluctuations 
combined with a restrictive monetary policy based on broadly defined money. 
Some researchers have expressed significant concerns about real exchange rate 
adjustments. Using a Vector Error Correction Model approach, N. T. Nguyen and 
Kalirajan (2006) suggested that devaluation could be implemented to stimulate 
exports and to improve current account balance and BOP, and also contribute to 
reduce the real exchange rate appreciation in the short run. A. T. P. Le (2007) also 
supported a stable and competitive real exchange rate. Menon (2009) suggested that 
the real exchange rate must be adjusted to accommodate for the growth in capital 
inflow. In analysing the transmission of monetary policy in Vietnam, V. H. Le and 
Pfau (2009) also found some significant contributions from real exchange. 
On the other hand, several studies analysed inflation in Vietnam and its causes and 
consequences. In analysing the macro economic conditions in 1990s, Goujon (2006) 
found that a nearly 2% exchange rate depreciation led to an additional cumulated 
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inflation of 1%. Given the dollarisation in Vietnam, the author suggested that 
controlling inflation (monetary expansion) requires controlling the exchange rate. 
Interestingly, in contrast, when studying inflation in Vietnam during the same time 
frame, Vo et al. (2002) concluded that changes in the money supply and the 
exchange rate contained very little advance information on Vietnamese inflation. 
T. T. H. Nguyen and D. T. Nguyen (2010) argued that inflation is an internal 
problem, while external factors (such as world prices) play a less significant role. 
The authors also found the considerable role of exchange rate, the devaluation in 
particular, in increasing pressures on inflation. In another approach, V. H. Le and 
Pfau (2009) found a significant link between money supply and real output, but 
failed to confirm a significant connection between money and inflation. 
Shinichi and Pham (2005) estimated the real money demand in Vietnam. The study 
employed the techniques of co-integration using an error correction model with 
impulse response and variance decomposition. Using quarterly data over the period 
1993-2004, estimation results showed that the long run demand for real broad money 
of domestic currency was determined by income, domestic interest rate, inflation 
rate, and rate of return of USD deposits. The study found that the growth rate of 
broad money of domestic currency always had a positive correlation with inflation, 
and monetary policy played a very important role in determining the general price 
level.  In addition, the authors concluded that, from the short run model of demand 
for broad money, it would take 15 quarters to adjust the disequilibrium between the 
money supply of VND and the money demand of VND.  
Using a similar approach, a later study by H. D. Nguyen and Wade (2010) offered 
support for those findings. Using the data of the period 1999-2009, the authors found 
the dominant effect of income on real money demand for VND in the long run, 
evidence of currency substitution and dollarisation, and sensitivity of real money 
demand to inflation. However, in contrast to the finding of Shinichi and Pham (2005) 
about the impact of interest rates on long-run real money demand over 1993-2004, H. 
D. Nguyen and Wade (2010) found no influence of official interest rates for 1999-
2009. They suggested this might be due to the fact that as the economy becomes 
more open, the interest rate policy might become less effective. The findings from 
these studies raises the necessity to examine the decoupling between the official SBV 
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setting rate and the market rate. However, until recently, no study has addressed this 
issue.  
Some researchers have raised concerns regarding the choice of monetary policy 
framework. Using VAR estimation, K. V. Tran (2005) found that the central bank 
appears to adjust monetary growth in response to the price level, the exchange rate, 
and the difference between the world price of gold and the price of gold in Vietnam 
at the official exchange rate. In addition, the central bank is unlikely to be able to 
control public demand for gold via changes in interest rates. Menon (2009) agreed 
that the SBV has limited instruments in dealing with large capital inflows. He 
suggested that, in this case, the SBV should appreciate the real exchange rate to 
sterilise the impacts, as they cannot use the monetary instruments in the form of 
dong-denominated interest-bearing assets. V. H. Le and Pfau (2009) undertook a 
comprehensive study about monetary transmission mechanisms and found that, 
instead of interest rates, the exchange rate and credit channels played a pivotal role in 
transmitting monetary policy in Vietnam. Referring to the choice of targeting 
inflation, A. T. P. Le (2007) argued that strict inflation targeting is not appropriate 
for Vietnam, as it requires inflation controlling to take priority over other 
development objectives. 
In general, most studies have only dealt with a specific aspect of the monetary policy 
framework, such as the exchange rate, inflation control, or money demand by using 
technical evaluation methods such as VAR, Vector Error Correction Model, and 
Granger causality test. No study appears to have focussed on the framework as a 
whole. This thesis argues that it is crucial to have a comprehensive study about the 
whole framework to examine all aspects of monetary policies, such as objectives, 
instruments, and mechanisms in a systematic way. In addition, the data used in those 
studies mostly tracked back to the period prior to the recession. Therefore, they 
might not fully capture the impacts of recent problems well. 
By exploring the whole framework using a comprehensive approach with the latest 
data, this study expects to produce an extensive analysis of monetary policies 
conducted in Vietnam between 1995-2014. Additionally, this study also accounts for 
the changing context of international financial systems, which can be expected to 
significantly affect all developing economies. 
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3.7 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
The literature review of monetary policy frameworks and related aspects provided 
these conclusions: 
First, the actual impact of monetary policy on an economy is still controversial; 
however, in the short run it is seen as an efficient tool to achieve important macro-
economic objectives, such as (low) inflation and economic growth. Nevertheless, 
poor monetary policy can lead an economy to recession and financial crisis.  
Second, the preferred objective of monetary policy is the most important factor when 
countries choose their framework. Most developing countries target economic 
growth; thus, they prefer to use a pegged exchange rate regime. In advanced 
economies, price stability is the ultimate objective of inflation targeting. 
Third, despite its threats and challenges, financial liberalisation is still considered by 
many to be an efficient way to bolster economic growth for a small open economy. It 
is necessary to account for the institutional changes and economic impacts from 
financial liberalisation as part of developing an optimal monetary policy framework 
in Vietnam. 
Fourth, the aftermath of the global crisis in 2008 (ineffective monetary easing in the 
US or the sovereign debt problem in the EU) demands more studies regarding 
modern monetary policy frameworks (unemployment targeting) and benefit/loss 
distributions from financial globalisation post crisis.  
Fifth, research into Vietnam‘s monetary policy framework has been limited thus far. 
Most studies have only dealt with a specific aspect of the monetary policy 
framework, such as the exchange rate, money demand, or inflation control. No study 
has evaluated the appropriateness of the framework in a comprehensive manner. In 
addition, data used in those studies has mostly tracked back to the period prior to 
WTO accession and the subsequent boom and recession. Therefore, they might not 
fully capture the impacts of problems well. 
In the next sections, the study discusses the methods used to analyse and address the 
key issues, particularly for the case of Vietnam. 
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Chapter 4: Methods of Analysis 
Thus far, it is widely acknowledged that monetary policy works mainly through its 
impact on aggregate demand and has real effects on the economy in the short to 
medium term. However, the mechanism through which monetary policy exerts 
impacts on the economy is described as a black-box (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). The 
quantitative effect of a policy change is hard to estimate and depends on the degree 
to which the policy change has been projected, along with the expectations of policy 
changes in the future (Hwee Kwan Chow, 2004). 
This chapter reviews the most popular qualitative and quantitative methods in 
analysing the monetary policy framework and its impact on the economy. Outcomes 
from this chapter will help to formulate the appropriate empirical approaches to 
analyse the monetary policy framework of Vietnam. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As the importance of a monetary policy was more widely recognised, more and more 
of its underlying positions were discussed in theory and practice. To the best of the 
author‘s knowledge, there is no universal method used to justify whether a country 
should change its monetary policy framework. 
To implement a monetary policy successfully, policy makers must first have an 
accurate assessment of the timing and impact of policy changes on economic 
activities. However, the evaluation of a monetary policy and its effectiveness appears 
limited for several reasons.  
First, academic literature seems to find it difficult to follow the complexities of 
policymaking in the real world. The former governor of England‘s central bank, 
Mervyn King (2005) has stated that in some respects monetary practice is ahead of 
monetary theory. Alternately, it is getting harder to theorise the operation of modern 
monetary policy.  
Second, the analytical models used to evaluate monetary policies still have crucial 
limitations (Hammond, Kanbur, & Prasad, 2009). For example, neo-Keynesian 
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models that are widely used in many policy institutions depict only a small role for 
money, despite a broad consensus that in the long run inflation remains a monetary 
phenomenon (Goodhart, 2007).  
Third, estimation errors in analytical models have become a crucial problem that 
needs to be addressed. A recent report from the Reserve Bank of Australia shows 
that their predictions for inflation were acceptably accurate around two-thirds of the 
time, but their economic growth forecasts were far from real figures (Tulip & 
Wallace, 2012). It appears the rapidly changing nature of money-related events have 
made mechanisms elusive, and model forecasting something of a guessing game, 
with some forecasts being outperformed by a random walk experiment.  
Fourth, even the most well-resourced and respected monetary analysts and policy 
makers have been caught unawares by events. The denial of the unfolding financial 
crisis by then FED Chairman Greenspan (and many others, including those who 
resolutely guided banks towards bankruptcy) is a case in point, as was the 
unexpected-by-so-many Asian Crisis a decade earlier. Most experts seem to have 
been comprehensively blind to the development of such events. 
The problems faced by the modelling and policy establishment are indeed many and 
complex. The areas explored in this research are recognised as challenging, and the 
present contribution will itself be limited. 
The evident limitations and often poor quality of estimation all contribute to 
concerns about, and the difficulty of, judging and implementing effective monetary 
policy. In fact, to deal with questions about the appropriateness of monetary policy, 
most studies prefer to use various kinds of qualitative analysis, typically based on ex-
post analysis of real situations where policy changed. Specifically, studies have tried 
to determine the conditions that each type of monetary policy stance requires to be 
conducted successfully. Based on practical lessons and past experience from various 
countries, case analysis is used to argue whether this stance or that framework might 
be appropriate for a certain country in particular circumstances.  
Other than such qualitative methods, there are empirical modelling techniques used 
to analyse the topics that are of particular interest. The most popular approaches are 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models and the Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) approaches to evaluate monetary transmission. Another 
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approach worth mentioning is to analyse the Trilemma status to examine the 
combination of monetary instruments. Common in all three types of studies is 
analysis of the roles and impacts of different types of monetary policy instruments on 
various economic sectors. Based on their results, qualitative, DSGE, and VAR 
studies variously argue how changes to the framework or alternate settings would be 
―better for the economy‖. Others, recognising the problems of discretionary policy, 
simply prefer some rules.  Each of these four positions is considered below.  
4.2 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF MONETARY POLICY  
To determine whether a monetary framework is suitable for a country, most studies 
use some form of qualitative analysis. Hammond (2012a), in a comprehensive 
analysis of exchange rate targeting, argued that this framework is appropriate for 
emerging economies where financial markets and instruments are under-developed. 
According to Hammond, this framework is simple, clear, and transparent, which 
contributes to lower inflation expectations. In Friedman (2001) and Mundell (2001) 
opinion, a fixed exchange rate should be treated as a monetary rule rather than just a 
type of exchange rate regime. They argued that a fixed exchange rate to a big 
neighbourhood is good for a small economy, since the monetary policy of a big 
country is always better. To do so, the small country should try to maintain the 
inflation rate equal to that of the big country. The choice of which big country to 
unify the currency to should be based on: extensive level of trade, flexible level of 
wages and prices, workers‘ mobilisation, capital mobilisation, monetary policy in 
both countries, and political relation. Mishkin (2007) expressed concern about the 
disadvantages of this framework, as he expected shocks in the anchor country to 
propagate to the attached economy in ways that could lead to financial stability 
problems when the local central bank lost the ability to act as lender of last resort. 
Eichengreen (1999) examined 29 countries that detached fixed exchange rate 
regimes for more flexible ones, and found that 23 cases were accompanied by a 
financial crisis (ignited by exchange rate instability). Obviously, a flexible exchange 
rate is not the solution to all problems, and also requires fiscal discipline and sound 
structural policies (Hammond et al., 2009). 
Mishkin (2007) suggested that monetary targeting is not viable for emerging 
countries due to the instability of the relationship between monetary aggregates and 
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inflation. On the other hand, Hammond (2012a) argued that emerging economies can 
consider using monetary targeting for its strong advantages as it: (i) allows 
independent domestic policy, and (ii) does not depend on the availability of 
forecasts, models, or good demand side data. However, Hammond did agree with 
Mishkin about its potential disadvantage, as such targeting requires reliable 
relationships between inflation and money aggregate. The great monetarist Mundell 
(2001) suggested that monetary targeting is appropriate if a country has to cope with 
a high inflation rate of over 20%, in that it is efficient to control the excess growth of 
money supply. 
Another view by Frankel (2010) stated that exchange rate targeting might be more 
appropriate than monetary targeting. He backed this up with the fact that in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, most Latin American economies targeted exchange rates, 
rather than monetary targeting, to achieve the success of stabilisation programs 
(Chile‘s tablita, Argentina‘s convertible plan, Brazil‘s real plan). However, Frankel 
(2010) also raised the concern that exchange rate targeting was untenable during the 
currency crisis of 1994-2001. 
Recently, the inflation targeting framework has attracted the most interest from 
researchers. According to Mishkin (2007), inflation targeting might be a good choice 
for a medium-term strategy of monetary policy, as it has several crucial advantages: 
(i) inflation targeting is easily understood by the public, therefore it is highly 
transparent; (ii), inflation targeting, in contrast to exchange rate targeting, better 
supports a domestic economy in coping with external shocks; (iii) in contrast to 
monetary targeting, inflation targeting is not required to maintain a stable 
relationship between money and inflation. Instead, it uses all available information to 
help determine the most appropriate settings of monetary instruments. However, 
Mishkin (2007) argued that inflation targeting was not suitable for most emerging 
countries because those countries do not meet all the conditions of the policy, which 
are: (i) public announcement of medium-term targets for inflation rate; (ii) an 
institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy; 
(iii) a statistics model in which many variables, and not just monetary aggregates or 
the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments; (iv) 
transparency of the monetary policy strategy by regular communication with the 
public and the markets about the plans, objectives, and decisions of the monetary 
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authorities; and (v) accountability of the central bank in pursuing its inflation 
objectives. 
Mundell (2001) suggested inflation targeting to be the most suitable rule if the 
central bank needs to reduce and control the inflation rate from a high level (15-20%) 
to a lower level. Frankel (2010) discussed the differences between the models to 
analyse the inflation targeting rule for developed and developing countries in various 
studies. He noted that:  
 Models for developing countries usually do not feature exogenous shocks in 
trade conditions or difficulties in the external accounts. In the model for developed 
countries, there is no need to worry about financing trade deficits, presumably 
because international capital markets function well enough to smooth consumption in 
the face of external shocks. However, for developing countries, the problem is that 
international capital markets often intensify external shocks, rather than the opposite. 
 Inflation targeting can be vulnerable to supply shocks, which are larger for 
developing countries. Under a strict inflation targeting framework, to prevent the 
price index from rising as the consequence of an adverse supply shock, a monetary 
policy would have to tighten to the point where the entire brunt of the fall in the 
nominal GDP is borne by the real GDP. The most reasonable objective function is to 
allow part of the shock to show up as a rise in the price level. 
Another issue when considering inflation targeting (price stability) is which type of 
price index to monitor. Friedman (2001) stated that each country might have a 
specified definition of their price stability or different consideration of its optimal 
inflation. Those lead to different types of policies, therefore, it is difficult to say this 
policy is better than the other. The price index here might refer to a range of price 
levels of imported prices, weights, consumption, or production, etc. 
Frankel (2010) gave an empirical example of the difference in targeting the 
consumer price index (CPI) and producer price index (PPI). Specifically, theory 
states that if the price of imported commodities goes up in CPI targeting, the central 
bank needs to tighten monetary policy to appreciate the currency. But the case of 
Korea between 2007-2008 proved the policy inappropriate. On the other hand, at the 
same time, the Gulf central banks tightened their monetary policy to allow currencies 
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to appreciate when the price of their export commodities went up. This proved to be 
an appropriate policy, as Gulf central banks target PPI rather than CPI. 
Another empirical study by Mishkin and Savastano (2000) stated three broad 
monetary policy strategies applied in emerging and transition economies as: pegged  
exchange rate, monetary targeting, and inflation targeting. By analysing both the 
advantages and disadvantages of each policy in various countries, the authors came 
to the conclusion that the policy of inflation targeting, used popularly in developed 
nations, would not be suitable for emerging countries because of the significant 
differences in economic conditions. 
More generally, Mahadeva and Sterne (2000), in investigating how countries should 
change their monetary policy framework, found five practical considerations: (i) the 
policy history of the country, what has worked or failed in the past; (ii) the starting 
point for controlling inflation, how the country would try to maintain price stability; 
(iii) experiences from similar countries in choosing policies; (iv) the economic 
characteristics of the country, particularly its financial system; and (v) the political 
characteristics of the country. 
Comparative analysis has the advantage of a highly descriptive approach. However, 
for its negative points, it requires a lot of information and data to become a creditable 
ex-post analysis. Ex-ante use in planning requires a number of assumptions. 
4.3 TRILEMMA ANALYSIS 
Trilemma: A basic approach 
The term Trilemma
12
 (Impossible Trinity) was first created by Mundell (1963) and 
Fleming (1962) in their so-called Mundell-Fleming model about the choice of 
exchange rate regime. It implies that an economy cannot simultaneously maintain 
exchange rate stability, free capital movement, and independent monetary policy at 
the same time. 
                                                 
12
 In 1997, Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) brought the term ―Trilemma” into widespread use within 
economics, an alternative to the longer phrase of ―impossible trinity‖. 
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Feenstra and Taylor (2011, p. 540) proposed a simple explanation of the Trilemma 
phenomenon by introducing a system of three equations. In the approach, each policy 
goal can be expressed as follows:   
(i) Fixed exchange rate:  
(1) 
    
 
     
In the equation (1), E is the exchange rate between domestic currency and foreign 
currency, E
e
 is the expected exchange rate in the future. In a fixed exchange rate 
regime, a country tries to keep a fixed or maintain a relatively stable/small change in 
the value of the currency (zero or stable/small depreciation or appreciation). The 
regime is desired as a means to promote stability in trade and investment.  
(ii) Free capital movement:  
(2)      
    
 
   
International capital mobility is considered a crucial device to encourage integration, 
efficiency, and risk sharing. To follow this policy, the country maintains the freedom 
for investors to bring money in and out, implying they can buy and sell the currency 
whenever and in whatever quantities they want. With the adjustment from the 
Uncovered interest parity rule, the market will set and adjust the exchange rate as 
the result of arbitrage activities. Equation (2) describes the equilibrium position, 
when the difference between the domestic interest rate (i) and the international 
interest rate (iF) must be equal to the change of exchange rate level. 
(iii) An independent monetary policy: 
(3)          
With monetary policy independence, the country can set the domestic interest rate 
independent of the international interest rate (and this will definitely affect the 
exchange rate). Monetary policy autonomy is desired in managing the domestic 
economy‘s business cycle (and other economic disturbances). 
Certainly, the three equations (1), (2), and (3) could not occur simultaneously, for 
example if (1) holds and (2) holds making      then (3) is impossible. Under the 
implication of Trilemma, this means that a country must either forego exchange rate 
stability to maintain a degree of monetary independence, or forego monetary 
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independence to retain exchange rate stability. The application of the Trilemma is 
most obvious when the policies are at the ends of a spectrum: (i) hard peg or free 
float; (ii) perfect capital mobility or total immobility; (iii) complete autonomy or no 
autonomy at all. 
In practice, a country might not absolutely sit at one of those three corners: in 
practice, the rigidity of the peg, the degree of capital mobility, and the independence 
of monetary policy could be partial rather than full (Feenstra & Taylor, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Trilemma rule in various nations 
Source: Adapted from Aizenman and Ito (2014, p. 33) 
 
For example, countries like Australia or the United States choose independent 
monetary policy and free capital flows and allow exchange rates to fluctuate freely. 
Whereas, China tries to maintain stable exchange rates and independent monetary 
policy; thus, they require restrictions on capital flows (Mankiw, 2010).  
Quantifying the Trilemma Index 
Over the last three decades, many developing countries have opted for increasing 
financial integration to boost economic growth. This means that those countries had 
to pursue higher capital mobility as the obvious choice. Under the Trilemma rule, 
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this leaves them to lean toward either an independence of monetary policy (with a 
floating exchange rate) or a fixed exchange rate (without independent monetary 
policy). Many countries tried to maintain both objectives and unfortunately fell into 
financial crises. The most well-known crises caused by violating the Trilemma rule 
are: the Mexican peso crisis (1994–95), the 1997 Asian financial crisis (1997–98), 
and the Argentinean financial collapse (2001–02) (Aizenman, 2010). 
These financial crises, particularly the Asian crisis in 1997, made economists think 
about ways to transform the Trilemma rule into usable applications to evaluate 
monetary policy to apply within various countries. The motivation behind the 
application is that it is more useful to examine what policy framework countries 
implement, rather than depending on public speeches about their policies (Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh, & Taylor, 2004).  
 
  
Figure 4.2: Violating the Trilemma rule – the case of Thailand 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on World Development Indicators Database (World Bank) and 
Global Development Finance (IMF) (Accessed on 10/5/2012) 
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Since the introduction of the Mundell-Fleming model, there have been several 
approaches to try to quantify the Trilemma rule. In 2004, Obstfeld et al. (2004) 
developed a method to empirically validate this central, yet hitherto untested, 
hypothesis in international macroeconomics. Specifically, the authors examined the 
stability of three Trilemma policies independently over time, in which (i) the 
exchange rate was coded between ―pegs‖, ―occasional pegs‖, ―non-pegs‖; (ii) capital 
control was coded as ―having‖ or ―not having‖; (iii) the interest rate was estimated 
based on the equation: 
                  
In which,     is the local interest rate at time t,      is the base rate (world rate) at 
time t, and Δ is the difference operator. 
The hypothesis of the estimation is that, with perfect capital mobility and an 
exchange rate permanently and credibly pegged within a band that is literally of zero 
width, it is expected to find β = 1. β being unity means that local and base interest 
rates would always move equally and the pegging country‘s monetary has no 
independence. Otherwise, β < 1 if the home monetary authority could use its 
monetary independence to offset base interest-rate shocks but β > 1 if it reinforces 
them. 
The equation is then estimated in error correction form to account for any long-term 
relationship between the interest rate series: 
               (                 )      
By estimating the above equation for many countries during a long time-span from 
1870-2000, accounting for the status of exchange rate and capital control restrictions, 
the authors concluded the Trilemma rule existed in both the Bretton Woods era and 
after that. The specific conclusions were as follows: 
(i) Exchange rate pegs have a substantially closer connection to the world 
interest rate than non-pegs.  
(ii) The interest rates of pegged economies react more actively to changes in 
the base rate; in turn, the base rate can explain more of the changes in the local rate 
for pegs; and it would be expected that pegs react more quickly and have a stronger 
long run relationship to the base than do the non-pegs.  
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(iii) Absent capital controls, countries should not choose to peg, as they will 
lose considerable monetary independence. Inversely, non-pegs still have a reasonable 
amount of autonomy, even when they give up capital controls.  
Another remarkable effort to quantify the Trilemma index was conducted by 
Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2008), who quantified the three policies of exchange rate 
flexibility, monetary independence, and capital account openness as per the 
following: 
Monetary independence (MI): The extent of monetary independence is measured 
as the reciprocal of the annual correlation of the monthly interest rates between the 
home country and the base country. Money market rates are used. 
The index for the extent of monetary independence is defined as: 
     
    (     )      
      
 
where i refers to home countries and j to the base country. By construction, the 
maximum and minimum values are 1 and 0, respectively. Higher values of the index 
mean more monetary policy independence. 
Exchange rate stability (ERS): To measure exchange rate stability, annual standard 
deviations of the monthly exchange rate between the home country and the base 
country are calculated and included in the following formula to normalise the index 
between zero and one: 
    
    
                            
 
Financial openness/integration (KAOPEN): The index of capital account 
openness, or KAOPEN, is taken from the study of Chinn and Ito (2008). The index is 
calculated as a combination of dummy variables assigning to policy restrictions 
regarding the liberalisation of international capital flows, including:  
(i) variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rates (k1); 
(ii) variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions (k2); 
(iii) variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions (k3);  
(iv) variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k4). 
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The input for the valuation is taken from IMF‘s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Using the data series from 
1970-2006, Aizenman et al. (2008) also confirmed the correctness of the rule by 
validating the notion that a rise in one Trilemma variable should be traded-off with a 
drop of the weighted sum of the other two. Due to the limitation of data, the study 
could only provide annualised indices, which restricted the power for the specified 
country case study, and this is the shortcoming of the study. 
Analysing the outcomes of estimations, Aizenman et al. (2008) also pointed out 
some remarkable findings for developing countries:  
(i) More monetary independence can reduce output volatility, while greater 
exchange rate stability implies greater output volatility, which can be mitigated 
by reserve accumulation; 
(ii) More monetary autonomy is associated with a higher level of inflation, while 
more exchange rate stability and more financial openness could lower the 
inflation level;  
(iii) A policy of a stable exchange rate while financial development is at a medium 
level can increase output volatility; 
(iv) More financial openness with a high level of financial development can reduce 
output volatility, though more financial openness with a low level of financial 
development can be volatility-increasing;  
(v) Net inflow of portfolio investment and bank lending can increase output 
volatility and higher levels of short-term debt or total debt services can increase 
both the level and the volatility of inflation. 
Since its introduction in 2008, there have been more and more studies that apply this 
approach in evaluating the Trilemma status in various countries. For example, using 
annual data from 1970-2010, Hsing (2012) estimated the Trilemma index for Greece 
to evaluate its impacts on inflation, growth, and volatility. In his findings, the author 
confirmed the existence of Trilemma rule in Greece by showing the correlation 
among exchange rate stability, monetary independence, and financial integration. In 
addition, in the case of Greece, the author found that more exchange rate stability did 
exert significant influence on the inflation rate, the growth rate, inflation volatility, 
and output volatility. However, greater monetary independence contributed to lower 
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output volatility; while greater financial integration exerted positive linkages with 
lower inflation rate, less inflation volatility, and less output volatility. 
In another study, Cortuk and Singh (2011) applied a similar approach to the case of 
Turkey. Using quarterly data from 1998Q1 to 2010Q4, the authors also confirmed 
the existence of the Trilemma rule in Turkey and found the changing roles of three 
Trilemma policies in different periods of time. Particularly, monetary independence 
and exchange rate stability have diminishing effects on inflation, while capital 
openness has an increasing effect. 
4.4 DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (DSGE) 
General equilibrium models have been a popular method for evaluating the impacts 
of a policy on the whole economic system. However, the incorporation of a monetary 
policy was not conducted comprehensively until the invention of Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) by Kydland and Prescott (1982). Like other general 
equilibrium models, DSGE models aim to describe the behaviour of the economy as 
a whole by analysing the interaction of many microeconomic decisions. The 
decisions considered in most DSGE models relate to some of the main variables 
studied in macroeconomics, such as consumption, saving, investment, labour supply, 
and labour demand. The decision-makers in the model, often called ‗agents‘, may 
include households, business firms, and possibly others, such as governments or 
central banks. The method was further developed by Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997), with the assumption that prices are set by monopolistically competitive firms, 
and cannot be instantaneously and freely adjusted. 
A comprehensive DSGE approach in the evaluation of monetary policy can be found 
in the study of Smets and Wouters (2007). Based on this approach, there is an 
increasing use of DSGE in building structural models for central banks including the 
European Central Bank (Christoffel, Coenen, & Warne, 2008) and the Federal 
Reserve (Edge, Kiley, & Laforte, 2010). 
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Figure 4.3: The Basic Structure of DSGE Models 
Source: Sbordone, Tambalotti, Rao, and Walsh (2010, p. 25) 
 
Basically, the structure of a DSGE model is built around three interrelated blocks: a 
demand block, a supply block, and a monetary policy block. The equations defining 
these blocks are derived from assumptions about the behaviour of the main economic 
actors in the economy: households, firms, and the government. These agents interact 
in markets that periodically clear, which leads to the ―general equilibrium‖ 
characteristic of the model. A fundamental feature of DSGE models is the dynamic 
interaction between the blocks, in the sense that expectations about the future are a 
crucial determinant of today‘s outcomes. That said, output and inflation in the future, 
and thus their expectations as of today, depend on monetary policy in the future in 
the same way as they do today, taking into account what will happen from then on 
into the infinite future (Sbordone et al., 2010). 
Apart from many advantages as a comprehensive and macro analysis, this approach 
is relatively complicated and depends strongly on the availability and precision of the 
data.  
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4.5 VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE APPROACH (IN EVALUATING THE 
CHANNELS OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION) 
Empirical evaluation of the impacts of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables 
is not a simple task, as well as the evaluation of the mechanism through which 
shocks from monetary instruments transmit to outputs and price level. There is no 
general agreement in building a structural model to quantify the effects of monetary 
policy. Therefore, to overcome the lack of consensus, following the seminal work by 
Sims (1980), a major part of the empirical evaluation used VAR to study the effects 
of monetary policy. The major advantage of VAR analysis in modelling monetary 
transmission is that it provides a reliable framework in which various dynamic 
linkages among variables can be examined (Beier & Storgaard, 2003). The other 
great feature is that it helps to identify the effects of policy without establishing a 
complete structural model of the economy (Rudebusch, 1996). 
The VAR model is a system of linear equations consisting of endogenous and 
exogenous variables. Each equation specifies one endogenous variable as a linear 
function of its own lagged values, as well as lagged values of the other variables in 
the system. A conventional VAR model has the following expression: 
(4)                  
  where  yt is the vector of endogenous variables; 
 xt is the vector of exogenous variables; 
 ut is the vector of white noise innovations;  
 Yt-1 is the matrix of lagged yt.  
By estimating the equations in (4) and using various post-estimation techniques, such 
as Granger causality tests, impulse responses functions, and variance 
decompositions, statistical linkages among variables can be obtained from the VAR 
model. Initially, VAR was used mainly in the evaluation of a monetary policy in 
closed economies, but later also further expanded to cases of open economies 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998) provide a comprehensive review). 
However, conventional VAR has also been criticised for its inability to provide 
strong and definitive findings. That said, it is difficult to draw any definitive 
conclusion from the large number of estimated coefficients from A and B matrices in 
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(4). In addition, as the model is built using an unstructured approach, it is also 
difficult to conclude the economic meaning of the estimated parameters, which are 
subject to the so-called ―Lucas critique (1976)‖13. 
Acknowledging the disadvantages of a conventional VAR, a structural vector 
autoregressive (SVAR) model was developed as the better alternative approach. 
Stemming from the seminal contributions of Bernanke (1986) and  Sims (1986), the 
SVAR method has become a standard tool in empirical studies regarding monetary 
policy. The major change in SVAR compared with VAR is in the assumptions of the 
linkages among variables before estimating. While in VAR, there is no such 
assumption, as the model lets the data tell-the-story themselves, in SVAR a few 
assumptions are made to identify the linkages among variables. The act of making 
assumptions, or identification or restrictions, is based on economic theory and results 
from past empirical studies. This allows building up of the rationality and precision 
of the model, which leads to better outcomes of estimations. 
SVAR might be the most popular technique in the VARs family due to its simplicity, 
not data-demanding but still providing significant outcomes. The crucial drawback of 
SVAR is that it can only employ a restricted number of variables due to the problem 
of limited degrees of freedom. This small number of variables is unlikely to cover all 
information sets used by actual central banks, which used to follow hundreds of data 
series, or by the financial market participants and other observers. 
To solve the problem of dimensionality in SVAR (i.e., the degrees-of-freedom 
limitation), there are quite a few different directions in the development of the VARs 
family, in which it may find factor-augmented vector autoregression, bayesian vector 
autoregression, panel vector autoregression, or global vector autoregressive. 
Factor-augmented vector autoregression (FVAR) emerged from the seminal 
contribution by Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2004), who attempted to incorporate 
factors from a large cross section of economic indicators into extra endogenous 
variables in a standard VAR. These factors proxy the information set of the central 
                                                 
13
 The Lucas critique, named for Robert Lucas' work on macroeconomic policymaking, argues that it 
is naive to try to predict the effects of a change in economic policy entirely on the basis of 
relationships observed in historical data, especially highly aggregated historical data. 
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bank (part of) that may have been inadvertently excluded from the standard VAR 
model. FVAR appears a better choice if data availability is guaranteed.  
Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) differs from standard VAR in the way 
model parameters are treated as random variables, with prior probabilities assigned 
to them. The general idea is to use informative priors to shrink the unidentified 
components in the unrestricted model, thereby reducing parameter uncertainty and 
improving estimation accuracy. Banbura, Giannone, and Reichlin (2010) considered 
BVAR the most appropriate tool to build large data sets models. 
Panel vector autoregression (PVAR) have the same structure as standard VAR 
models, in the way that all variables are assumed to be endogenous and 
interdependent, but the difference is that variables are presented in a cross sectional 
dimension. PVARs are particularly favourable in analysing the transmission of 
specific shocks across sections and time. For example, Canova, Ciccarelli, and 
Ortega (2012) studied how shocks from Germany, defined as simultaneously 
increasing of domestic output, employment, consumption, and investment, were 
transmitted to nine other Europe economies. In general, PVAR is hailed for its 
particular advantages in (i) being able to capture both static and dynamic 
interdependencies; (ii) links across units might be treated in an unrestricted fashion; 
(iii) incorporating time variations in the coefficients and in the variance of the shocks 
easily; and (iv) being able to account for cross sectional dynamic heterogeneities 
(Canova & Ciccarelli, 2013). 
Global vector autoregression (GVAR) might be considered an "upgraded" version of 
PVAR in term of scale and dimensionality. The methodology provides global 
macroeconomic modelling that combines time series, panel data, and factor analysis 
techniques to address a wide set of economic and financial issues ranging from 
policy analysis to risk management. It is particularly suitable approach to build a 
global modelling framework for the quantitative analysis of the relative importance 
of different shocks and channels of transmission mechanisms. GVAR intuitively 
captures important features of a PVAR, while trying to maintain a simple structure 
that allows them to be easily estimated (Canova & Ciccarelli, 2013). While the 
GVAR model was first developed mainly as macroeconomic policy analysis, its 
application has become much broader. For example, it has been used to analyse 
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credit risk (Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler, & Weiner, 2006) or evaluate the UK 
entry into the Euro (Pesaran, Smith, & Smith, 2007). 
The application of VAR technique in empirical studies is increasing and enlarging. 
For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) explored US monetary transmission at the 
disaggregated level utilising a VAR model, and the study revealed that monetary 
policy has different impacts on different components of final expenditures. Nearly 10 
years later, the corresponding authors revisited the topic again with a FVAR 
approach (Bernanke et al., 2004). For emerging economies, SVAR is a particularly 
preferable option due to its advantage to conventional VAR and less data demanding 
than FVAR or BVAR. Many studies have utilised SVAR to evaluate the impacts of 
monetary policies in various country case studies, making the approach the most 
popular in monetary economics. For example, Morsink and Bayoumi (2001) 
provided an analysis of Japan‘s stance; Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) studied 
the monetary policy and the transmission mechanism in Thailand; Tushar, Hasmik, 
and Randa (2006) examined the monetary transmission mechanism in Jordan; and 
Rania and Andreas (2007) researched the issues in Egypt.  
In general, VAR‘s approach is hailed for being simple to use and for the ease of 
interpreting the results. However, analysis is only partial, as it focuses on monetary 
aspects and omits the interactions between monetary aspects with other components 
of the economy. It also fails to investigate the viability of investments. Therefore, 
this approach fails to provide a complete analysis (Walsh, 2010).  
4.6 NARRATIVE APPROACH (IN EVALUATING THE CHANNELS OF 
MONETARY TRANSMISSION) 
C. Romer and Romer (1989) were the pioneers of adopting a narrative approach to 
address the identification problems in the time series models of monetary policy. 
This approach relies on reading the central bank‘s documents releases to gather 
information about policy-makers‘ intentions. Afterwards, the policy stance is 
identified and the driving force of each policy movement is then detected. Only those 
exogenous policy shifts, which are not driven by current and future developments on 
the real side of economy, are chosen. These policy shocks are exogenous, identified 
with respect to the state of the real economy. 
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This approach is first specially concerned with how to correctly estimate the effect of 
monetary policy, and to be able to measure monetary policy changes (i.e., to describe 
monetary policy in a quantitative way). Second, it tries to address the well-known 
identification problems in the literature. It is necessary to identify the causation 
direction of the observed interaction between monetary policy and economic 
fluctuations. However, a simple regression of output on changes in monetary policy 
is very likely to result in biased estimates of the effect of monetary policy, because 
the causation might also run in the other direction. Therefore, it is crucial to 
determine which change of monetary policy is exogenous. 
4.7 RULE METHODS: TAYLOR RULE AND MCCALLUM RULE 
For a simple definition, the Taylor rule stipulates how much the central bank should 
change the nominal interest rate in response to changes in inflation, output, or other 
economic conditions. In particular, the rule suggests that for each 1% increase in 
inflation, the central bank should raise the nominal interest rate by more than one 
percentage point (Taylor, 1993). 
The original version of the rule is expressed as: 
        
          
             
where    is the target short-term nominal interest rate (e.g., the federal funds rate in 
the US),    is the rate of inflation as measured by the GDP deflator,   
  is the desired 
rate of inflation,   
  is the assumed equilibrium real interest rate,    is the logarithm 
of real GDP, and    is the logarithm of potential output, as determined by a linear 
trend. Taylor states that both    and    (policy parameters) should be positive. 
Due to its simplicity, the Taylor rule is hailed as a relatively straightforward model to 
estimate the stance of monetary policy. The advantage of this model is that it helps 
predict the optimal interest rate based directly on just two variables: the GDP gap 
and the inflation gap. The Taylor rule has become popular and empirical studies have 
used it to evaluate monetary policy in certain economies, including the Euro area 
(Mésonnier & Renne, 2004), Tunisia (Sghaier, 2012), and Ghana (Boamah, 2012). 
As interest rates do not always play the key role in monetary policy in many 
countries, the Taylor rule is considered to be inappropriate in those economies. For 
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that reason, McCallum (2002) proposed an alternative approach to the Taylor rule, 
one that specifies a target for the monetary bases (M0) rather than the interest rate. 
The McCallum rule expresses the target as: 
                  (       )           
where mt is the natural logarithm of M0 at time t (in quarters);        is the average 
quarterly increase of the velocity of M0 over a four-year period from t-16 to t;     is 
the desired rate of inflation, that is, the desired quarterly increase in the natural 
logarithm of the price level;     is the long-run average quarterly increase of the 
natural logarithm of the real GDP; and       is the quarterly increase of the natural 
logarithm of the nominal GDP from t-1 to t. 
The McCallum rule is considered a useful tool to evaluate the monetary policy of 
emerging economies, particularly those that utilise an exchange rate targeting 
framework. 
4.8 THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH OF THIS STUDY  
The main objective of this research is to develop a ―more adequate‖ monetary policy 
framework to support long-term economic growth in the context of changing external 
economic and financial environments. ―Optimality‖ in the use of the proposed 
monetary framework is assessed based on theoretical arguments, policy objectives, 
and empirical facts. Focusing on the theoretical arguments, this study analyses the 
conditions and criteria, such as the monetary policy framework required, so that its 
objectives can be obtained. 
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Figure 4.4: The objectives of empirical approaches  
 
The central methodology of this study is a model of the channels of monetary 
transmission for the case of Vietnam. To answer the questions about the suspected 
problems in the current monetary policy framework, as well as the features of the 
―optimal‖ framework, this study designed a model of channels of monetary 
transmission and conducted analysis through investigation of each monetary 
channel. It describes how the monetary policy operations, such as changes in the 
nominal money stock or the short-term nominal interest rate, impact inflation and 
real variables, such as aggregate output and net export. In addition, it also raises 
awareness regarding investigating the linkages among monetary policies, to analyse 
how those policies in combination make their impacts on the real economy and 
inflation. 
Specifically, in the next section, based on the approach initiated by Aizenman et al. 
(2008), and a measure to quantify financial liberalisation presented in the study by 
Abdul, Enrica, and Thierry (2010), a Trilemma Analysis is carried out to examine 
the monetary policies linkages in Vietnam. Following this, an empirical analysis of 
the channels of monetary transmission mechanism is conducted using a structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) approach. 
In the study by Aizenman et al. (2008), the Trilemma index is a combination of the 
three components of exchange rate flexibility (ERS), monetary independence (MI), 
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and capital account openness. The fundamental idea of the approach is to build up 
the quantified indices that correctly replicate the status of the respective policies. 
Accordingly, the value of ERS index is quantified to fall in [0,1]; in which, the value 
of 0 stands for flexible exchange rate, while value of 1 stands for fixed exchange 
rate. For MI, value of 0 equals to totally dependence interest rate policy, while value 
of 1 equals to totally independence. To quantify capital account openness, this study 
applied the idea from Abdul et al. (2010), which analyses the level of financial 
openness as the combination of several dimensions (please refer to Appendix A: 
Coding Rules for the Financial Liberalisation Index for more detail). By giving the 
adequate points (from 0-3) for each dimension whenever the country 
increases/decreases the levels of liberalisation in relevant policies, the final combined 
total points could be considered the liberalisation index of the country.  
In the next empirical analysis, based on the approach designed by Mishkin (2007) 
and Boivin et al. (2010), SVAR models are built up to capture primary monetary 
instruments and policies in all channels, as well as various monetary shocks from 
external sources. The study also uses the impulse response function, the Granger 
causality test, and variance decomposition to estimate the various effects of monetary 
shocks on macroeconomic indices. 
By evaluating the impacts of different channels, the study is able to determine how 
efficiently each monetary policy is likely to affect the entire economy system. The 
evaluation of each channel also helps to answer the question of whether the current 
policies are adequate to deal with current and future challenges. The simple 
investment viability model allows both a rudimentary feedback loop and a simple 
check list for policy makers. 
In addition to the data collected through the narrative approach, other data is taken 
from the International Monetary Fund‘s (IMF) International Financial Statistics, 
except for output (from the Vietnam General Statistics Office) and REER (calculated 
from data collected from IMF‘s International Financial Statistics and Bank of 
International Settlement‘s databases). 
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Chapter 5: Trilemma Analysis of External 
Influences 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to provide elements to address Research Question 1 and Research 
Question 2.  
Considering the advantages of the method and the availability of data, this study used 
the method from Aizenman et al. (2008) to quantify the Trilemma Index for Vietnam 
between 1998-2013. Due to the limitation of data availability and the objective of the 
study focusing on a database of many countries, the authors (Aizenman et al.) could 
only produce yearly indices. When applied to a specific case (country), this yearly 
index is considered to provide little use to serve as a useful indicator for current 
have-to-be-quickly-responded-to monetary policies.
14
 Therefore, in the case of 
Vietnam, this thesis attempts to calculate the monthly index instead of the yearly, 
which might serve as a more useful indicator for monetary policy makers. 
Findings from empirical estimations support the existence of the Trilemma rule in 
Vietnam between 1998-2013. There is also statistical evidence to argue that the 
SBV‘s efforts to stabilise the exchange rate and interest rate (or monetary policy in 
general) is unlikely to have had a significant impact upon inflation. It has also been 
found that the further opening up of the capital account had a significant linkage with 
inflation rate during this time. 
5.1.1 MEASURING MONETARY INDEPENDENCE (MI) 
This thesis replicated Aizenman et al. (2008) by measuring MI in the formula of the 
correlation between ii, interest rates in the home country (Vietnam), and ij, interest 
rates in the base country (the United States): 
                                                 
14
 This argument is made in light of Mervyn King‘s comment that monetary practice is ahead of 
monetary theory. Mr King was the governor of England‘s central bank from 2003-2013. 
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      (     )
 
 
Specifically, ii is the refinancing rate when commercial banks ask for loans from the 
SBV, data taken from the SBV‘s database; ij is the effective fund rates, similar to the 
policy rate from the FED
15
. The United States was chosen as the base country in the 
formula because the US dollar is the dominating foreign currency in Vietnamese 
markets, with almost all international transactions denominated in USD. That said, a 
change in the international value of USD, for example initiated by an adjustment of 
the FED fund rate, would directly affect the foreign exchange market in Vietnam. 
Monthly correlations between it and ij (corr(ii,ij)) were estimated from daily data
16
. 
As the values of corr(ii,ij) would range in [-1,1], the MI value would range in [0,1] 
accordingly. 
When corr(ii,ij)=-1, it means that the two interest rates were moved/adjusted in 
opposite ways, for example the FED increased ij by 1% and at the same time the 
SBV decreased ii by 1%. In this case MI=1 to reflect that the way the SBV adjusted 
its policy rate was totally independent of the FED‘s operation. 
Similarly, when corr(ii,ij)=1, it means that the two interest rates were 
moved/adjusted in the same direction, for example the FED increased ij by 1% and at 
the same time the SBV increased ii by 1%. %. In this case MI=0 to reflect that the 
way that the SBV adjusted its policy rate was totally dependent on the FED‘s 
movement.     
It is worth noting a shortcoming of the above formula when applying it to the case of 
big economies. For example, if the home country is Japan and the chosen base 
country is the United States, whenever the policy rate in Japan is adjusted, it is hard 
to say whether that movement is based on the adjustment of a policy rate in the US or 
whether it is based on the status of Japan‘s domestic economy at that time. However, 
if the home country is a small economy with dependent financial markets like 
Vietnam, the formula would be applicable.   
                                                 
15
 Historical Data FED Interest Rates, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Retrieved 
from: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (Accessed on 1/9/2015) 
16
 For example, corr(ii,ij) of January 2000 is calculated from correlation of 31 observations in that 
month 
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Figure 5.1: Monetary Independence Index
17
 
 
Figure 5.1 depicts the MI index between January 1998 and December 2013. It shows 
that the SBV‘s interest rate policy was relatively independent with the FED prior to 
2004, when the values were stable around 0.5. Since then, the MI index has 
developed more fluctuation. The simple linear trended line of MI suggests that the 
interest rate policy was gradually adjusted towards a less independent stance. 
5.1.2 MEASURING EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY (ES) 
Similar to measuring MI, this study replicated Aizenman et al. (2008) in measuring 
ES from the monthly standard deviation of the change in a logarithm form of daily 
USD/VND exchange rate
18
, from which the ES index is obtained from the following 
formula: 
   
    
                            
 
   (stdev: standard deviation) 
The first difference of the logarithm form in the above formula is taken to account 
for the percentage change in the exchange rate. If the exchange rate is fixed, the 
                                                 
17
 The index is smoothed out by applying the seven-month moving averages encompassing the 
preceding three-months concurrently, and following three-months of each observation. 
18
 For example, the stdev of February 2000 was calculated from 29 daily observations in that month. 
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value of first difference of the series would be equal to zero, which makes its 
standard deviation equal to zero as well. In this case, ES=1 to reflect the fact that the 
exchange rate was kept fixed during the period. On the other hand, any significant 
and frequent adjustments to exchange rates would translate into bigger values of the 
standard deviation, which in turn lowers the value of ES. For example, if the daily 
exchange rates in a month were found to deviate from its mean value for about 1% 
on average, its standard deviation would equal to 0.01. In this case, ES=0.5 to reflect 
the fact that during the month, the exchange rates deviated firmly by 1% from its 
mean value. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Exchange Rate Stability Index
19
 
 
To calculating the ES index for Vietnam, this study used daily USD/VND exchange 
rate data taken from OANDA database.
20
 
Figure 5.2 depicts the performance of the ES index between January 1998 and 
December 2013. It shows that the SBV‘s exchange rate policy was quite 
stable/independent (score closely to 1 point) between two periods: from 1998 until 
                                                 
19
 The index is smoothed out by applying the seven-month moving averages encompassing the 
preceding three-months concurrently, and following three-months of each observation. 
20
 Historical Data on Currency Exchange Rate, OANDA - Forex Trading and Exchange Rates 
Services. Retrieved from: www.oanda.com (Accessed on 1/9/2015) 
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mid-2000 and early-2002 until end of 2004. The performance of the ES index 
fluctuated between 2005-2007, then became more stable again from 2008 until the 
present. However, the level of independence reduced sharply to around 0.6 on 
average. The trended line of the ES shows that exchange rate policy was sharply 
adjusted toward a more flexible stance between 1998-2013. 
5.1.3 MEASURING FINANCIAL OPENNESS (FO) 
To measure the financial openness (FO) index, this study diverted slightly from the 
original approach by Aizenman et al. (2008), which used the KAOPEN index, 
developed in another study. The KAOPEN index is a combined component that 
indicates the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account 
transactions, on capital account transactions, and the requirement of the surrender of 
export proceeds (Chinn & Ito, 2008).  
This study followed the idea from Abdul et al. (2010) in quantifying the financial 
liberalisation index, but only employed the appropriate aspects for evaluating capital 
inflows/outflow restrictions. Specifically, FO is defined as the combination of four 
separate aspects as follows: 
   
           
  
 
In which: 
    Restrictions in foreign exchange market;  
  : Restrictions of entry for foreign financial institutions;  
   : Restrictions on international capital flows; 
  : Restrictions for foreign investors on securities markets. 
Information about the above restrictions was taken from the Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER - International 
Monetary Fund). Each aspect was assigned a grade between 0-3 (0 for totally 
restricted and 3 for totally free/open) based on the current status of openness. 
Following this, the aspect points were added up and divided by 12 (possible 
maximum number) to obtain the final index. Accordingly, this Financial Openness 
(FO) index value ranged from 0 (no flow at all) to 1 (free flows). More details 
regarding the measurement are presented in Appendix A. 
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Figure 5.3: Financial Openness Index 
 
Data suggests that, prior to 2005 international capital flows were relatively restricted 
in Vietnam. Between the eight years from 1998 to 2006, there was almost no new 
policy in regards to opening the capital account. In 2006, the government began to 
remove the barriers regarding international capital flows. During the same period, the 
securities market also experienced great expansion as a result of those liberalisation 
policies. However, from 2012, progress reversed (probably as a consequence of the 
high inflation phenomenon since 2009). In general, the trended line of the FO 
suggests that the capital account policy was adjusted toward the opening stance 
between 1998-2013. 
5.2 TESTING THE TRILEMMA RULE 
The most important feature of the Trilemma rule regards the constraint among those 
three policies indices. In theory, the rule argues that those indices cannot reach their 
maximum values at the same time. Practically, it is rational to expect policy makers 
to always try to maximise the combination of the three indices to the maximum 
point, where a further increase of policies would create more harm than benefit. If 
this assumption holds, it is equivalent to say that an increase in one index might 
require a decrease in the combination of others.  
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Aizenman et al. (2008) proposed a method to test the above hypothesis by regressing 
those three indices (without a constant term) against a constant number series,
21
 as 
follows: 
(5)                           
If the regressions provide significant statistical outcomes (high R
2
, significant 
coefficients         ), this is the evidence to argue that: (i) the Trilemma rule is in 
effective in the country; and (ii) linear specification is applicable to explain the 
"binding" characteristic of those three policy indicators. Otherwise, in the case where 
the regression turns out to be an insignificant estimation, this suggests either that 
Trilemma rule is incorrect for the country, or that the linkage among the three policy 
indicators is nonlinear. 
In addition, another assumption is made regarding the structural break of the data 
series.
22
 The whole sample is divided into two sub-periods: 1998M1 to 2006M12; 
and 2007M1 to 2013M12. The date 1 January 2007 is chosen as the break point 
between the periods, because this is the official date Vietnam joined the WTO and 
many opening polices came into effect. This helps to distinguish and compare the 
changes in policies between the two periods. The value of constant C is chosen at 2 
to hypothetically reflect the nature of Trilemma phenomenon. According to the rule, 
only a combination of two out of three policies could be maintained at the same time, 
it might be rational to assume that the combination of all three policies might be 
equal to 2 at all times when each aspect scores a point in the range [0,1]. 
Table 5.1 presents the outcome from estimations of equation (5) in two sub-periods 
and for the whole sample. All coefficients are highly statistically significant at 99%; 
the adjusted-R
2 
of the estimations are all high (>99%), suggesting the relatively high 
goodness of fit and showing empirical support for the Trilemma rule.  
The values of estimated coefficients of MI, ES, FO in Table 5.1 provide some hints 
of the trade-off ratios among the three policy indicators, or the weights countries put 
on the combination of those policy goals. However, due to their limited construction 
those estimated coefficients cannot provide sufficient information to determine the 
                                                 
21
 The regression outcome would be the same for any given C value.  
22
 Appendix C provides a full analysis of the chosen structural break for the series. 
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value of trade-off ratios. The better informative indicators are the predictions using 
the estimated coefficients and the actual values for the variables, such as  ̂    , 
 ̂     and  ̂    . 
 
Table 5.1: Estimation of Goodness of fit  
 
1998-2006 2007-2013 1998-2013 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
MI 0.275* 0.632*** 1.804*** 
 
(0.149) (0.123) (0.174) 
ES 0.452*** 0.917*** 0.679*** 
 
(0.054) (0.111) (0.087) 
FO 4.302*** 1.800*** 1.170*** 
 
(0.160) (0.130) (0.094) 
    
BIC -197.146 -166.537 -74.932 
N 108 84 192 
R
2
 0.9979 0.9982 0.9907 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Figure 5.4 shows different predictions using the coefficients and actual values of 
each two within three policy indicators, including: 
      ̂      ̂      
      ̂      ̂      
      ̂      ̂      
 
1998-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 5.4: Combinations of Trilemma policy indicators 
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1
MIES MIFO
ESFO
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
2007m1 2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1 2012m1 2013m1
MIES MIFO
ESFO
 Chapter 5: Trilemma Analysis of External Influences 93 
Between 1998-2006 (Model 1), the combination of higher exchange rate stability and 
more financial openness (ESFO) was the dominant bundle for the whole period. 
While the combination of monetary independence and financial openness (MIFO) 
closely caught up to ESFO, the third policy combination of monetary independence 
and exchange rate stability (MIES) was distant from the other two. For 2007-2013, 
ESFO was still the leading combination, MIFO made the second important faction, 
while MIES closed the gap significantly with the other two bundles in comparison 
with the previous period. 
This result reflects the fact that controlling the exchange rate and capital flows were 
the top priorities of the SBV between 1998-2013. Monetary independence 
contributed a minor role in first period 1998-2006, its impact slightly increased in the 
second period of 2007-2013. 
5.3 TESTING THE STABILITY OF TRILEMMA INDEX  
To test the stability of the combined Trilemma policies for the whole sample, the 
fitted values were calculated from estimation of Model 3 and its performance was 
examined (see Figure 5.5). This fitted values series is hereafter called the Trilemma 
index, in the sense that it reflects the fluctuation of the combined values of three 
Trilemma policies series over time around a constant number C. By choosing C=2 in 
the previous section, the estimated Trilemma index would be considered a proxy of 
Trilemma rule. 
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Figure 5.5: The stability of Trilemma index 
 
The addition of a polynomial smoother line (Kernel-weighted local polynomial 
smoothing) allows us to see three different periods in the performance of the 
Trilemma index:  
(i) In the first period, from early 1998 to end of 2003, the Trilemma index was 
relatively stable;  
(ii) In the second period, from early of 2004 to end of 2007, the index made a V-
shape trend line, though the values fluctuated in a zone between 1.5 and 2, and rarely 
went higher than 2;  
(iii) In the third period, from early 2008 up to end of 2013, the index shows a bigger 
fluctuation and the trended line indicates that the average values were frequently 
higher than 2. 
In brief, Figure 5.5 shows that the Trilemma index from 2008 onward was less stable 
than in the previous period, as the value of the index fluctuated in higher and wider 
ranges, suggesting a sudden violation of the rule in this period. 
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In order to have a better comparison of the stability of the Trilemma index between 
the two sub-periods, some further investigation was carried out. That said, the 
Trilemma index for this sub-period was calculated from estimated coefficients from 
the other sub-period. Following this, the Trilemma index for the whole period was 
plotted on the same graph. In detail, after determining the estimated coefficients for 
MI, ES, FO for 1998-2006 in Model 1, those coefficients were replaced into Model 2 
for the whole period 1998-2013 to calculate the Trilemma index. The same 
procedure was applied to the estimated coefficients from an estimation of 2007-2013 
replaced back into Model 1 for the whole sample. Doing this, demonstrates how the 
Trilemma index might perform if the SBV maintained the same set of policies from 
this sub-period into the other. 
 
  
Figure 5.6: The stability of Trilemma index in 1998-2013  
(estimated coefficients of 1998-2006 on the left, and estimated coefficients of 2007-2013 on the right) 
 
The two new Trilemma index series with different estimated coefficients are depicted 
in Figure 5.6. As can be seen, when the estimated coefficients from 1998-2006 were 
applied to the whole series, the fitted values for 2007-2013 increased to the range of 
3-3.5 (left figure). Whereas, the fitted values for 1998-2006 were stable around 1.7 
when the estimated coefficients from 2007-2013 were filled in (right figure). The 
results imply some findings given below: 
(i) The combination of Trilemma policies in 1998-2006 seem more stable than 
in 2007-2013; 
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(ii) If the combination of the Trilemma policies in 1998-2006 is assumed to be 
optimal (such Constant=2), this bundle would violate the Trilemma rule if applied for 
2007-2013 (when fitted value of Constant reach 3-3.5). Whereas, the combination of 
policies in 2007-2013 would not cause an issue when applied for 1998-2006 (fitted 
value of the constant reduced stability around 1.7). 
The initial findings for the stability of the Trilemma policies seem to be correlated 
with the fact that the Vietnamese economy performed well between 1998-2006 and 
experienced difficulty after 2007, as shown in Section 2.1. It raises the question as to 
whether the stability in those policies might have contributed to the stability of the 
economy. To determine the answer to this question, in the next section, more tests 
were carried out to determine any significant linkages between the Trilemma policies 
and macroeconomic indicators. 
5.4 IMPACTS OF TRILEMMA POLICIES ON INFLATION  
This section analyses the interaction between the Trilemma policies and the inflation 
rate based on the approach initiated by Aizenman et al. (2008), with a few 
adjustments. The following model was established for estimation: 
(6)                                                 
In which, Inft is the measure of inflation in two forms: 
(i) Inflation rate (cpi_g): Measured as monthly CPI growth rate; 
(ii) Inflation volatility (std_cpi): Measured as the foward 12-month 
standard deviation of cpi_g. Those volatility variables are constructed 
based on the assumption that changes in Trilemma policies might take 
up to 12 months to exert their full impact on macroeconomic indicators.     
The inclusion of cpi_g and std_cpi on the left-hand side of equation (6) is to account 
for instant and lagged impacts respectively. In detail, the regression with cpi_g 
expects to find out any impact from the Trilemma policies on inflation within the 
same month. While with std_cpi, it is expected to look at the linkages between the 
Trilemma policies and a fluctuation in inflation rates over the next 12 months.     
RESt is the level of current gross international reserves as a ratio to yearly GDP 
(summation of the previous 12 monthly GDP). The inclusion of RESt in the model is 
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based on the assumption that there is a positive correlation between the amount of 
foreign reserves and the Trilemma policies. That reserve accumulation gives 
policymakers more flexibility in dealing with the short-run trade-offs between MI 
and ES, at a given level of FO. In short, the more reserves a country has, the higher 
the Trilemma index it could maintain. 
Inft-1 is added to the models to account for possible dynamic effects. 
The inclusion of new variables reduces the range of the sample from 2008M1-
2013M12 to 2008M1-2012M12   
 
Table 5.2: Estimation Results for Inflation Model 
 
Inflation rate Inflation rate Inflation volatility Inflation volatility 
 1998-2006 2007-2012 1998-2006 2007-2012 
Inft-1 0.159 0.630***   
 (0.096) (0.095)   
MI -0.029* 0.008 0.010*** -0.007 
  (0.013) (0.018) (0.002) (0.005) 
ES -0.016* 0.005 -0.001 0.002 
  (0.007) (0.014) (0.001) (0.004) 
FO -0.04 0.028*** -0.005 -0.004 
  (0.037) (0.029) (0.005) (0.008) 
RES 0.001 0.016 -0.009* 0.020*** 
 (0.024) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004) 
_Cons 0.014 -0.025 0.006* 0.008 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.002) (0.007) 
  
    
r2 0.143 0.43 0.403 0.45 
p 0.007 0 0 0 
df_r 101 66 103 67 
bic -724.603 -474.21 -1161.77 -670.562 
N 107 72 108 72 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (standard errors are shown in parentheses below the individual 
coefficient estimates) 
 
Using monthly data from 1998M1 to 2013M12, the estimations were conducted for 
two sub-periods 1998M1-2006M12 and 2007M1-2013M12. The results of 
estimations are presented in Table 5.2.  
Although not very significant, the estimated coefficients of MI and ES generally fit 
conventional expectation, that negative coefficients suggest greater MI and ES 
probably reduces inflation and inflation volatility. FO had an insignificant negative 
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impact on inflation between 1998-2006, but the impacts turned to a positively 
significant impact on inflation in the latter period. Estimated coefficients for RES 
were only statistically significant in explaining the inflation volatility, suggesting that 
foreign exchange market intervention might not be effective in either mitigating the 
Trilemma trade-off or reducing inflation. With the exception that Model 1 has a low 
R
2
, all other regression produced relatively good values of R
2
 at over 40%.  
5.5 IMPACTS OF TRILEMMA POLICIES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH  
Similar to the previous section, this section investigates the interaction between the 
Trilemma policies and economic growth using the same method. The model 
established for estimation is as following: 
(7)    
 
                                            
In which, gdpt is the measure of economic growth in two forms: 
(i) Growth rate (gdp_g): Measured as monthly real GDP growth rates; 
(ii) Growth volatility (std_gdp): Measured as forward 12-month standard 
deviation of gdp_g;  
Other variables are the same as in the inflation models, with gdp_g and std_gdp on 
the left-hand side account for instant and lagged impacts respectively, RESt is the 
ratio of reserves over GDP. gdpt-1 is added to the models to control for possible 
dynamic effects. Estimations were conducted for two sub-periods 1998M1-2006M12 
and 2007M1-2013M12, using monthly data. The results of the estimations are 
presented in Table 5.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5: Trilemma Analysis of External Influences 99 
Table 5.3: Estimation Results for Growth Model 
 
Growth rate Growth rate Growth volatility Growth volatility 
 1998-2006 2007-2012 1998-2006 2007-2012 
gdpt-1 0.219* 0.234   
 (0.094) (0.121)   
MI -0.175 -0.028 -0.015 -0.044 
  (0.222) (0.353) (0.015) (0.029) 
ES -0.011* -0.023** 0.000 -0.105*** 
  (0.117) (0.279) (0.008) (0.023) 
FO -0.104 -0.305 -0.03 0.372*** 
  (0.672) (0.581) (0.046) (0.048) 
RES -0.168 -0.087 0.061* 0.217*** 
 (0.445) (0.299) (0.030) (0.025) 
_Cons 0.177 0.254 0.147*** -0.05 
 (0.294) (0.505) (0.020) (0.042) 
      
r2 0.058 0.056 0.101 0.658 
p 0.297 0.56 0.026 0.000 
df_r 101 66 103 67 
bic -103.769 -45.432 -689.365 -406.579 
N 107 72 108 72 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (standard errors are shown in parentheses below the individual 
coefficient estimates) 
 
The explanatory power of all estimations is relatively low (around 10%), except the 
case growth volatility in 2007-2012. FO presented a negative influence to the growth 
rate in both periods; however, the impacts on growth volatility were at a positive sign 
and especially significant in 2007-2012. More capital account opening resulted in 
less economic growth, this outcome seems unexpected, though it comes from low 
significant estimations. ES is the only policy provides some robust outcomes, that 
any positive change in ES exerts a negative influence to economic growth and its 
volatility. This finding suggests that trying to stabilise the exchange rate might not be 
a good policy for economic growth in Vietnam. RES, was again an insignificant 
factor in the model.  
5.6 FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The quantitative analysis of the Trilemma indices for Vietnam between 1998-2013 
pointed out the following key findings: 
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(i) Prior to 2005, the exchange rate was maintained in a relatively fixed 
manner, while financial openness was nearly constant. Since 2006, financial 
openness has moved up gradually and the exchange rate has fluctuated and become 
more unstable. This would indicate that as capital account was still in a restricted 
status, it might be comfortable for the SBV to control the exchange rate. 
Furthermore, it might raise the question about the appropriateness of exchange rate 
regime the SBV has used since 2006, and whether or not the regime is suitable with 
the changing conditions of the domestic economy, as well as the international 
financial system following the global crisis of 2008. 
(ii) The implementation of the Trilemma policies in 1998-2006 was more 
stable and less volatile than in 2007-2014. There was a shocked change in the 
progression of the Trilemma index between 2006 and 2007, which is likely to show 
that the rule was violated suddenly. This also supports the validity of the break point 
(January 2007), which divided the dataset into two sub periods: the stable one in 
1998-2006 and the fluctuated one in 2007-2014. 
(iii) Between 1998-2006, the interest rate and the exchange rate policies 
showed some significant linkages with the inflation rate. However, for 2007-2012, 
those linkages disappeared; only financial openness exerted a significant impact on 
the movement and volatility of the inflation rate. This finding indicates that when the 
economy was still relatively closed, the SBV could use regular monetary instruments 
(interest rate and exchange rate) to effectively control inflation; however, when the 
economy became more open, external force (financial openness) seemed to exert an 
impact on inflation more effectively. 
(iv) For the movement and volatility of economic growth, the exchange rate 
stability proved to be an effective policy, while the linkages from the interest rate and 
financial openness policies were unclear and insignificant. This finding suggests that 
the SBV should pay more attention to their exchange rate policy, as it might be the 
most efficient tool to promote economic growth.  
In conclusion, these results may demonstrate the fact that the SBV‘s effort in 
stabilising the exchange rate and interest rate (or monetary policy in general) is 
unlikely to have significant impacts on inflation; and there is evidence to support the 
concern that the further opening up of the capital account has a statistical linkage 
with the surge in the inflation rate between 2007-2011. In addition, there is initial 
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evidence to support the concern that the current monetary policies framework might 
not be appropriate in supporting sustainable economic growth in the long-run. 
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Chapter 6: SVAR Analysis of Monetary 
Channels 
As discussed in 3.7, SVAR is a reliable method that can be used to investigate the 
monetary transmission in a small, open economy like Vietnam.  
The SVAR approach used in this study mainly stems from seminal studies by Sims 
(1992), and Bernanke and Gertler (1995); and is particularly based on Kim and 
Roubini (2000) and Raghavan, Silvapulle, and Athanasopoulos (2012) as the 
application for the case of a small, open economy. 
Applying SVAR to Vietnam is a challenging task for several reasons: data 
availability and quality, unclear objectives, and frequent changes in monetary policy 
operation (see Camen (2006)). Hence, this chapter tries to provide empirical 
evidence with the following goals: 
(i) Constructing a SVAR model with an appropriate identification arrangement for 
Vietnam. A better understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism is very 
important, as it assists the central bank to determine the proper way to use the 
monetary policy to control inflation or promote economy growth.  
(ii) Monitoring and evaluating the linkages among key macroeconomic variables and 
monetary policy instruments. Specifically, this chapter evaluates and compares the 
impacts of monetary policies on macroeconomic indicators between 1995-2006 and 
2007-2013. The lags duration of monetary instrument effects is estimated and 
identified. 
(iii) Evaluating and comparing the impacts of different monetary transmission 
channels, including the interest rate channel, credit channel, and exchange rate 
channel. Investigating the empirical impacts from various monetary channels will 
assist to determine the most effective monetary transmission. 
Findings from empirical estimations show that there were significant changes in both 
the combination and impacts of monetary transmission channels before and after 
WTO accession in 2007. The SBV previously concentrated on quantity monetary 
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instruments (money supply, direct credit control) to perform monetary policy 
between 1995-2006. However, the efficiency of those instruments was unstable and 
reduced sharply with the opening of the Vietnamese economy from 2007. The 
exchange rate was the most effective channel in promoting growth in both 1995-
2006 and 2007-2013. The credit channel was also an effective channel in 1995-2006, 
but its influence has faded since 2007. In particular, the highly positive response 
from the consumer price index toward shocks from the money supply and exchange 
rate between 2007-2013 raises the question of the combined effect of monetary 
policy instruments in controlling inflation. This enhances the concern arising from 
Chapter 5 that further opening of the capital account was the main cause of the surge 
in the inflation rate between 2007-2011. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In a standard SVAR model, it is assumed that the economy is described by a 
simultaneous equations model with a structural form given by: 
(8)                                 
In which,    is the vector of endogenous variables,    is the vector of structural 
innovations, the model assumes that   ~ N(0,Σ) and        
    , which is a 
diagonal matrix, that is, the innovations originate from uncorrelated and independent 
sources.    (i=1,..,p) are coefficient matrices at lag p. 
The parameters required to be estimated in the model are    and the variances of the 
error terms contained in   . However, the structural model given by (8) cannot be 
directly estimated, as this would lead to correlation between the structural 
innovations    and the regressors in each equation. The problem could be solved by 
transforming the model into a reduced form, in which regressors and innovations in 
each equation are uncorrelated; hence, the parameter could be estimated. The 
reduced form model is obtained by multiplying both sides of (8) with   
   as follows: 
(9)      
           
              
           
     
or:   
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In which,    is the corresponding vector of reduced-form innovations,      
     or 
       ,        
     
      
     is the variance covariance matrix of reduced 
form errors. Furthermore,            for all t≠s and  [  ]    (white noise 
residuals). 
Estimating the reduced form model can produce coefficient matrices          ; 
which can be used to identify the structural coefficients          . Reduced-form 
innovations   , estimated from a reduced form model, can be used to estimate    
and . Here, to be able to obtain    from    as        , one needs to restrict the 
identification of the system. Specifically, by imposing 
      
 
 restrictions on the 
elements of    matrix, only the system is identified. In case there are more than 
      
 
 restrictions, the system will be over identification.  
6.2 ISSUES IN SVAR MODELLING 
The important task in SVAR modelling is to choose the appropriate variables and 
identify restrictions in the contemporaneous matrix A0, which requires both 
theoretical economic arguments and stylised facts (Raghavan et al., 2012). In 
particular, this task must be carried out cautiously to address a range of issues when 
modelling the monetary transmission.  
6.2.1 KEY MONETARY POLICY INDICATOR 
It is crucial to identify the most appropriate monetary policy indicator for a specified 
country study. As Walsh (2003) argued, empirical results are primarily different due 
to the way monetary policies are measured. This means that empirical studies using 
the same database, but with different policy variables, would produce different 
results. 
In general, the policy interest rate is suggested as the best proxy of monetary policy, 
particularly for advanced economies (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992). In the case of the 
US, Sims (1992) suggested the short-term interest rate, while Bagliano and Favero 
(1998) preferred the long-term interest rate as the appropriate indicator of monetary 
policy changes. However, there have also been various arguments in favour of 
choosing other proxies of monetary policy changes. Eichenbaum (1992) and Strongin 
(1995) suggested that the proxy was a shock to non-borrowed reserves, Gordon and 
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Leeper (1994) found the FED rate and monetary aggregates generated similar 
dynamic responses, while Cushman and Zha (1997) found that the exchange rate also 
played an important role in describing the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
Generally, the key monetary policy indicator is chosen based on comparing the 
performance of different monetary instruments in the monetary transmission, of 
which one appears to be exogenous and more influence would be chosen. For 
example, in the case of the US study, the FED rate is the preferred monetary 
indicator in many SVAR studies due to its power and exogeneity over other 
instruments. However, studies of Singaporean monetary transmission must pay 
greater attention to the exchange rate, as this is the most important monetary policy 
indicator in the economy of this country (Hwee Kwan Chow, 2004).  
6.2.2 PUZZLES 
Many empirical studies using the VAR methodology in open and closed economies 
have identified several empirical anomalies (―puzzles‖). In conventional economics, 
it is expected that a contractionary monetary policy shock would lead to an 
immediate rise in the interest rate, a temporary decline in output and money supply, 
and a gradual decrease in the general price level. However, SVAR estimations might 
provide abnormal outcomes that are against the arguments from conventional 
economics. Kim and Roubini (2000) summarised the most popular puzzles as 
follows: 
The liquidity puzzle: Nominal interest rate increases rather than decreases following 
a positive monetary aggregate shock (such as M0, M1, and M2) (Leeper & Gordon, 
1992). 
The price puzzle: Price level increases rather than decreases following a positive 
interest rate shock (Sims, 1992). 
The exchange rate puzzle: Domestic currency depreciates relative to the international 
currency (such as US dollar), rather than appreciating following a positive interest 
rate shock (Sims, 1992). 
The forward discount bias puzzle: Positive interest differentials on domestic assets 
are associated with persistent appreciation of the domestic currency (Kim & Roubini, 
2000). 
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The existence of puzzles is expected, as it is the dedicated outcome from various 
assumptions in SVAR identification. The liquidity puzzle might appear when 
monetary aggregate is chosen as the key monetary instrument, which commonly 
happens in early SVAR studies of closed economies (Kim & Roubini, 2000). Sims 
(1992) suggested that changes in monetary aggregates might not represent changes in 
monetary policy, but only the reflection from shocks to money demand. Thus, he 
proposed using other indicators such as short-term interest rates rather than monetary 
aggregate to represent a change in monetary policy. However, this solution is not 
completely satisfactory as it leads to price puzzle. In the same study, Sims (1992) 
also addressed this situation by arguing that changes in the interest rate partly reflect 
inflationary pressures that cause price levels to increase. Therefore, later studies tried 
to include inflationary expectation as a proxy variable and were successful in 
explaining the price puzzles (e.g., see Gordon and Leeper (1994); Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994)).  
Fortunately, the inclusion of inflationary expectation was also found to address the 
exchange rate puzzle (Grilli & Roubini, 1995). Kim and Roubini (2000) proposed an 
identification scheme to address all puzzles in the case of a small, open economy. 
Their identification included world crude oil price and US Federal Fund rate as 
proxies for inflationary expectation and external shocks, in addition to other 
domestic variables.  
The exchange rate puzzle disappears when a non-recursive identification method is 
employed, in which the interest rate and exchange rate are allowed to be 
simultaneously determined (Kim & Roubini, 2000). Since then, the approach has 
gained popularity and become the ―benchmark model‖ in many studies.  
6.2.3 RECURSIVE VS NON-RECURSIVE MODELS 
Recursive VAR  
In the recursive VAR model, it is assumed that contemporaneous interactions among 
variables are recursive; that means current structural shocks cannot simultaneously 
affect the preceded ordering variables. The covariance matrix of the structural 
disturbances, is therefore assumed to be diagonal (implying that the structural shocks 
are orthogonal), and the matrix A0 is assumed to be lower triangular. Specifically, 
this assumption imposes a recursive form on the contemporaneous correlations in the 
system as follows: the first variable responds solely to its own shock, the second 
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variable responds to the first variable, plus to a shock to itself, and so on. The last 
variable in the system reacts immediately to shocks from all other variables; 
however, disturbances to this variable have no contemporaneous effect on any the 
other variable. 
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According to Christiano et al. (1998) and Raghavan et al. (2012), the economic 
underlying of recursive ordering is based on an assumption that central banks adjust 
monetary policy instruments with predetermined macroeconomic information; 
therefore, macroeconomic indicators do not respond contemporaneously to changes 
of monetary policies. 
Non-Recursive VAR  
While the recursive VAR strictly assumes no mutual contemporaneous impacts 
between variables, the non-recursive VAR relaxes these assumptions by allowing 
mutual contemporaneous impacts, which provide more options in identifying 
variable relationships in the model. 
(11) 
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For example, in model (11), the first variable responds only to its own shock; the 
second variable responds to the first variable shock to itself and from the sixth 
variable; but the fifth variable responds to all other variables, including the shock to 
itself.   
Zha (1997) criticised the validity of a recursive assumption in describing the central 
bank‘s operation in practice. It is unrealistic to make the assumption that the central 
bank cannot observe unexpected changes in output and prices within the same 
period. The policy makers at the central bank must use all available information 
when adjusting the policy. A non-recursive assumption would solve this problem 
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because it allows for any simultaneous contemporaneous interaction between policy 
variables and other non-policy variables (Brischetto & Voss, 1999; Cushman & Zha, 
1997; Kim & Roubini, 2000). 
6.3 MODEL SETUP 
Theoretically, the restrictions imposed on the A0 matrix should come from the results 
of reliable empirical macroeconomic models. However, in the case of Vietnam, the 
number of reliable empirical macroeconomic studies is limited due to the lack of 
macroeconomic data.
23
 To solve this problem, the more common approach is to 
impose a set of identification restrictions that are broadly consistent with economic 
theory that expects to provide sensible outcomes. Kim and Roubini (2000) created a 
template of identification in SVAR while evaluating the monetary policy of OECD 
economies. The template later became the ―standard‖ approach in modelling the 
monetary policy framework for a small open economy, which has been applied in 
many case studies, such as Rokon (2008) in Canada, Raghavan et al. (2012) in 
Malaysia, and Thanabalasingam (2013) in Sri Lanka. In this thesis, a similar eight-
variable SVAR has been established to investigate the comprehensive linkages 
among economic factors in Vietnam. The outcomes of the analysis are expected to 
answer the following research questions:  
(i) What is the impact from external shocks on domestic indicators in Vietnam? 
(ii) What is the impact from different monetary channels on macroeconomic 
indicators? Which channel is the dominant one? 
(iii) What was the difference in the performance of the monetary policy between 
1995-2006 and 2007-2013? 
6.3.1 VARIABLES DESCRIPTION  
The model employed the following variables for estimation:  
Yt = [oilt, fedt, gdpt, cpit ,m1t,interestt, creditt, exratet] 
                                                 
23
 This is not only true of Vietnam, this is also common even when conducting studies of more 
advanced economies (Brischetto & Voss, 1999). 
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There were two international variables and six domestic variables in the model. The 
two international variables, crude oil price (oil) and the FED rate (fed) accounted for 
external shocks, in which oil was the non-policy external inflationary pressure and 
the fed was the proxy for external foreign monetary policy pressure. Other domestic 
variables included the gross domestic product (gdp) and consumer price index (cpi), 
which were the targets of monetary policy; money supply (m1) and the policy 
interest rate (interest), which were considered monetary policy instruments; and the 
nominal market exchange rate (exrate), which accounted for the market information 
force. 
Using real GDP with other macroeconomic non-policy and policy variables in 
nominal terms is a standard practice in the monetary literature (see, for example, 
(Bagliano & Favero, 1998; Bernanke & Mihov, 1998; Brischetto & Voss, 1999).  
For policy variables, the refinancing rate from the SBV was chosen as the proxy of 
monetary policy. This is the rate applied by the SBV when state commercial banks or 
private commercial banks come to ask for loans borrowing. This policy rate is the 
direct tool, through which the SBV can control monetary policy and other monetary 
instruments such as monetary aggregate and exchange rate. Moreover, in Vietnam, 
the dominance of SOCBs in the banking system and SOEs in the business sector and 
their close relationship in the domestic credit supply leads to the dominance of 
impact of market interest rate on the private sector. Therefore, the use of market 
interest rate might not cover the operation of state sector. In this case, the policy 
interest rate, which affects both private and state sectors, was deemed more 
appropriate. 
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Figure 6.1: The development of M0, M1, M2 in 1995-2014 (on logarithm scale) 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on IMF e-Library Database (Accessed on 15/1/2015) 
 
For the variable of monetary aggregate, while most VAR and SVAR studies about 
Vietnam monetary transmission have used M2 (such as V. H. Le and Pfau (2009) or 
Phan (2014)), this study found M1 to be a better indicator as an intermediate 
instrument. The reason is that M2 became a very broad measurement with the rapid 
development of the financial system and more opening of the domestic economy. In 
addition, M2 might even be impacted from other macroeconomic factors rather than 
only monetary policy, which all contributed to the rapid expansion of M2 compared 
to M1 or M0 (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 6.1).
24
 In Figure 6.1, it can be seen that M2 
quickly diverged from M1 and M0, reflecting the fact that the development of M2 
might be gradually less dependent on the development of M1 and M0. In other 
words, financial markets might have a new method to create money without the 
SBV‘s control. Therefore, in this case, M1 was the better indicator to reflect the 
reaction of the SBV to the state of the economy and foreign shocks. 
One important goal of the model was to capture and compare the impacts from 
different monetary transmission channels on the real economy. This was done by 
                                                 
24
 Figure 6.1 is a repetition of Figure 1.1, except the data is presented in a logarithm scale. 
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investigating the linkages between interest (proxy of interest rate channel), credit 
(credit channel), exrate (exchange rate channel), and macroeconomic indicators
25
. 
6.3.2 DATA SOURCES  
Fung (2002) suggested that using a high frequency data series is more appropriate 
when contemporaneous restrictions are used to identify the VAR models. Therefore, 
rather than using quarterly data like other studies, this study used monthly data from 
January 1995-December 2013 for the estimations. This approach has a shortcoming 
in collecting data for gdp series. For Vietnam, data for gdp is only available at 
quarterly level at the highest frequency. Therefore, monthly data of gdp was 
interpolated from quarterly data and monthly growth rate of industrial production 
using Denton (1971) approach. Except gdp, all other monthly series were available 
from the IMF database and other trusted sources. The next section briefly presents 
the description of each variable: 
1. Gross domestic product (denoted as gdp): These are real GDP figures, 
calculated in constant price of 1994 and were seasonally adjusted. Unit is 
billion VND.  
2. Consumer price index (cpi): Collected from IMF e-Library Data website. The 
proxy of price level cpi was measured as monthly consumer price index (which 
was taken as the base point=100 on January 2010). 
3. Money supply (m1): In IMF definition, M1 for Vietnam was the sum of 
currency outside banks and demand deposits other than those of central 
government. Data were in billion VND, collected from IMF e-Library Data 
website and seasonally adjusted. 
4. Policy interest rate (interest): This was the refinancing rate applied by the 
SBV to commercial banks‘ loans borrowing.  
5. Nominal market exchange rate (exrate): The figure was taken from the 
national authorities or the rate was determined in the legally sanctioned 
                                                 
25
 The asset price channel is opted out for various reasons: (i) the data was only available from 2000 
onward, since before this time the financial asset market in Vietnam did not exist; (ii) securities and 
equity markets in Vietnam are still in infant development and subject to speculation factor rather than 
macro policies (Vo & Pham, 2010).    
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exchange market. The unit was the amount of VND per USD, taken at the end 
of period. Data were collected from the IMF e-Library Data website. 
6. Private credit (credit): This variable included gross credit from the financial 
system to individuals, enterprises, nonfinancial public entities not included 
under net domestic credit, and financial institutions not included elsewhere. 
The unit was the amount of VND, taken at the end of period. Data were 
collected from the IMF e-Library Data website. 
7. Crude oil price (oil): This was the crude oil price taken from West Texas 
Intermediate spot price FOB (USD per barrel). The oil price was then 
converted from USD to VND by the market exchange rate. 
8. FED fund rate (fed): The federal fund rate was the interest rate at which the 
depository institutions traded federal funds (balances held at Federal Reserve 
Banks) with each other overnight. As VND is mainly pegged to USD, changes 
in the FED rate must exert significant impact on the SBV‘s exchange rate 
policy. Hence, the FED rate was considered to be the proxy for international 
interest rate. 
6.3.3 MODEL IDENTIFICATION 
Considering the existence of various issues in recursive identifications in SVAR 
modelling, which were presented in Section 6.2.3, this study attempted to investigate 
the monetary transmission of Vietnam based on non-recursive identifications. This is 
mainly based on the fact that the SBV must closely monitor the performance of the 
price level at all times and does not rely on a sole instrument to implement monetary 
policy. Therefore, a non-recursive identification is more flexible and more 
appropriate for modelling the economy.  
The identification of the contemporaneous matrix of the structural parameters was 
identified following the general idea from Kim and Roubini (2000) and particularly 
from Raghavan et al. (2012). To improve the quality of those identifications, a 
conventional VAR was conducted prior to examining the possible linkages among 
variables before putting them into the matrix (see Appendix B for the full analysis). 
Finally, the contemporaneous matrix was identified as below: 
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where ɛoil, ɛfed, ɛgdp, ɛcpi, ɛm1, ɛinterest, ɛcredit, ɛexrate respectively are the structural 
innovations of the shocks from the crude oil price, FED fund rate, gross domestic 
product, consumer price index, money supply, policy interest rate, private credit 
supply, and nominal exchange rate.  
It is noticeable that vector Yt consists of three different blocks of variables that have 
inter-linkages with each other, which are (i) the foreign block (oil, fed), representing 
the exogenous shocks from international economy, (ii) the non-policy block (gdp, 
cpi), describing the goods market equilibrium, (iii) and the policy block, (m1, 
interest, credit, exrate) describing the money market equilibrium.  
(1) Foreign block (oil, fed): The inclusion of foreign variables was essential for 
correct specification, improved identification of contemporaneous relationships, and 
to capture the underlying impulse responses of variables to various shocks 
(Raghavan & Silvapulle, 2007).  
In addition, is the fact that Vietnam is a crude oil exporter but still has to import final 
products of oil for domestic production and consumption. All revenue from crude oil 
exporting has been used to pay the foreign debt repayments and offset the state 
budget deficit. As the first oil refinery factory was brought into operation only 
recently (in 2012), oil price is certainly a crucial factor in the economy.  
The importance of oil puts it at the top of the model with the assumption that oil 
might exert an effect on all other variables contemporaneously. The inclusion of the 
fed is to account for the impact from international monetary policy. This assumption 
is based on the fact that the US has the biggest economy in the world and most of its 
policies affect other countries, including Vietnam. In addition, the fed is assumed to 
be contemporaneously correlated with oil because the Federal Reserve needs to 
adjust their policy immediately whenever there is a shock to the international oil 
price.  
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Certainly, the shocks originating from Vietnam are unlikely to have any significant 
impact on the rest of the world, thus oil and fed are not contemporaneously affected 
by domestic variables. 
(2) Non-policy block (gdp, cpi): These are the targeted economic variables, which 
are assumed to receive contemporaneous influence from foreign variables and lagged 
impacts from other domestic variables. Specifically, gdp is influenced by oil, while 
cpi is impacted by both oil and fed. The rationality behind this assumption is that 
domestic enterprises must respond immediately to oil price shocks due to the 
important role of oil in all sectors. However, they are unlikely to adjust outputs and 
prices within a month in response to unexpected shocks from domestic monetary 
policies. 
(3) Policy block (m1, interest, credit, exrate): This block consists of SBV‘s regular 
monetary instruments, which are money supply (M1), policy interest rate, credit 
supply, and market exchange rate.  
For identification, it is assumed that gdp, cpi, and interest contemporaneously impact 
m1, meaning that while adjusting for the current level of money supply, the SBV also 
monitors the level of output and price level, as well as other monetary indicators, 
such as policy interest rate. Interest is assumed to be affected by fed, gdp, and cpi 
contemporaneously. That said, SBV adjusts the refinancing rate based on the 
international interest rate level and other domestic targeted variables. Credit is 
assumed to not be influenced by foreign variables but is impacted by all domestic 
variables, except gdp. In comparison to ―standard‖ identification, the addition of 
credit allows the evaluation of the impacts from various monetary channels. As 
presented in Section 4.5, the monetary policy might exert an impact to the real 
economy via various channels, such as the interest rate channel, exchange rate 
channel, credit channel, or asset price channel.  
However, this model had to omit the asset price channel due to the lack of trusted 
data and the fact that the financial asset market in Vietnam is still in its infancy and is 
subject to a speculation factor rather than macro policies. That said, this study aims 
to evaluate the impacts from the other three channels; the interest rate channel, 
exchange rate channel, and credit channel.   
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The exchange rate is expected to play a key role in the model due to two reasons: (i) 
Exports always play an important role in the country‘s plan for economic 
development in the past, present, and future. The exchange rate has been the key 
factor in promoting export volume in both the short run and long run (N. T. Nguyen 
& Kalirajan, 2006); and (ii) the domestic economy still suffers dollarisation at a 
moderate scale, and people consider foreign currency (particularly USD) to be a safe 
financial asset whenever there is a shock to the economy (T. H. Nguyen, 2011). In 
addition, fluctuations in the exchange rate have been found to affect not only the 
prices of tradable goods but also those of non-tradable goods in Vietnam (H. M. 
Nguyen et al., 2012). Although the current model does not include a direct 
representative of asset price channel, the inclusion of the market exchange rate, 
which is considered a popular financial asset in Vietnam, is expected to cover some 
impact of the asset price channel.    
Exrate is assumed to be affected by almost all other variables except credit. Other 
than impacts from domestic variables gdp, cpi, and interest, the exchange rate level 
is also influenced by oil, and fed. As the country must use foreign currency to import 
oil, its impact on exrate is clear. The higher the oil price, the more foreign currency 
is required for purchasing, and the less foreign reserves can be used to control the 
exchange rate. In short, through the exchange rate channel, foreign variables 
indirectly exert influence on domestic variables. 
All variables are seasonally adjusted using the X-12 approach
26
 and are presented in 
logarithm form,
27
 except interest and fed (in percentage data). The sample is divided 
into two sub periods: (i) January 1995-December 2006, namely the ―first period‖, 
covering the period after Vietnam joined ASEAN and before joining the WTO; (ii) 
January 2007-December 2013, namely ―the second period‖, covering the period 
Vietnam joined the WTO up to the present. The choice of January 2007 as the break 
                                                 
26
 X-12-ARIMA is the US Census Bureau's software package designed to transform data series into 
seasonally-adjusted data series. More detail can be found on the US Census Bureau's website at: 
https://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/  
27
 The act of converting data series into logarithmic form is to reduce the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity and to make the interpretation of estimated coefficients easier. 
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between the two periods is supported by the finding from the structural break test 
presented in detail in Appendix C. 
6.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
This section presents the main outcomes of the study from estimating the SVAR 
model (  ), focusing on the impacts of the three monetary policy instruments: 
interest rates, exchange rate, and credit supply on macroeconomic indicators.  
6.4.1 STATIONARY TEST, OPTIMAL LAG, AND CO-INTEGRATION TEST 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests show that all key variables Lgdp, Lcpi, 
interest, Lm1, Lcredit, Lexrate, fed, Loil are not stationary in levels (see Table 6.1). 
As the variables are transformed into first difference form, they all become stationary 
or I(1).  
Table 6.1: ADF Test Results on Variables for Stationary 
Variable  Test statistic p-value Stationary 
In Logarithm  
Lgdp -1.501 0.5332 No 
Lcpi 4.141 1.0000 No 
interest -2.285 0.1769 No 
Lcredit -0.859 0.8011 No 
Lexrate -0.639 0.9806 No 
Lm1 -1.100 0.7149 No 
fed -0.399 0.9103 No 
Loil -1.038 0.7393 No 
First Difference of 
Logarithm 
 
DLgdp -21.214 0.0000 Yes 
DLcpi -6.685 0.0000 Yes 
Dinterest -13.570 0.0000 Yes 
DLcredit -16.093 0.0000 Yes 
DLexrate -15.937 0.0000 Yes 
DLm1 -15.553 0.0000 Yes 
Dfed -13.570 0.0000 Yes 
DLoil -14.382 0.0000 Yes 
 
Tests of lag length based on FPE, Akaike (AIC), HQIC, and Schwartz (SBIC) all 
indicate that one lag is the optimal option (see Table 6.2). As the likelihood ratio 
statistics recommend longer lags, this study therefore chose 12 lags (steps) for the 
estimations of impulse responses function and variance decomposition, as one lag 
was insufficient to capture the dynamic system of the model. 
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Table 6.2: Test of optimal lags 
Sample:  1995m8 - 2013m12                    Number of obs      =       221 
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 4796.58 
   
6.20E-30 -44.5449 -44.4942 -44.4195 
1 5004.57 415.98 64 0 1.6e-30* -45.8844* -45.4283* -44.7556* 
2 5054.89 100.65 64 0.002 1.90E-30 -45.7571 -44.8957 -43.625 
3 5099.7 89.606 64 0.019 2.20E-30 -45.5786 -44.3117 -42.4431 
4 5152.47 105.55 64 0.001 2.50E-30 -45.4742 -43.8019 -41.3353 
5 5207.9 110.86 64 0 2.80E-30 -45.3945 -43.3168 -40.2523 
6 5256.92 98.034 64 0.004 3.30E-30 -45.2551 -42.772 -39.1095 
7 5287.48 61.108 64 0.579 4.60E-30 -44.944 -42.0555 -37.7951 
8 5335.24 95.528 64 0.006 5.70E-30 -44.7929 -41.499 -36.6407 
9 5377.6 84.712 64 0.043 7.40E-30 -44.5916 -40.8923 -35.436 
10 5443.82 132.44 64 0 8.00E-30 -44.6123 -40.5076 -34.4533 
11 5506.79 125.94 64 0 9.00E-30 -44.6027 -40.0926 -33.4404 
12 5588.02 162.46* 64 0 8.80E-30 -44.763 -39.8475 -32.5973 
Endogenous:  DLoil, Dfed, DLgdp, DLcpi, DLm1, Dinterest, DLcredit, DLexrate 
Exogenous:  _cons 
 
Johansen‘s co-integration tests for variables in levels form indicates that there was 
co-integration at rank one among variables (see Table 6.3). This result is quite 
understandable as it may find individual co-integration among variables, such as 
between credit and GDP or between the exchange rate and interest rate. However, as  
Bagliano and Favero (1998) and Fung (2002) pointed out (among many others), the 
SVAR model implicitly allows co-integration in the data. Therefore, it is still 
acceptable to conduct SVAR estimation in this case. In addition, Johansen‘s co-
integration tests for the series at first different form indicates that there was no 
evidence of co-integration (see Table 6.4).  
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Table 6.3: Johansen tests for co-integration of variables at levels   
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =     226 
Sample:  1995m3 - 2013m12                                        Lags =       2 
maximum rank parms LL eigenvalue trace  statistic 5% critical  value 
0 72 4177.419 . 175.6955 156 
1 87 4205.296 0.21862 119.9413* 124.24 
2 100 4224.557 0.15671 81.42 94.15 
3 111 4239.12 0.12092 52.2922 68.52 
4 120 4251.471 0.10354 27.5906 47.21 
5 127 4258.716 0.0621 13.1015 29.68 
6 132 4262.784 0.03536 4.9656 15.41 
7 135 4265.23 0.02142 0.0726 3.76 
8 136 4265.267 0.00032 
  
 
Other tests for serial uncorrelated residuals and model stability all provided good 
results, indicating that the model could be used with all variables in first difference of 
logarithm and no imposition of the co-integration.  
 
Table 6.4: Johansen tests for co-integration of variables in first different form   
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =     226 
Sample:  1995m3 - 2013m12                                        Lags =       2 
maximum rank parms LL eigenvalue trace  statistic 5% critical  value 
0 72 4934.889 . 735.8545 156 
1 87 5019.989 0.53067 565.6544 124.24 
2 100 5093.44 0.47946 418.7542 94.15 
3 111 5151.584 0.4036 302.4647 68.52 
4 120 5201.018 0.35559 203.5967 47.21 
5 127 5242.544 0.30866 120.5445 29.68 
6 132 5275.696 0.25523 54.2421 15.41 
7 135 5293.322 0.14502 18.99 3.76 
8 136 5302.817 0.08094 
   
6.4.2 ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE CONTEMPORANEOUS COEFFICIENTS MATRIX 
Estimations of the contemporaneous coefficients matrix are presented in Table 6.5. 
Results from Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autocorrelation in the residuals of 
VAR models suggests that residuals were not serially correlated. 
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Table 6.5: Estimation of the Contemporaneous Coefficients Matrix A0 for 1995-2006 
 
DLoil Dfed DLgdp DLcpi DLm1 Dinterest DLcredit DLexrate 
DLoil 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dfed 
-0.0034* 
(0.00161) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DLgdp 
0.05026 
(0.05866) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
DLcpi 
-0.00609 
(0.00507) 0 
0.01197* 
(0.00724) 1 0 0 0 0 
DLm1 0 0 
0.08374 
(0.05274) 
0.85451 
(0.58963) 1 
0.78355 
(0.51076) 0 0 
Dinterest 0 
-0.13397 
(0.30172) 
0.02215*** 
(0.00846) 
-0.01234 
(0.09682) 0 1 0 0 
DLcredit 0 0 0 
-0.15288 
(0.37217) 
-0.7092*** 
(0.05278) 
-0.33513 
(0.31815) 1 
0.08442 
(0.16126) 
DLexrate 
0.00091 
(0.01108) 
-0.74435 
(0.56599) 
-0.07948*** 
(0.01616) 
-0.12206 
(0.18102) 
-0.03016 
(0.02545) 
-0.25426 
(0.15627) 0 1 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (standard errors are shown in parentheses below the individual 
coefficient estimates) 
 
Some of the estimated structural contemporaneous parameters supported their 
respective equations significantly. In particular, estimated coefficients of the m1 
function for 1995-2006 were insignificant, while in interest and exrate equations 
were significant, indicating that innovations in interest and exrate might work more 
efficiently than money supply. In 2007-2013, the estimated coefficients in m1 and 
exrate equations were significant, but interest and credit were not. 
One remarkable implication is that in both periods, the coefficients for gdp and cpi 
were positive in the exrate equations. This result suggests that when the total output 
and inflation increase, the exchange rate increases (i.e., VND devalues with respect 
to USD). 
Table 6.6: Estimation of Contemporaneous Coefficients Matrix A0 for 2007-2013 
 
DLoil Dfed DLgdp DLcpi DLm1 Dinterest 
DLcred
it DLexrate 
DLoil 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dfed 
-0.0042*** 
(0.00175) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DLgdp 
0.09155 
(0.10315) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
DLcpi 
-0.0301*** 
(0.00737) 0 
0.00856 
(0.00775) 1 0 0 0 0 
DLm1 0 0 
-0.04291 
(0.03456)  
-0.08921  
(0.50171) 1 
0.89751** 
(0.35283) 0 0 
Dinterest 0 
-1.9209*** 
(0.57134) 
-0.00386 
(0.01003) 
-0.6342*** 
(0.12868) 0 1 0 0 
DLcredit 0 0 0 
-0.28423 
(0.48881) 
-0.06602 
(0.1072) 
-0.30233 
(0.36735) 1 
0.23674 
(0.26753) 
DLexrate 
-0.00181 
(0.01467) 
-0.38046 
(0.85884) 
0.00766 
(0.01396) 
0.11153 
(0.21535) 
0.04645 
(0.04363) 
-0.26616 
(0.15530) 0 1 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (standard errors are shown in parentheses below the individual 
coefficient estimates) 
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6.4.3 RESPONSES OF DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS 
The results from impulse response trace out of the time path of the effect of structural 
shocks on the dependent variables of the model. This allows assessment of whether 
the identified shock could be interpreted as a monetary policy shock, by comparing 
the results to the consensus view of the transmission mechanism (Fung, 2002). In the 
next section, the estimated impulse responses of the variables over a 12-month period 
and to structural one-standard-deviation monetary policy shocks are graphically 
presented in various figures. In each figure, the primary line is the orthogonalised 
IRF, which in this case corresponds to selecting a Cholesky decomposition for the 
contemporaneous matrix. The shaded area represents the 68% confidence interval 
band for the IRF, which has become widely accepted in the economics literature, 
even though it is below the norm (95%) in statistics (for example, see Uhlig (2005)). 
In addition, it should be noted that although some IRFs might be statistically 
insignificant, they are still reported for purpose of comparison between periods. 
Responses of domestic variables to external shocks  
As a small, open economy, it is expected that Vietnam might suffer significantly 
from external shocks. Moreover, between two variables capturing external shocks in 
the model, oil and fed, one could expect that investigating oil might provide more 
meaningful outcomes than fed. This is because the financial markets in Vietnam have 
not been fully integrated into the global markets; therefore, the FED rate could have 
a less significant direct influence on the domestic economy than the world price of 
oil. This section investigates the impacts of oil on all domestic variables in the model 
and also looks for the linkage between the fed and interest.  
1995-2006 2007-2013 
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Figure 6.2: Responses of m1 to shock from oil 
1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
  
Figure 6.3: Responses of interest to shocks from oil and fed  
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 present the impulse responses of m1 and interest to shocks 
from oil in both sub-periods. Between 1995-2006, shock from oil exerted a positive 
impact on m1, but there was no significant impact found on interest. The magnitude 
of the response was small and faded out after five months. In the latter period, both 
m1 responded negatively while interest responded positively to a shock from oil. The 
magnitudes of the responses were bigger and disappeared after about 10 months. 
Note that changes in the results from the first period to the second period suggest that 
Vietnam‘s economy appears to have become more integrated to the world economy. 
More importantly, those results suggest that the SBV was more active in dealing with 
the impact from external inflationary factor from the first to the second periods. In 
other words, in the former periods from 1995-2006, the SBV appears to have been 
less concerned with external shocks. 
Figure 6.3 also depicts the response from interest to innovation in fed, continuing to 
support the above argument. Between 1996-2006, interest shows an insignificant 
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response toward shock from fed, however, from 2007-2013, the response became 
positively significant with greater value of the coefficient.  
In Figure 6.4, it is obvious to see that world oil price puts significant pressure on the 
consumer price index. Between 1996-2006, any shock from oil price created a 
positive response in cpi in the first two months and the impact lasted until the eighth 
month. For 2007-2013, the positive response was stronger in the first five months 
and only died out after a year (12 months). 
 
1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.4: Responses of cpi to shock from oil 
 
A shock from oil price also caused a negative impact on output growth in the short 
run between 1996-2006 (see Figure 6.5). The impact was significant and only 
disappeared after six months. In the latter period, 2007-2013, the response also 
started with a negative impact, but quickly recovered to positive values in one month. 
The results are quite interesting and understandable. Prior to 2006, Vietnam was a 
net importer of oil because the country exported crude oil, but imported final product 
for domestic use. The first oil refinery, Dung Quat, was built in 2005-2009 and began 
its production in 2010. This has helped the economy become less dependent on 
importing oil from overseas. Therefore, as the country gradually turned from being a 
net oil importer to a net exporter, the shock from higher world oil price has also 
turned from negative to positive. 
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1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.5: Responses of gdp to shock from oil 
 
Responses of various monetary channels to monetary shocks 
In the model, it is assumed that shock to m1 is treated as the first innovation to 
monetary policy, meaning that any change in m1 would be followed by change in 
interest, then other intermediate monetary instruments such as credit and exrate. 
Therefore, the estimations of impacts from shocks to m1 on interest, credit, exrate 
might provide useful information about the direction and impact from monetary 
policy toward different monetary channels. 
Responses from interest to shocks from m1 are presented in Figure 6.6 for both 
periods. Holding other things constant, common economic understanding would 
expect that any increase in m1 should be followed by a decrease in interest due to 
supply and demand effects. In the case of Vietnam, a positive shock from m1 led to a 
decrease of interest in the first two months, but the impact turned to positive from the 
third month before fading out in the fifth month (for 1995-2006) and the tenth month 
(2007-2013). There are several explanations for the presence of this liquidity puzzle. 
First, the inflationary effect caused by an increase in money aggregate may be 
greater when the economy is less open and financial markets are under-developed. 
Therefore, the emergence of inflationary effect might require a quicker positive 
response from the policy interest rate to control inflation. Second, money supply may 
increase passively due to expansion in other macroeconomic policies, that is, an 
increase in fiscal spending, rather than due to monetary policy operation. If this is the 
case, the SBV may need to increase the interest rate to control for a possible rise in 
the price level.  
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1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.6: Responses of interest to shock from m1 
 
Between 1995-2006, impacts from the shock in the money supply on credit varied 
significantly from the first to the third month. The results showed a positive impact 
in the first month, a slight negative influence in the second month, then a positive 
increase in the third month. However, the impact died out completely from the fourth 
month onward. In the latter period, the credit supply still received a positive impact 
from the money supply innovation in the first three months, though the magnitude 
was much lower and the duration expanded to the seventh month. Again, this result 
confirms the importance of aggregate money, as the main instrument of the SBV in 
the former period. In a relatively closed economy with an under-developed banking 
system, it seems easier for the SBV to use monetary aggregate to control the liquidity 
supply (credit supply) to the economy.  
 
1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.7: Responses of credit to shock from m1 
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Between 2007-2013, credit still displayed a positive reaction to a shock from m1, 
indicating that credit supply still played a significant role in monetary transmission 
mechanism after the opening of the economy. Certainly, the SBV could not divert 
from using a classic monetary instrument in the short time after financial 
liberalisation. 
Reaction from the exrate to shocks to the money supply in both surveyed periods 
demonstrated different behaviours. Between 1996-2006, the response was found to 
be positive in the first month and turned negative in the second and third months 
before reversing back to positive impacts in the fourth month onward. In contrast, 
between 2007-2013, the response was negative in the first month but reversed back 
to positive from the second month onward. In both periods, the impacts died out after 
the seventh month. The inconsistent and insignificant reactions from exrate in both 
periods are reasonable, as the money supply is not the main factor that drives the 
market exchange rate between VND and USD in Vietnam. Literature has argued that 
factors other than the money supply, such as dollarisation and the important 
influence of the ―black credit market‖, in fact, have a more dominant role in driving 
movement in the exchange rate. For example, (i) dollarisation was reported to stay at 
approximately 30% between 1996-2009 (H. M. Nguyen et al., 2012); (ii) the 
existence of a ―black‖ market for currency exchange without influence from the 
SBV; (iii) even the SBV occasionally uses administrative instruments rather than 
monetary tools to affect exchange rate. 
 
1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.8: Responses of exrate to shock from m1 
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Responses of output to shocks from monetary channels 
This section investigates the responses from gdp to shocks to various monetary 
channels in both sub-periods. 
  
1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.9: Responses of gdp to shock from interest 
 
In Figure 6.9, shocks from interest exert fluctuated impacts on gdp in both periods. 
Between 1996-2006, the response was positive in the second month, but turned 
negative in the third month before turning positive again. The duration of influence 
disappeared after the sixth month. A similar pattern was also found in 2007-2013, 
where the response turned from negative in the second month to positive in the third 
month, before quickly dying out after six months. However, it should be noted that 
the significant power of those impacts was small, so those arguments could not be 
claimed to be strong findings. 
1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.10: Responses of gdp to shock from credit 
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Regarding the credit channel, the response from gdp to a shock to credit was 
positively significant and lasted for nearly six months in the first period. However, 
the response was tiny and insignificant in the latter period. The large confidence 
interval, which included zero, indicates that an unexpected increase in credit may or 
may not have positively or negatively impacted on gdp.  
Among various monetary channels, the influence from the exchange rate channel 
appears to be the most significant. Responses from gdp to shocks from exrate were 
positive in both periods, particularly for 1995-2006. This means any devaluation of 
domestic currency exerted a positive impact on economic growth during the first 
several months (see Figure 6.11). However, for 2007-2013, the large confidence 
interval area also indicates that the impact was unclear.       
 
 
 
1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.11: Responses of gdp to shock from exrate 
 
In brief, the investigation of influence from shocks on various monetary channels on 
economic growth shows the significant role of the credit channel in the first period. 
The exchange rate channel exerted positive impacts all the time, while the linkages 
from the interest rate channel were relatively weak.  
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Responses of price level to shocks from monetary channels 
Figure 6.12 shows the responses from cpi to shocks from interest and m1. It is 
interesting to note that the consumer price index showed positive responses to shocks 
from the interest rate, while there were inverse responses to shocks from the money 
supply in two periods. However, the large shaded area in the estimations of impact 
from shock from interest on cpi should be noted, which indicate that the power of 
explanation was not strong. In other words, cpi might react either positively or 
negatively to shock from interest. 
The emergence of the price puzzle in both estimations supports the argument that the 
policy interest rate is not the main monetary instrument of the SBV in controlling 
inflation. In this case, it would raise the question as to whether the price level 
increases after an innovation in policy interest rate due to public concern about 
incoming inflationary pressure. 
The above argument is partly confirmed when looking at the responses from cpi to 
shocks to m1. Between 1996-2006, the response took a negative stance, again raising 
the question about the normal linkage between monetary instruments and inflation. 
In conventional economics, this means that SBV might use m1 to bolster the price 
level to avoid deflation. In fact, this result is rational because Vietnam actually 
experienced low and even negative inflation rates between 1999-2004. During this 
period, the proportion between m1 and m2 was also stable (see Figure 6.1), which 
indicates that monetary aggregate was slowly transmitted to liquidity supply in the 
economy. However, the response from cpi to innovation in m1 turned to positive and 
significant between 2007-2013. 
 
1995-2006 2007-2013 
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Figure 6.12: Responses of cpi to shock from interest and m1 
 
In summary, this evidence suggests that the money supply might have played a role 
in the inflation phenomenon since 2007. However, the persistence of price puzzle in 
both periods indicates that the SBV‘s interest rate policy was not the primary 
instrument or failed to control inflation. 
 
 
1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.13: Responses of cpi to shock from credit 
 
While the linkage between cpi and shock from credit was relatively weak, the 
response of the price level to innovation in the exchange rate was positive and 
significant. This is an expected finding from a small, open economy like Vietnam, 
where the exchange rate is an important factor in all sections. While the response 
between 1996-2006 was unclear (evidenced by a large confidence interval including 
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zero) and died out quickly, the impact in the latter period was highly significant and 
lasted for almost a year (12 months).  
 
1995-2006 2007-2013 
  
Figure 6.14: Responses of cpi to shock from exrate 
 
6.5 FINDINGS 
The investigation into the responses of the domestic variables to the various shocks 
to the economy has provided the following key findings: 
(i) External inflationary shocks (oil price) had significant impacts on the 
domestic economy. Together with the similar finding of a significant impact from 
external capital inflows in Chapter 5:, this confirms that Vietnam is a small, open 
economy that might be vulnerable to external shocks. 
(ii) Prior to 2007, the SBV leaned on using quantitative monetary instruments 
(money supply, direct credit control) to perform monetary policy. However, the 
efficiency of those instruments was unstable and reduced sharply with the opening of 
the economy. 
(iii)  The exchange rate was the effective channel for promoting growth for the 
whole research period. The credit channel was effective prior to 2007; however, its 
influence has recently faded. 
(iv)  The particular highly positive response from the consumer price index 
toward shocks from the money supply and exchange rate between 2007-2013 raises 
the question of the combined effect of monetary policy instruments toward a shock 
from capital inflows. An increase of capital inflows will raise the money supply and 
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put pressure on the exchange rate at the same time, which in turn contributes to 
higher inflation. This finding enhances the concern arising from Chapter 5: that the 
further opening of the capital account was the main cause of the surge in the inflation 
rate between 2007-2011. 
In summary, the outcomes from the SVAR analysis seem to confirm the main 
findings from the Trilemma analysis, which are: (i) while quantitative monetary 
instruments were efficient in controlling inflation prior to 2007, this is no longer the 
case; (ii) the exchange rate is the most significant factor in promoting economic 
growth; (iii) there were significant linkages between financial openness and the high 
inflation phenomenon between 2007-2011.    
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Chapter 7: Monetary Policy Framework 
and Discussion  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The conceptual and empirical analyses presented suggest both a need for changes to 
monetary policy frameworks and ways in which these might be developed. Utilising 
conventional qualitative analysis, this chapter addresses Research Question 3: How 
could Vietnam make adjustments to the monetary policy framework to sustain 
economic growth in the new international context? 
Specifically, the adequacy of the current framework for monetary policy is discussed 
in Section 7.2. The goals, channels, and instruments used in the monetary policy are 
the focus of Section 7.3. The performance of current and potential key monetary 
policy relations is addressed in Section 7.4. Finally, Section 7.5 considers the 
implementation of the financial liberalisation processes to make it a safer journey, 
along with the potential repositioning of the policy stances of the State Bank of 
Vietnam. 
7.2 ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM’S MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Drawing on theory fundamentals in Chapter 3: and empirical findings in Chapter 5: 
and Chapter 6:, key features of Vietnam‘s monetary transmission between 1995-2013 
are summarised in this section.  
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7.2.1 QUANTIFIED INSTRUMENTS USED TO BE THE FAVOURED TOOLS 
 
Figure 7.1: The dominance of quantified monetary instruments prior to 2007 
 
(1) Prior to 2007, quantified monetary instruments were the main policy tools of the 
SBV. Empirical findings from Chapter 5: showed that the credit and exchange rates 
were the most effective channels for influencing inflation and economic growth 
between 1995-2006. This is quite understandable, given the fact that Vietnam was a 
relatively closed economy with many restrictions on external capital inflows and 
under-developed capital markets during this period. Therefore, the SBV may have 
found it convenient to utilise lending facilities (refinancing and discount rates) to 
manage the credit supply and reserve requirement to adjust liquidity (see Section 
2.2.3). As the total amount of the money supply was effectively under control, 
quantified monetary instruments became the obvious choice of the SBV. 
Figure 7.2 visually describes the flows of funds in the banking system during this 
period. Due to the relatively closed financial system, the SBV was in a direct 
position to influence the liquidity flow from/to banking system. Commercial banks 
received the funds from the SBV and supplied them to the economy through 
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lending/deposit with firms, households, individuals. Those funds were used for 
investment, production, or consumption and would later return to the banking 
system.  
 
 
 Figure 7.2: Flows of Funds in Monetary Mechanism prior financial liberalisation 
 
(2) Empirical studies (Trilemma and VAR analysis) concluded that exchange rate 
was a significant factor influencing economic growth. This is an expected outcome 
for a small and export-oriented economy with a pegged exchange rate and 
dollarisation. The country needs to adjust their exchange rate at a favourable point to 
gain competitive advantages for exporting goods and services. 
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Figure 7.3: Official Exchange Rate and Official Bands 1995-2013
28
 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on IMF and SBV data sources 
 
Overall, one might say that the SBV was successful in moderating its pegged 
exchange rate between 1995-2006. To manage the negative impact from the Asian 
crisis in 1997, the SBV continuously widened the currency bands from  0.25% to 
 10% between 1997-1998 (see Figure 7.3). As the result, while the official exchange 
rate was devalued in total by 27% from 1997-1999, the domestic economy emerged 
from the crisis without serious damage. Until 2007, right before the WTO accession, 
the exchange rate between the VND/USD gradually depreciated a further 14% in an 
increasing devaluation manner, which accompanied the period of time when 
Vietnam‘s economy was growing at the best pace in its history (see Section 2.1.2).  
(3) Market interest rate plays a minor role in financial system. Empirical findings 
showed that the interest rate and its gap with the FED rate provided no firm linkages 
with macroeconomic indicators of the inflation rate and growth (Sections 5.4, 5.5, 
                                                 
28
 The SBV quoted the official exchange rate as the daily average exchange rates of the interbank 
market of the previous business day. Based on this exchange rate, commercial banks set their own rate 
within a band of plus and minus the official band. This system might be classified as a crawling peg. 
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and 6.4.3). In addition, the correlation of monthly policy rates between the SBV and 
the FED was 0.6 for 1995-2006 and -0.12 for 2007-2013. While it might be argued 
that under-developed financial markets were likely to limit the effectiveness of the 
monetary transmission through interest rates (Camen, 2006), those results firmly 
indicate that the interest rate was not at the central position of the SBV‘s monetary 
policy between 1995-2013. 
Why was the interest rate channel not effective during this time? One reason was 
because the SOCBs, the dominant players in the banking system at that time, used to 
provide dedicated loans to SOEs without considering market factors (such as credit 
risks). Because the price of money was not adequately valued, this is no doubt as to 
why empirical results show that changes to the interest rate exerted no significant 
influence on other macro-economic indicators. The SBV even admitted that a 
restrictive monetary policy would not be effective in reducing inflation and together 
with the government, it regularly used administrative instruments to control prices 
(Camen, 2006). 
7.2.2 TROUBLES FROM FOREIGN FLOWS SINCE 2007 
(1) The surge of external flows created shocked impact on the SBV’s control of 
monetary policy. Since 2007, as the WTO accession required the country to further 
open the economy and financial system, the SBV had to cope with more challenges 
to its operation. The accession of foreign firms and banks (reflecting investors‘ 
optimism about Vietnam after its WTO accession), accompanied by foreign currency 
inflows, required the conversion to domestic currency VND, which created pressure 
on the pegged exchange rate and total money supply (M2). In addition, the slow 
response of the SBV to increase interest rates in a timely manner in late 2010, 
coupled with external influences from high world commodity prices, contributed to 
more inflationary pressures (see Figure 1.3). Furthermore, the relatively undeveloped 
money and bond markets constrained the SBV‘s capability to use conventional open-
market operations to control the flows of fund. Those are the key factors that explain 
why Vietnam experienced high inflation between 2007-2008 and 2011-2012. 
 138 Chapter 7: Monetary Policy Framework and Discussion 
 
Figure 7.4: The Penetration of External Inflows into the Money Supply 
 
Figure 7.5 describes how external inflows distracted the SBV‘s control on domestic 
flows of fund. The presence of foreign banks and firms has created the potential for 
enormous flows of foreign currency into domestic markets. At first, foreign banks 
might need to acquire domestic currency from the SBV to do business, but they can 
then obtain it from other sources. Compared to domestic banks, foreign banks have 
more capital, higher credit ratings, and better service quality, which assists them to 
rapidly gain popularity in the economy. Domestic banks and firms now have new 
options to make the payment with international counterparts, rather than depending 
on a few SOCBs as before. There are some new channels of transactions, such as 
between foreign firms and foreign banks, that are completely out of the SBV‘s 
control. In the long run, dollarisation might be worsening whenever inflation 
increases.   
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Figure 7.5: The Penetration of External Inflows into Flows of Fund 
 
(2) There is absence or insignificant presence of asset price and relative asset price 
channels in the mechanism. This is an unsurprising finding given the under-
development of financial markets in Vietnam. Activities regarding these markets are 
mostly driven by speculation factors rather than macro policies (Vo & Pham, 2010). 
 
7.2.3 INTERBANK TRANSACTION – NEW CHANNEL OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION 
 
  
Figure 7.6: Interbank Transaction Volume from 2005-2013 (billion VND) 
Source:  Author‘s compilation from various sources 
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The previous section showed that unprecedented surges in capital inflows were not 
adequately sterilised by the SBV, leading to high inflation and small panic in the 
financial system between 2007-2011. The SBV‘s loss of control of fund flows is a 
real issue and it might be made worse by the emergence of a new monetary 
channel—the interbank transaction. Figure 7.6 shows that total value of transactions 
on interbank markets went up continuously from 200 thousands billion VND/month 
in early of 2007 to nearly 1 million billion VND/month at the end of 2011. Those 
figures reflect the phenomenal development in this new area of banking system, 
particularly as it was accompanied with high inflation figures during the same period.  
 
 
Figure 7.7: Interbank – New Channel of Monetary Transmission   
 
Are there any linkages among high inflation, the central bank losing control of the 
money supply, and increasing volumes of interbank transactions? McLeay, Radia, 
and Thomas (2014) offered an explanation by examining how money was created in 
a modern economy. According to McLeay et al. (2014), the majority of money in the 
modern economy is created by commercial banks when they are making loans, rather 
than by a central bank when they increase/decrease money supply as in traditional 
perception. In traditional perception, banks can only lend money out after they 
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receive deposits from household savings. In modern banking, banks do not necessary 
wait for the deposits to come in, they can simply make a new loan by creating a 
matching deposit in the borrower‘s bank account, thereby creating new money. 
Although banks cannot do so freely without limitation due to risk management, as 
long as a new deposit is coming in, a new loan can go out in the opposite direction. 
Rather than depending solely on a central bank to receive a money supply, the 
development of an interbank market allows banks to receive a wholesale supply of 
funds to fulfil even the enormous borrowing demand of their customers. The result is 
that there would be more money in circulation, with a higher money multiplier 
factor.  
The illustration for the above explanation can be found by examining the 
development of the money supply in Vietnam. As could be seen from Figure 7.8, 
between 2003-2012, M2 always had a higher growth rate than M1 (except in 2008 
and 2010). The average growth rate of M2 during this period was 28%/year while for 
M1 was 19%/year, which contributed to the increase of the ratio M2/M1 from 2.1 in 
2003 to 4.1 in 2012. This, coupled with the quick expansion of interbank transaction 
volume (see Figure 7.6), offers the reason why the SBV would find it harder to 
control the total money supply. 
 
 
Figure 7.8: The growth rate (y-o-y) of M1 and M2 in 1996-2014 (unit: billion VND) 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on IMF e-Library Database (Accessed on 15/1/2015) 
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
M2 M1
 142 Chapter 7: Monetary Policy Framework and Discussion 
In practice, the total money supply only becomes harder to control when the banking 
system becomes more innovated. Fortunately, McLeay et al. (2014) found that the 
amount of money created in the economy still depends on interest rate setting by the 
central bank, even in developing economies where bank lending is seen as the most 
effective channel of monetary policy. This would indicated to the SBV that instead 
of monitoring the total amount (quantity) of money in the economy, it would be 
better to take control of the interest rate (quality) of the money.  
7.2.4 SUMMARY 
Prior to 2007, the relatively closed economy and financial system allowed the SBV 
to effectively use quantified monetary instruments to control the money supply to the 
economy. The credit supply from bank lending and the exchange rate were the most 
effective channels in the monetary transmission mechanism (see Section 6.4.3). The 
interest rate did not play a significant role due to the dominance and distortion of the 
SOCBs in the banking system, which always provided loans to the SOEs without 
considering market factors (such as credit risks). 
The event of joining the WTO in 2007 and further opening of the economy exerted 
many challenges to the SBV‘s monetary policy framework. First, the surge of capital 
inflows put huge pressure on the domestic financial market, which the SBV failed to 
sterilise, resulting in the high increase of the money supply starting in 2007. Second, 
the entry of new foreign banks with an enormous supply of foreign currency exerted 
a greater challenge to the SBV in coping with the worsening dollarisation. Third, the 
innovation of the domestic banking system leading to increasing interbank 
transaction activities extended money circulation and money multiplier without the 
SBV‘s awareness. 
The emergence of these problems troubled the SBV‘s operation, resulting in high 
inflation and a slowed down economy between 2007-2011. As their old policies were 
unsuccessful, the SBV turned to non-market administrative measures, such as caps 
on interest rates, quotas on bank credit, and restrictions on lending to different 
sectors, which all further contributed to market distortions and inefficiencies that are 
still prevalent. In the next section, this study proposes a range of recommendations to 
the SBV to manage these challenges, and to regain the control and efficiency of its 
monetary policy framework. 
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7.3 TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE MONETARY POLICY  
7.3.1 THE GOAL OF MONETARY POLICY 
As presented in Section 3.3, targets of monetary policy kept changing with the times 
to adapt to the development of financial and economic conditions. For the last two 
decades, the role of the monetary policy in Vietnam has been strictly tied to a set of 
objectives, with economic growth being the most important. This strategy was 
strongly criticised in the literature, with more and more empirical studies arguing for 
a more focused goal of the SBV (Camen, 2006; A. T. P. Le, 2007; To et al., 2012). 
For example, the latest government policy document regarding the operation in 2015 
required the SBV to:  
Manage the monetary policy in a proactive and flexible manner in close 
association with the fiscal policy to control inflation, stabilize macro-
economy, support economic growth at a reasonable level, and ensure the 
liquidity of credit institutions. Flexibly manage the reasonable interest and 
exchange rates in consistence with macro-economic and monetary 
developments, especially inflation; and ensure the value of VND, continue to 
restrict the dollarization and goldarization. Implementing credit measures 
towards credit extension together with credit quality control; focusing on 
lessening difficulties to help boosting business and production; continuing to 
implement programs on connecting bank loans with economic policies, 
shifting credit structure towards focusing on the priority areas. (Resolution 
No. 77/2014/QH13 dated November 10, 2014 on the Economic 
Development Plan for 2015). 
The current mindset inside the SBV is that they could use the monetary policy to 
achieve many objectives at the same time. From the above statement, it seems that 
the SBV considers that it should be in charge of almost every possible aspect of the 
monetary policy, including price stability, economic growth, the exchange rate, 
interest rate, and credit supply. The literature review (Chapter 3:) showed that, in the 
history and theory of monetary policy frameworks, any central bank would only be 
able to follow a specific set of frameworks. Jan Tinbergen, who was awarded the 
first Nobel prize in Economics, made the famous economics rule under his name that 
―a single instrument can only be used to achieve a single target‖ (Tinbergen, 1952). 
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Therefore, any comprehensive multi-objectives monetary approach risks being 
inefficient and impossible (Trilemma problem, see Section 4.3).  
Nowadays, most central banks around the world consider price stability to be the 
main priority task (see Section 3.3). Particularly in relation to advanced economies, 
there is a general agreement in academic literature that the key role of monetary 
policy is to maintain price stability (Bernanke et al., 2001). This is based on the 
recognition that economic growth and employment could be promoted if inflation is 
kept at low and stable rates (Hammond et al., 2009). Following the global financial 
crisis in 2008, the consensus has shifted considerably and financial stability is now a 
key concern. The breaking paper by Blanchard, Dell‘Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) 
argued emphatically that price stability is necessary but not sufficient to deliver 
macroeconomic stability. In addition to price level, policymakers have to monitor 
other targets, including the composition of output, the behaviour of asset prices, and 
the leverage of different agents (Blanchard et al., 2010).  
With the latest perception of policy goal, under the light of Tinbergen's rule, it is 
recommended that the SBV monitors all macroeconomic indicators closely and 
chooses the appropriate monetary framework to achieve a specific goal. In addition, 
the SBV should pay more attention to price stability (inflation control) as the 
ultimate objective, rather than any other macroeconomic objectives. In fact, statistics 
show that the economy achieved a quite good performance when inflation was 
controlled effectively in 1992-1997 and 2000-2006; and suffered setbacks when 
inflation was out of control in 1986-1991 (Figure 2.6) and 2006-2012 (Figure 2.7). In 
addition, VAR estimation outcomes for 1995-2006 and 2007-2012 both confirmed 
the close relationship between inflation and the economic output. In all channel 
estimations, the contribution of shock from inflation on the variation of output 
overcame all other monetary policy instruments at all times. 
7.3.2 MONETARY TRANSMISSION CHANNELS 
To achieve its policy goals, the SBV should understand the operation and know how 
to improve the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism (Table 7.1). For 
example, if the SBV knew that exchange rate channel is now more influential than 
the interest rate channel in affecting price level (as per the findings from the SVAR 
analysis in Chapter 5:), it might have taken a different approach in dealing with 
increasing high inflation between 2007-2011. Instead of a slight adjustment to the 
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exchange rate and a high rise in the interest rate, a bigger change to exchange rate 
with a small increase in the interest rate might have been more effective. Arguably, 
limited knowledge of the monetary transmission mechanism made the SBV‘s effort 
ineffective and costly in controlling inflation (Vo & Pham, 2010). 
To improve the efficiency of the monetary transmission channels, the SBV needs to 
improve the quality and efficiency of relevant components in each channel. Those 
components might range from legal and institutional issues of the money market, to 
functions of the banking system. The detail of this recommendation is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation; however, general ideas might be worth discussing here. 
For example, to improve the effectiveness of the credit channel, in the short run, the 
SBV needs to find effective solutions to reduce bad debts (see Section 2.1.3); in the 
long run, the SBV must wipe out the unhealthy credit relationship between the 
SOCBs and SOEs (see Section 2.1.3). In another case, the efficiency of the interest 
rate channel would be improved only if the SBV allowed the market interest rate to 
be fully liberalised, no more controlled band or ceiling rates on commercial bank 
loans. Furthermore, the SBV not only needs to monitor the traditional transmission 
channels (interest rate, exchange rate, and credit channels), it should also observe the 
development of new ones (asset price, expectation price, and interbank channels). 
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Table 7.1: Interactions between Monetary Channels and Monetary Targets 
No. Channels 
Target (Control 
measure) 
Type of 
Targeting 
Impacted 
Economic 
attribute 
Measure 
1 
Narrow Credit 
Channel (see 
Section 3.5.4, 
Figure 3.5 & 
Figure 7.1) 
The growth in 
money supply 
Monetary Inflation 
A given rate of 
change in the 
CPI 
2 
Exchange Rate 
Channel (see 
Section 3.5.2, 
Figure 3.5 & 
Figure 7.1) 
The spot price of 
the currency 
Exchange 
Rate 
Foreign 
Exchange 
The spot price of 
the currency 
3 
Interest Rate 
Channel (see 
Section 3.5.1, 
Figure 3.5 & 
Figure 7.1) 
Interbank interest 
rate 
Price Level Price Stability 
A specific value 
of  CPI 
Inflation Inflation 
A given rate of 
change in the 
CPI 
4 
Asset Price 
Channel (see 
Section 3.5.3 & 
Figure 7.4) 
Interest rate 
Financial 
Assets Price 
Consumption 
Price level of 
financial assets 
5 
Monetarist 
channel (see 
Figure 3.5) 
The growth in 
money supply 
Financial 
Assets Price 
Saving and 
Consumption 
Price level of 
financial assets 
6 
Interbank Channel 
(see Figure 7.7) 
Foreign 
Inflows/Outflows 
Fund Flows 
External 
Exposure 
Credit, CPI, 
exchange rate 
7 All channels Combination Employment Unemployment 
A given value of 
unemployment 
rate 
 
In addition, it is necessary for the SBV to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the 
combination among the channels and understand how to use them efficiently. For 
example, if the SBV is concerned about the performance of inflation, they must 
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simultaneously control the growth of the money supply and interbank interest rates, 
while closely monitoring the performance of the CPI level (see Table 7.1).  
In addition, the SBV need to keep in mind that simultaneously pursuing multiple 
objectives and targets is impossible. The analysis in 3.7 has shown that the SBV may 
have violated the Trilemma rule between 2006-2008. In detail, the country tried to 
further open the capital account, while still maintaining a relatively fixed exchange 
rate and independent interest rate policies. This pursuit of inconsistent 
macroeconomic policies once pushed ASEAN countries into financial crisis in 1997. 
In the case of Vietnam, although the country did not fall into crisis, it still resulted in 
high inflation and financial turbulence (see Section 2.1.3). 
 
 
Figure 7.9: Three Aspects of Trilemma rule  
 
This means that in order to avoid financial turbulence, the SBV should carefully 
monitor the interest rate and exchange rate channels, while allowing the movement 
of capital flows. Capital inflows were found to have significant influence on 
economic growth in Vietnam (N. T. Nguyen & Kalirajan, 2006; Vo & Pham, 2010), 
while the interest rate and exchange rate should be the key instruments for the SBV 
to maintain price stability. Therefore, making a sound monetary policy means that 
the SBV must also take into account the balance between capital inflows and price 
stability.  
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7.4 KEY RELATIONSHIPS AND MONETARY POLICY 
Money Supply and Credit Policy 
Between 1990-2006, particularly after the introduction of the Law of the State Bank 
in 1997, the implementation of the monetary policy mainly focused on aggregate 
money supply. This was an internal strategy and not formally announced to the 
public. Many studies have confirmed that the SBV‘s credit to banks (SBV‘s 
refinancing facilities) has been a main channel through which liquidity is provided to 
the economy to promote output growth (Camen, 2006; Vo et al., 2002). 
This strategy might only be appropriate for a closed economy. In Chapter 5:, the 
SVAR estimation also confirmed that the influence of the money supply on macro 
indicators (economic growth and inflation) was less effective in 2007-2013 than in 
1996-2006. In addition, as pointed out in Chapter 1:, after joining the WTO and 
implementing many openness polices to the financial market, the SBV still mainly 
used a reserve requirement ratio to control the liquidity supply to the domestic 
economy. 
Statistics from Section 2.3 indicate the segmentation of the credit market, with 
SOCBs tending to apply more non-commercial practices, while JSCBs apply more 
commercial practices (Camen, 2006). Literature suggests the existence of private 
sector borrowers is a necessary condition for a monetary policy to work. That 
monetary policy loses its effectiveness if this condition is not satisfied (Koo, 2014). 
This partly explains why the SBV‘s monetary policy was ineffective later, when 
inflation and the economic slow-down made a severe crush on the private sectors 
(see 2.1.3).  
Another issue related to credit supply regards the existence of the informal financial 
sector. Due to difficult access to formal external finance from the banking system, 
private enterprises, particularly those small in size, have to seek credit from the 
informal financial sector. In Vietnam, informal credit comes from sources such as 
professional moneylenders, relatives, and friends. Like other countries, it is quite 
difficult to measure the scale of this sector in Vietnam. As of 1999, the IMF 
estimated that only 25% of total savings was held in the banking system, and a 
similar figure (around 25%) of broad money was in the form of cash balances kept 
outside banks (International Monetary Fund, 1999). This means that a significant 
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amount of financial transactions might take place outside of the official banking 
system. This partly contributes to explaining why the interest rate channel is not 
significant in the monetary transmission mechanism (see Section 6.4.3).  
In summary, it might be misleading if the SBV still pays too much attention to 
controlling the absolute value of M2. Instead of controlling the quantity of money, it 
would be better if the SBV changed their focus to control its price (interest rate). 
Interest Rate Policy  
In developed economies, the market interest rate is the most important indicator of a 
monetary policy. Any small adjustment to the interest rate might quickly exert a 
large influence on the whole financial system. Compared to other central banks in 
more developed economies, the SBV could not use the interest rate instrument as a 
strong intervention in the financial market. In turn, underdeveloped financial markets 
are likely to limit the effectiveness of the monetary transmission through interest 
rates (Camen, 2006). That is why there are weak linkages between the market 
interest rate and the performance of macro indicators (gdp and cpi) in both the short 
run and long run (see Section 6.4.3). Alternatively, the interest rate policy was less 
efficient in Vietnam between 1996-2013. 
On the other hand, in practice, the liberalisation of lending rates for domestic 
currency loans between 2000-2001 did not lead to a noticeable increase in lending 
rates in Vietnam as initially expected. The lack of a response of interest rates to the 
liberalisation of lending rates can be partly explained by the fact that at the time that 
interest rates were liberalised, three quarters of total loans were provided by SOCBs, 
which have a history of providing loans without taking credit risks fully into account 
(Camen, 2006, p. 237). 
To make the policy sound more efficient, it is recommended that the SBV spend 
more effort on the deregulation of market interest rates, and stop the kinds of lending 
schemes that provide special funds at a lower cost for a particular group of industries 
or regions. This would lead to a more market-oriented interest rate determination 
process by commercial banks, which would make investment decisions in the 
economy more precise and help the SBV gain more power for the interest rate policy.  
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Exchange Rate Policy 
As Vietnam has tried hard to promote economic growth through its exports engine, the 
exchange rate policy has played a crucial role in the economy in the past and it expects 
to do the same in future. Interestingly, the market exchange rate was found to have a 
strong linkage with output both before and after 2007. This was also the most effective 
monetary tool to promote the output growth of the economy (see Section 6.4.3).  
The SBV occasionally informed the public that volatility in the USD/VND rate was 
expected to be kept to no more than 2% per annum (T. P. Nguyen & D. T. Nguyen, 
2010). However, the move incited fears that the SBV might be left as the only legal 
supplier of foreign exchange, and had to use the country‘s international reserves to 
back what was perceived to be an over-valued exchange rate. In reality, the 
commercial banks‘ exchange rates were always set at the upper boundary allowed by 
the SBV, demonstrating the free market upward trend of the exchange rate. 
Expectations of a stable exchange rate have contributed to a strong increase in 
borrowing in foreign currency in Vietnam, together with lower interest rates on 
foreign currency loans compared to VND. In the long run, this combination of 
exchange rate policy and interest rate policy will be unmanageable given the higher 
opening of financial markets, due to the Trilemma rule (see 3.7). Luckily, the market 
did not, in that instance, decide to bet against the SBV, but high-risk strategies like 
these could easily bring about surges in capital outflows such as that which happened 
in Thailand in 1997 (Leung, 2009). In fact, due to a surge in capital inflows in late 
2007 and early 2008, the SBV faced the dilemma of whether or not to intervene in 
the foreign exchange market to prevent the USD/VND exchange rate from falling 
(equivalent to the appreciation of VND) (T. P. Nguyen & D. T. Nguyen, 2010).  
In the ―optimal‖ framework, the exchange rate policy also needs to support the goal 
of price stability. Given the current features of the under-developed financial system, 
the literature shows that a floating regime is not suitable for a small open and price-
taker economy like Vietnam, while a hard fixed exchange rate will make the 
financial system vulnerable to external shocks and speculative attacks (Hammond et 
al., 2009). Therefore, a pegged exchange rate (managed fixed with a band) would be 
an obvious choice for the country. 
However, recognising the importance of Trilemma rule, the SBV would be more 
flexible in choosing the more important goal: to keep the exchange rate at a desired 
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level (controlled exchange rate) or to attract more foreign investment (free capital 
movement). In addition, this slow-adjusted exchange rate regime has been found to 
have a negative effect on the development of the foreign exchange market. Other 
consequences might include higher transaction costs, greater reliance on the parallel 
market, and deeper dollarisation (T. P. Nguyen & Nguyen, 2009).  
Greater exchange rate flexibility would help buffer external shocks, facilitate 
improved reserve adequacy, and help lay the groundwork for shifting toward using 
inflation as a nominal anchor over the medium term (International Monetary Fund, 
2014). 
7.5 FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION AND CENTRAL BANKS 
An increasing number of studies have revealed that financial liberalisation‘s benefits 
are broadly conditional. That said, financial liberalisation‘s positive impact on 
growth is dependent on the economic development level, the existence of relatively 
developed domestic institutions and sound macroeconomic policy (Gamra, 2009). 
Therefore, it is necessary to account for the institutional changes and economic 
impacts from financial liberalisation as part of developing an optimal monetary 
policy framework in Vietnam, or in nations facing similar challenges.  
Riedel and Clayton (2009) noted that accumulation of international reserves, 
particularly in 2007 and 2008, helped to expand domestic credit and fuel inflation. In 
Chapter 5:, the results from the Trilemma Analysis also suggested that changes in the 
restriction level toward international capital flows and a level of total reserves 
showed significant linkages with growth and inflation volatilities. In other words, as 
the financial system was further opened up, foreign capital flows and their 
consequences became harder to control. It also demonstrated that interest rate 
independence and exchange rate stability, those popular monetary tools, also had no 
significant impacts on the movement and volatility of the growth rate and inflation 
rate during this time. It seems obvious to recommend that the SBV‘s old approach of 
monetary policies were less efficient in coping with new challenges of further 
financial liberalisation (more capital account open). In short, it would be argued that 
the fairly liberalised capital account and openness to capital flows since 2007 have 
complicated the implementation of monetary policy, making it difficult for the SBV 
to maintain a stable exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. 
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In addition to making the exchange rate scheme more flexible and adjusting the 
interest rate policy more efficiently (as mentioned in previous sections), it is 
suggested that Vietnam should try to hold back and monitor the financial openness 
more carefully. In the meantime, the country should focus on achieving the necessary 
pre-conditions to receive the most benefits, before advancing further into financial 
openness progress, such as: (i) a higher level of economic development; (ii) a higher 
level of income; (iii) more macroeconomic stabilisation; and (iv) improved financial 
institutional development. 
Many studies have argued that it would be better for the central bank in developing 
countries to gain independence, as in developed countries (Crowe & Meade, 2008; 
Cukierman, Miller, & Neyapti, 2000; Haan, Masciandaro, & Quintyn, 2008). The 
recognition is that the increasing independence supports the central bank in 
promoting growth and employment by keeping low and stable inflation (Hammond 
et al., 2009). 
Similar to other emerging countries, the SBV has less and lower effective 
instruments but must deal with more objectives: from output growth, employment 
promotion, to financial and price stability. In addition, Vietnam‘s macroeconomic 
conditions still consist of many constraints, which makes it harder for the SBV to 
implement an effective monetary policy, including underdeveloped financial 
markets, a monetary policy that has too many objectives (growth, exchange rate, 
employment, stability), the dominance of fiscal policy, a weak banking system 
(central bank cannot use aggressive instruments because they can destroy weak 
commercial banks), and greater openness (allowing capital inflows). Improving the 
capacity of the SBV to gradually address those constraints will be a crucial reform. 
The role of the public‘s memory and expectation on inflation are both crucial in 
shaping the current inflation. This implies the significant role of the credibility of the 
policy toward inflation (T. T. H. Nguyen & D. T. Nguyen, 2010).  If the SBV is to be 
a more professionally independent agency from government, it seems appropriate 
that it operate under the surveillance of the National Assembly, the highest state 
power in policy making in Vietnam. With a new ―optimal‖ framework, it would then 
be better placed to achieve price stability and other selected goals. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future Studies 
This chapter briefly represents the main findings, limitations, and recommendations 
for future studies.  
8.1 MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study is the first attempt to explore deeply into the monetary policy framework 
of Vietnam, both before and after WTO accession and the further opening of the 
economy. In general, it found that the economy experienced decent performance 
between 1995-2006, with a high growth rate and stable macroeconomic conditions. 
However, the events of joining the WTO in 2007 and the global financial crisis since 
2008 have exerted undesirable monetary impacts on the economy, particularly the 
striking high inflation rate, which the domestic policy-makers have failed to 
effectively contain. Based on empirical study results and the literature review, this 
study suggests that in order to overcome this challenging period and get the economy 
back on track again, the Vietnamese central bank (SBV) should make some essential 
adjustment to the current monetary policy framework. The key suggestions include 
reviewing the objective, instrument mix, and the goals of the monetary policy, 
adding qualified monetary instruments to complement quantified monetary 
instruments, and flexibly adjusting the exchange rate (or some other adjustments) to 
avoid the Trilemma problem. 
Research Question 1: How are changes in Vietnam's international policy 
configurations and its inflation performance empirically related?  
The first research question of this dissertation concerned the effectiveness of the 
SBV‘s monetary policy in controlling inflation in Vietnam. The Trilemma analysis in 
Chapter 5: found a similar pattern between the inflation movement and the stability 
of the Trilemma index. Looking at Figure 2.16 and Figure 5.5, between 1998-2004, 
the Trilemma index was stable and inflation rate was low, which all contributed to 
the high performance in economic growth. However, since 2007, when the Trilemma 
index was fluctuating at a higher average level, the economy was significantly 
slowed down and inflation climbed to two-digit value. In Section 5.4, further 
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investigation of the linkages between inflation, its volatility, and the Trilemma 
policies also found the insignificant contribution from the change of interest rate 
independence and exchange rate stability toward inflation. This section also points 
out that foreign capital inflows (denoted as financial openness) had the most 
significant linkage with inflation. 
In Chapter 6:, estimation results from the SVAR model continued to confirm the 
loose connection between inflation and the policy interest rate, but found a strong 
linkage with the money supply. In addition, external inflationary force (oil price in 
model) was found to exert significant influence on all domestic variables. 
The outcomes from the two empirical chapters has provided some evidence to 
demonstrate that the shocking increase in the money supply (partly contributed by 
external inflationary pressure) led to high inflation between 2007-2011. However, 
the SBV failed to contain the phenomenon with their regular monetary instruments: 
the policy interest rate and exchange rate. 
Research Question 2: Do current monetary policies support sustainable 
economic growth?   
The second research question concerned the contribution of monetary instruments in 
promoting economic growth. In Section 5.5, the linkages between growth, growth 
volatility, and other Trilemma policies were investigated in various regressions. In 
general, for both sub periods between 1998-2006 and 2007-2013, the studies all 
confirmed the most significant contribution of the exchange rate stability toward the 
growth rate and its volatility. There was no significant influence from interest rate 
independence, while the impact from financial openness was unclear and fluctuated. 
The analysis of the SVAR model in Chapter 6: presented the same conclusion about 
the impact of the exchange rate on economic growth. In 1996-2006, the credit supply 
was the most influencing factor, but the linkage disappeared between 2007-2013; 
whereas the impacts from exchange rate were significantly positive all the time. In 
other words, a small devaluation of exchange rate supported a higher growth rate in 
the short term. This is not a surprising finding, as Vietnam has always considered 
international trade to be the important motivation of economic development; 
therefore, the exchange rate must play a significant role. 
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Again, no strong connection was found between the interest rate and economic 
growth in both sub-periods. This finding reflects the fact that, although being 
announced to be liberalised, the interest rate was still strictly controlled by the SBV 
and therefore doesn‘t represent the equilibrium between supply and demand in 
financial markets.  
Research Question 3: How could Vietnam make adjustments to its monetary 
policy framework to sustain economic growth in the new international context? 
Undoubtedly, the current monetary policy framework needs adjustment, which was 
the concern of the third research question. Camen (2006) argued that in Vietnam the 
structural transformation of the current financial system makes it difficult to identify 
stable relationships between principal macroeconomic variables, with the implication 
that the monetary policy needs to be conducted in the presence of important 
uncertainties.  
The combined outcomes from the Trilemma analysis and SVAR estimation on the 
monetary transmission mechanism showed that the inflation phenomenon was 
coming from weak management of monetary policy toward foreign capital flows. As 
a consequence, the exchange rate and interest rate policies became less effective and 
failed to stabilise the economy. Therefore, this study suggests that inflation targeting 
is a required objective of monetary policy, more flexibility to the exchange rate 
scheme, a more controlled interest rate policy, while the SBV should gain more 
independence from the government. While not currently playing a big role in the 
economy, the asset price channel should gain more focus in future. 
In terms of theory contribution, the experiment of a combination of Trilemma and 
VAR/SVAR analyses in this study developed a rational approach to examine the 
performance of a country‘s monetary policy framework. It might develop into an 
effective tool to assess monetary policies, particularly for developing countries in the 
new context of an international financial system as the consequence of the global 
crisis of 2008.  
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8.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
8.2.1 LIMITATIONS 
While the research questions appear well addressed in the research undertaken, with 
some interesting findings presented, it is important to address the limitations in 
completing this dissertation. 
First, the quality and credibility of Vietnam‘s data is quite questionable. This is a 
well-known problem when conducting research about the country, particularly in 
macroeconomics. To account for the issue, this dissertation tried to utilise data from 
IMF sources only; however, as IMF need to collect data from Vietnamese partners as 
well, the question of the validity of the numbers and figures still remains. Certainly, 
invalid data would provide biased estimations and incorrect arguments. 
Second, it might be insufficient to use one empirical method to address one research 
question. This means, in arguing for the rightful combination of a monetary policy 
instrument, that it is better to look for another approach rather than using only the 
Trilemma analysis. Mandilaras (2015) provides an alternative and more 
comprehensive development of this work. The same issue occurs when using only 
SVAR to estimate the impacts from monetary instruments on macroeconomic 
indicators. The addition of more empirical analysis, if they provide the same 
outcomes, will make the findings stronger and more significant. 
Third, it might be insufficient to look solely at monetary policy as the main force 
behind the slowdown of an economy. There are many other macro policies, such as 
fiscal policy, trade policy, labour policy, etc., which might all contribute to the same 
problem. In that context, it is necessary to conduct more comprehensive research that 
covers more macro policies and their interactions. 
8.2.2 FUTURE STUDIES 
There was only so much that could be done in the time available; thus, some 
developments in this work were limited and have been left for further research. 
Additionally, the above limitations also provide some guidance for further research, 
which might cover the following areas:  
First, there is room for improvement in the methodology. For example, the use of 
VAR and SVAR to analyse monetary mechanisms could be further developed. While 
VAR can help to estimate the impacts from monetary instruments, SVAR can help to 
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identify how the monetary mechanism works in practice. Complementary conceptual 
developments could lead to more effective research and policies. Conducting FVAR 
analysis would be another improvement, in case data availability is guaranteed. 
Second, it is necessary to also investigate the performance of fiscal policy in 
Vietnam during the same research period. Literature shows that fiscal policy and its 
interaction with monetary policy can provide a more complete answer to the inflation 
phenomenon in most case studies viewed. The most recent study investigating the 
impact of fiscal policy in Vietnam is N. A. Nguyen et al. (2010), who found the 
contribution of fiscal policy in confronting the falling aggregate demand due to the 
global economic downturn between 2007-2010. However, the research also holds the 
question of impact from fiscal policy on inflation for future studies. 
Third, it is quite useful to extend the Trilemma research to cover other developing 
countries. For example, a past-looking Trilemma study using Aizenman‘s approach 
for the case of Thailand between 1996-1998 could provide some strong incentives: 
(i) is the approach correct in providing forward insight of the crisis?; (ii) if the 
previous answer is positive, the approach could be used to examine similar cases for 
any other emerging economies, and also even become a type of early-warning index 
for the stability of the financial system. 
Fourth, the channel models could be further investigated and more fully linked to the 
macroeconomic theories of open economies. The possibilities associated with 
channels that (may) bypass central bank influences deserve attention. This opens a 
new interaction with the Theory of Modern Money Creation (McLeay et al., 2014) 
and might provide another explanation for the causes of recent financial crises. 
Finally, there are questions associated with the development of emerging economies 
that deserve further attention. The impacts of the processes of liberalisations need to 
be better understood so that problems like those experienced by Vietnam can be 
avoided if possible. Effective monetary policies are a key part of any such 
endeavour. 
In conclusion, the potential for future studies regarding monetary policy in Vietnam 
are quite extensive, given the limitation in both quantity and quality of research thus 
far. In the new context of international finance, with many changes since the global 
crisis of 2008, these studies will be crucial. They would not only improve the 
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understanding of macroeconomic policies in the case of Vietnam, but also provide 
new insights for experts and policy makers in other emerging economies. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: CODING RULES FOR THE FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION 
INDEX 
Adapted from Abdul et al. (2010) 
1. Restrictions in foreign exchange market 
Coded as 0 whenever a special exchange rate regime for either capital or current 
account transactions exists. 
Coded as 1 when the surrender of export proceeds is lower than 100%. 
Coded as 2 if there is no requirement on surrender of export proceeds. 
Coded as 3 if no restrictions in foreign exchange activities,  foreigners are allowed to 
bring in/out an equivalent or more than USD 10.000 value in cash. 
2. Restrictions of entry for foreign financial institutions  
Coded as 0 when no entry of foreign banks is allowed.  
Coded as 1 when branching restrictions or joint venture is allowed, range of activities 
that banks can take consists of only banking activities, and non-residents must hold 
less than 50% equity share.  
Coded as 2 when the majority of share of equity ownership of domestic banks by 
non-residents is allowed, or equal treatment is ensured for both foreign banks and 
domestic banks, or an unlimited number of branching is allowed for foreign banks. 
Coded as 3 when there are no branching restrictions, all banks are allowed to become 
universal banks. 
3. Restrictions on international capital flows 
Coded as 0 when significant restrictions exist on both capital inflows and outflows. 
Coded as 1 when slight restrictions exist on either capital inflows and outflows. 
Coded as 2 when no restrictions applied on either capital inflows and outflows. 
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Coded as 3 when banks are allowed to borrow from abroad freely without restrictions 
and there are no tight restrictions on other capital inflows. 
4. Restrictions for foreign investors on securities markets  
Coded as 0 if a securities market does not exist.  
Coded as 1 when a securities market is starting to form with the introduction of 
auctioning of T-bills or the establishment of a security commission, foreign equity 
ownership is allowed but there is less than 50% foreign ownership. 
Coded as 2 when further measures have been taken to develop securities markets (tax 
exemptions, introduction of medium and long-term government bonds in order to 
build the benchmark of a yield curve, policies to develop corporate bond and equity 
markets, or the introduction of a primary dealer system to develop government 
security markets); majority equity share of foreign ownership is allowed.  
Coded as 3 when further policy measures have been taken to develop derivative 
markets or to broaden the institutional investor base by deregulating portfolio 
investments and pension funds, or completing the full deregulation of stock 
exchanges.  
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APPENDIX B: CONVENTIONAL VAR ANALYSIS MONETARY 
TRANSMISSION CHANNELS IN VIETNAM 
INTRODUCTION 
In this section, the study conducts a comprehensive VAR analysis for transmission 
monetary channels in Vietnam. VAR is a particularly an useful tool in analysing the 
dynamic effects of the shock from one to another one (Sims, 1980). The emphasis of 
the VAR approach is on policy innovations, that is, impacts from shocks in monetary 
policy implementation. Note that, while other channels are assessed from 1995-2013, 
the assets channel is only assessed from 2000-2013 due to data limitation.  
MODEL SETUP 
A VAR model could be described by the following equation: 
(13)                  
 where  yt is the vector of endogenous variables; 
 xt is the vector of exogenous variables; 
 A is the matrix of coefficients; 
 B is the matrix of coefficients; 
 ut is the vector of white noise innovations;  
 Yt-1 is the matrix of lagged yt  
In this study, yt mainly consists of real GDP (gdpt), consumer price index (cpit), base 
money supply (m1t), and various variables indicate different channels. Real output 
and general prices are standard inclusions in conventional VAR models. As it is 
officially stated that the principal component of the monetary policy strategy by the 
SBV is total liquidity and credit to the economy policy (Vietnam National Assembly, 
1997, 2010), thus the base money supply m1 was chosen as the key instrument of 
monetary policy in the model. Specifically, the variables in each channel are as 
follows: 
 Interest Rate Channel: yt = [gdpt , cpit, interestt, m1t]: In this channel, interestt 
is the market lending rate. The variables are ordered base on the assumptions about 
their stickiness. Output gdpt is ordered first because it adjusts more slowly than 
general prices and other variables. Interestt is ordered after cpit but before m1t to 
 173 Appendices 
reflect the degree of endogeneity of policy variables. The assumption is that in short-
run, shocks from monetary policies have no contemporaneous impact on gdpt and 
cpit due to the real sector‘s sluggish reaction. Market interest rate interestt only 
responds to shocks from gdpt and cpit, while m1t reflects contemporaneously with the 
shocks from all other variables. Estimations of the interest rate channel will shed a 
light on the relationship between the money supply and market interest rate, and how 
the market interest rate boosts real economy activities. 
 Credit Channel: yt = [gdpt , cpit, creditt, m1t]: In the credit channel, creditt is 
the total private credit volume in the economy, is ordered before m1t and after gdpt , 
cpit, to reflect how impacts from the money supply exert through the credit volume 
to the real economy variables. Private credit volume was chosen instead of total 
credit (including credit volume to state sector) due to the fact that the state sector 
often receives credit from the government under controlling decisions, without 
influence from market factors. Estimations of the credit channel will provide 
evidence about how efficiently the transmission of the money supply provides credit 
to the economy, as well as the linkage between credit volume and economy 
performance. 
 Exchange Rate: yt = [gdpt, tradet, cpit, exratet, m1t]: The exchange rate 
channel is expected to play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy. 
Being an export-oriented economy, it is obvious that Vietnam considers external 
trade an important motivation for domestic economic growth. In addition, 
dollarisation is still a significant issue, as people still consider foreign currencies a 
popular financial asset. In this estimation, exratet is the nominal effective exchange 
rate and tradet is the ratio between exports volume and imports volume
29
. Estimation 
results are expected to show the linkages between the exchange rate and trade ratio, 
inflation and economy output.  
 Asset Price Channel: yt = [gdpt, cpit, sharet, exratet, m1t]: The key variable in 
asset price channel is sharet, the index point of securities market. In the case of 
                                                 
29
 Theory suggests that shocks from the exchange rate are likely to exert impact on net exports. As 
Vietnam runs a deficit current account (imports are bigger than exports) it is thus incompatible to 
include negative values of net exports into the model. Therefore, the ratio of exports over imports is 
used as the proxy instead of net exports.  
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Vietnam, as the financial market is still under-developed and foreign currencies 
considered popular financial assets; hence, the exchange rate is included in the 
channel to account for an alternative type of asset price. 
The vector of exogenous variables xt = [oilt, fedt] consists of international gasoline 
price (oilt) and the FED fund rate (fedt). The former is a crucial imported good for the 
domestic economy in terms of both inputs and consumption products, while the latter 
is the indicator for external impact on the domestic financial market. It is necessary 
to include foreign variables in the model to capture the underlying impulse responses 
of variables to various shocks (Raghavan & Silvapulle, 2007). In addition, as the 
shocks originating from Vietnam are unlikely to have any significant impact on the 
rest of the world, the foreign variables are treated as exogenous in the model. 
DATA SOURCES  
This study used monthly data from 1995-2013 for estimations. With the exception of 
data for gdp, which was acquired by interpolation, other variables data have been 
taken directly from International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Vietnam General 
Statistics Office (GSO). All variables have been seasonally adjusted (by X-12 
procedure) and converted to logarithm form before use, except interestt and fedt. The 
next paragraph briefly summarises the description of every variable:    
1. Gross domestic product (denoted as gdp): These are the real GDP figures, 
calculated in the constant price of 1994. Monthly data for gdp was interpolated from 
quarterly data using Denton (1971) method. Unit is billion VND.  
2. Consumer price index (cpi): Collected from IMF e-library data website. The 
index has no unit and takes 2010 =100 as the base point. 
3. Money supply (m1): In IMF definition, M1 for Vietnam is the sum of 
currency outside banks and demand deposits other than those of central government. 
Data are in billion VND, collected from IMF e-Library Data website and seasonally 
adjusted. 
4. Policy Interest Rate (interest): This is refinancing rate applied by SBV to 
commercial banks‘ loans borrowing. 
5. Nominal market exchange rate (exrate): The figure is taken from national 
authorities or the rate determined in the legally sanctioned exchange market. Unit is 
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amount of VND per USD, taken at the end of period. Data were collected from IMF 
e-Library Data website. 
6. Private credit (credit): This variable includes gross credit from the financial 
system to individuals, enterprises, and nonfinancial public entities not included under 
net domestic credit, and financial institutions not included elsewhere. Unit is amount 
of VND, taken at the end of period. Data were collected from IMF e-Library Data 
website. 
7. Crude Oil Price (oil): This is the crude oil price taken from West Texas 
Intermediate spot price FOB (USD per Barrel). Oil price is then converted from USD 
to VND by market exchange rate. 
8. FED fund rate (fed):  The federal funds rate is the interest rate at which 
depository institutions trade federal funds (balances held at Federal Reserve Banks) 
with each other overnight. As VND is mainly pegged to USD, changes in the FED 
rate must exert a significant impact on the SBV‘s exchange rate policy. Hence, the 
FED rate is considered to be the proxy for the international interest rate. 
9. Trade ratio (trade): Ratio of exports value over imports value. 
10. Share price (share): Index of equity market. Data were collected from IMF 
e-Library Data website. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
In this section, the study evaluates the effects of three monetary policy instruments, 
namely interest rates, exchange rate, and credit supply (liquidity supply).  
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests showed that the logarithm form of key 
variables were not all stationary in levels, so they were first transformed into 
difference forms and all become stationary. It worth noting that the act of 
transforming non-stationary variable into stationary data might make the model 
become inefficient (Aleem, 2010; Disyatat & Vongsinsirikul, 2003; Raghavan & 
Silvapulle, 2007). 
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Table A1: ADF Test Results on Variables for Stationary 
Variable  Test statistic p-value Stationary 
In Logarithm  
Lgdp -1.501 0.5332 No 
Lcpi 4.141 1.0000 No 
interest -2.285 0.1769 No 
Lcredit -0.859 0.8011 No 
Lexrate -0.639 0.9806 No 
Lm1 -1.100 0.7149 No 
fed -0.399 0.9103 No 
Loil -1.038 0.7393 No 
trade -5.548   0.0000 Yes 
First Difference of 
Logarithm 
 
DLgdp -21.214 0.0000 Yes 
DLcpi -6.685 0.0000 Yes 
Dinterest -13.570 0.0000 Yes 
DLcredit -16.093 0.0000 Yes 
DLexrate -15.937 0.0000 Yes 
DLm1 -15.553 0.0000 Yes 
Dfed -13.570 0.0000 Yes 
DLoil -14.382 0.0000 Yes 
Dtrade -22.757   0.0000 Yes 
 
The lag length of estimations was chosen based on Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz (SC) 
Information Criteria, mostly at six lags. In addition, results from Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test for autocorrelation in the residuals of VAR models suggest that residuals 
were not serially correlated. 
In the next section, results from VAR estimation are presented separately for each 
channel in each period (1995-2006 and 2007-2013). In each channel, the study 
particularly reports the following items: 
 Results from the Granger Causality test for all variables in the channel to check 
any significant long-term relationship, particularly between key monetary instrument 
(such as interest rate, exchange rate) and key macroeconomic indicators (inflation, 
economic growth). 
 Results from estimations of coefficients for each equation in each channel, and 
its significance for up to 6
th
 lagged variables. 
 Figures of impulse response functions, specially focusing on the response from 
key macroeconomic indicators (inflation, economic growth) toward impulse factors 
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(such as interest rate, exchange rate). The study focusses on reporting the pattern of 
the impact (big or small, positive or negative) and how the effect took place during a 
time span of 24 months. 
 Table of variance decomposition results, particularly focusing on how the 
shocks from key monetary instrument (such as interest rate, exchange rate) exerted 
on the shocks to key macroeconomic indicators (inflation, economic growth).  
 
FOR 1995-2006 PERIOD 
 Interest Rate Channel 
Granger Causality test checks whether the current value of a variable explains 
current and future value of other variable. Results of the interest rate channel for 
1995-2006 (see Table A2) showed that interest had impacts on gdp at a 10% 
confidence level. It is interesting to note that only gdp had an impact, but interest and 
m1 had no significant impact on cpi. 
Table A2: Granger Causality test for Interest Rate Channel (1995-2006) 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
          
DLgdp DLcpi 8.72 6 0.19 
DLgdp Dinterest 11.888 6 0.065 
DLgdp DLm1 9.0759 6 0.169 
DLgdp ALL 24.916 18 0.127 
     DLcpi DLgdp 17.05 6 0.009 
DLcpi Dinterest 8.0634 6 0.233 
DLcpi DLm1 5.1212 6 0.528 
DLcpi ALL 34.915 18 0.01 
     Dinterest DLgdp 7.3412 6 0.29 
Dinterest DLcpi 5.7384 6 0.453 
Dinterest DLm1 10.395 6 0.109 
Dinterest ALL 25.575 18 0.11 
     DLm1 DLgdp 3.7696 6 0.708 
DLm1 DLcpi 5.3055 6 0.505 
DLm1 Dinterest 8.2912 6 0.218 
DLm1 ALL 21.76 18 0.243 
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In VAR coefficients estimation, gdp only received the impact from interest after the 
6
th
 lag (L6). In this estimation, cpi was immediately impacted by gdp at L1, L2, L6.  
Impulse response functions suggest that the interest rate had mixed impacts to gdp 
(Figure A1) and a mostly positive impact on cpi ( Figure A2), and the effects expired 
after 12 months. Specifically, impacts from interest on gdp fluctuated strongly from 
the 6
th
 to 12
th
 month, while the impacts on cpi exerted  the most influence in the first 
four months. 
 
Figure A1: Impulse Response of GDP in Interest Rate Channel (1995-2006) 
 
Variance decomposition shows that neither shocks from m1 nor interest played any 
significant role in explaining the shocks in gdp and cpi. Specifically, interest 
accounted for 6.2% and 7.2% of the total shocks to gdp and cpi respectively, and the 
identical figures for m1 were 1.8% and 5.7%. Whereas, the most significant figure 
was in the long run, approximately 8.9% of shocks to gdp were due to shocks from 
cpi. 
 
 179 Appendices 
 
 Figure A2: Impulse Response of CPI in Interest Rate Channel (1995-2006) 
 
Credit Channel 
Table A3 shows that, in the long run, credit had no Granger Causality impact on gdp 
and cpi, but received impact from m1 at 10% confidence level. 
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Table A3: Granger Causality test for Credit Channel (1995-2006) 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
          
DLgdp DLcpi 5.623 6 0.467 
DLgdp DLcredit 8.9918 6 0.174 
DLgdp DLm1 11.217 6 0.082 
DLgdp ALL 18.475 18 0.425 
     
DLcpi DLgdp 19.163 6 0.004 
DLcpi DLcredit 3.9003 6 0.69 
DLcpi DLm1 4.0888 6 0.665 
DLcpi ALL 27.547 18 0.069 
     
DLcredit DLgdp 1.9692 6 0.923 
DLcredit DLcpi 6.8658 6 0.333 
DLcredit DLm1 10.997 6 0.088 
DLcredit ALL 22.203 18 0.223 
     
DLm1 DLgdp 4.0321 6 0.672 
DLm1 DLcpi 6.5196 6 0.368 
DLm1 DLcredit 8.5826 6 0.198 
DLm1 ALL 22.237 18 0.222 
 
Results from the VAR estimations also pointed out that gdp had no direct impact 
from credit in the short run. 
The response of gdp to shocks from credit was relatively weak, only significant 
between 5
th
 and 8
th
 month, and faded out quickly beyond the 10
th
 month (Figure A3). 
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Figure A3: Impulse Response of GDP in Credit Channel (1995-2006) 
 
On the other hand, the patterns of variance decomposition for both gdp and cpi were 
similar to the case of the interest rate channel: There was no recognised impact from 
credit and m1. Figure A4 shows that shocks from credit exerted some positive 
impact on cpi during the whole first 10
th
 month. 
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 Figure A4: Impulse Response of CPI in Credit Channel (1995-2006) 
 
Exchange Rate Channel 
Market exchange rate exrate had no significant Granger Causality impact on gdp, 
trade and cpi using the same test. Conversely, only gdp had causality impact on 
exrate. 
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Table A4: Granger Causality test for Exchange Rate Channel (1995-2006) 
 
A positive shock from exrate exerted a slightly negative effect on gdp in the first and 
fifth months (Figure A5) but on cpi, the negative effect lasted almost the whole 12 
months (Figure A6). Similar impacts from trade on gdp and cpi were found as well. 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
     
DLgdp Dtrade 12.162 6 0.058 
DLgdp DLcpi 10.461 6 0.107 
DLgdp DLexrate 4.8536 6 0.563 
DLgdp DLm1 6.4075 6 0.379 
DLgdp ALL 29.307 24 0.209 
     
Dtrade DLgdp 10.819 6 0.094 
Dtrade DLcpi 3.928 6 0.686 
Dtrade DLexrate 5.7596 6 0.451 
Dtrade DLm1 8.7535 6 0.188 
Dtrade ALL 35.632 24 0.06 
     
DLcpi DLgdp 16.016 6 0.014 
DLcpi Dtrade 6.7137 6 0.348 
DLcpi DLexrate 5.5419 6 0.476 
DLcpi DLm1 3.4693 6 0.748 
DLcpi ALL 39.875 24 0.022 
     
DLexrate DLgdp 31.99 6 0.000 
DLexrate Dtrade 2.7922 6 0.834 
DLexrate DLcpi 12.521 6 0.051 
DLexrate DLm1 9.7935 6 0.134 
DLexrate ALL 56.2 24 0.000 
     
DLm1 DLgdp 2.0341 6 0.917 
DLm1 Dtrade 2.7677 6 0.837 
DLm1 DLcpi 7.0443 6 0.317 
DLm1 DLexrate 5.0584 6 0.536 
DLm1 ALL 20.069 24 0.693 
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Figure A5: Impulse Response of GDP in Exchange Rate Channel (1995-2006) 
 
Figure A6: Impulse Response of CPI in Exchange Rate Channel (1995-2006) 
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Estimations from the VAR showed the significant linkages between exrate and other 
macro variables. Exrate exerted impact on gdp after a month (L1), on cpi after five 
months (L5), on m1 after three and four months (L3, L4). 
In variance decomposition results, exrate accounted for only 1.9% and 5.1% in the 
variation of gdp and cpi after 12 months respectively. 
 
 Asset Price Channel 
It should be noted that in the asset price channel, the estimations only covered the 
period from 2001-2006 due to the availability of share data. 
Granger Causality results suggest that in the long run share had no connection with 
gdp and cpi. The same conclusion also came from the VAR estimation, as there was 
no evidence of a relationship between the lags of share and gdp, cpi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Granger Causality test for Asset Price Channel (2001-2006) 
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Interestingly, the inclusion of share made m1 become the most influenced variable in 
the model. In the impulse response functions of cpi (Figure A8), a positive shock 
from m1 exerted a positive impact on cpi for almost 24 months. In addition, variance 
decomposition results showed that m1 explained up to 23.05% of the variation of cpi 
after 24 months.  
 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
     
DLgdp DLcpi 17.735 6 0.007 
DLgdp DLshare 3.902 6 0.69 
DLgdp DLexrate 4.177 6 0.653 
DLgdp DLm1 12.415 6 0.053 
DLgdp ALL 44.985 24 0.006 
     
DLcpi DLgdp 10.177 6 0.117 
DLcpi DLshare 6.8605 6 0.334 
DLcpi DLexrate 12.006 6 0.062 
DLcpi DLm1 5.8067 6 0.445 
DLcpi ALL 37.489 24 0.039 
     
DLshare DLgdp 8.3172 6 0.216 
DLshare DLcpi 9.4831 6 0.148 
DLshare DLexrate 8.737 6 0.189 
DLshare DLm1 21.458 6 0.002 
DLshare ALL 46.928 24 0.003 
     
DLexrate DLgdp 5.9433 6 0.43 
DLexrate DLcpi 23.796 6 0.001 
DLexrate DLshare 19.802 6 0.003 
DLexrate DLm1 3.9754 6 0.68 
DLexrate ALL 71.145 24 0 
     
DLm1 DLgdp 5.4224 6 0.491 
DLm1 DLcpi 1.7444 6 0.942 
DLm1 DLshare 6.1569 6 0.406 
DLm1 DLexrate 1.5126 6 0.959 
DLm1 ALL 30.58 24 0.166 
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Figure A7: Impulse Response of GDP in Asset Price Channel (2001-2006) 
 
Figure A8: Impulse Response of CPI in Asset Price Channel (2001-2006) 
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FOR 2007-2013 PERIOD 
 Interest Rate Channel 
In contrast to the previous period of 1995-2007, the Granger Causality test for the 
interest rate channel between 2007-2013 (Table A6) showed that interest had no 
impact on gdp and cpi. However, cpi expressed a strong influence on interest. 
Table A6: Granger Causality test for Interest Rate Channel (2007-2013) 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
     
DLgdp DLcpi 19.688 6 0.003 
DLgdp Dinterest 4.6984 6 0.583 
DLgdp DLm1 12.497 6 0.052 
DLgdp ALL 38.936 18 0.003 
     
DLcpi DLgdp 9.7129 6 0.137 
DLcpi Dinterest 2.1993 6 0.9 
DLcpi DLm1 6.8831 6 0.332 
DLcpi ALL 17.78 18 0.47 
     
Dinterest DLgdp 7.2212 6 0.301 
Dinterest DLcpi 21.352 6 0.002 
Dinterest DLm1 7.1293 6 0.309 
Dinterest ALL 45.408 18 0.000 
     
DLm1 DLgdp 5.9542 6 0.428 
DLm1 DLcpi 10.276 6 0.113 
DLm1 Dinterest 11.335 6 0.079 
DLm1 ALL 35.646 18 0.008 
 
The estimated coefficients from VAR also provided a similar outcome to lags in six 
months from interest but did not play any role in explaining the variation of gdp. For 
the variation of cpi, interest exerted some impact at L3. In addition, while m1 
received no impact from any lags of interest, interest received the impact from L4 of 
m1. 
Impulse response functions for gdp (Figure A9) and cpi (Figure A10) also displayed 
a weak influence from interest. 
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In variance decomposition results, it can be seen that the inter-connection between 
gdp and cpi was higher. After 24 months, shocks from gdp explained 8.9% of the 
changes in cpi, conversely, shocks from cpi explained 18.9% of the changes in gdp. 
 
Figure A9: Impulse Response of GDP in Interest Rate Channel (2007-2013) 
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Figure A10: Impulse Response of CPI in Interest Rate Channel (2007-2013) 
 
 Credit Channel 
In contrast to the previous period from 1995-2006, the Granger Causality test for the 
credit channel between 2007-2013 showed the significant influence of credit on cpi 
in the long run. In VAR estimations, credit also exerted strong connections with gdp 
(L3), cpi (L3).  
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Table A7: Granger Causality test for Credit Channel (2007-2013) 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
          
DLgdp DLcpi 18.557 6 0.005 
DLgdp DLcredit 4.0294 6 0.673 
DLgdp DLm1 16.657 6 0.011 
DLgdp ALL 38.009 18 0.004 
  
   
DLcpi DLgdp 5.7335 6 0.454 
DLcpi DLcredit 35.72 6 0.000 
DLcpi DLm1 4.2017 6 0.649 
DLcpi ALL 57.361 18 0.000 
  
   
DLcredit DLgdp 19.534 6 0.003 
DLcredit DLcpi 8.7068 6 0.191 
DLcredit DLm1 24.469 6 0.000 
DLcredit ALL 83.498 18 0.000 
  
   
DLm1 DLgdp 3.3613 6 0.762 
DLm1 DLcpi 8.943 6 0.177 
DLm1 DLcredit 11.73 6 0.068 
DLm1 ALL 36.142 18 0.007 
 
In impulse response function, positive shocks from credit caused strong fluctuations 
in gdp in the first 12 months and only faded out after 24 months (Figure A11). 
Impacts on cpi were even clearer, as shown in Figure A12. 
However, the most noticeable finding comes in the variance decomposition results 
where credit explained up to 24.5% of the variation in cpi after 24 months.   
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Figure A11: Impulse Response of GDP in Credit Channel (2007-2013) 
 
 
Figure A12: Impulse Response of CPI in Credit Channel (2007-2013) 
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Exchange Rate Channel 
The market exchange rate exrate had a significant Granger Causality impact on cpi in 
the long-run. Estimated coefficients from VAR regression showed that, in the short 
run, exrate had a significant impact on both gdp (L2, L6) and particularly cpi (L3, 
L5, L6). 
Table A8: Granger Causality test for Exchange Rate Channel (2007-2013) 
 
 
 
 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
     
DLgdp Dtrade 4.1155 6 0.661 
DLgdp DLcpi 19.22 6 0.004 
DLgdp DLexrate 1.8117 6 0.936 
DLgdp DLm1 15.761 6 0.015 
DLgdp ALL 40.882 24 0.017 
     
Dtrade DLgdp 5.208 6 0.517 
Dtrade DLcpi 1.6426 6 0.949 
Dtrade DLexrate 1.3647 6 0.968 
Dtrade DLm1 14.791 6 0.022 
Dtrade ALL 40.684 24 0.018 
     
DLcpi DLgdp 11.187 6 0.083 
DLcpi Dtrade 5.0636 6 0.536 
DLcpi DLexrate 21.041 6 0.002 
DLcpi DLm1 5.942 6 0.43 
DLcpi ALL 45.277 24 0.005 
     
DLexrate DLgdp 3.4622 6 0.749 
DLexrate Dtrade 7.1581 6 0.306 
DLexrate DLcpi 1.7206 6 0.944 
DLexrate DLm1 15.914 6 0.014 
DLexrate ALL 28.692 24 0.232 
     
DLm1 DLgdp 11.12 6 0.085 
DLm1 Dtrade 11.175 6 0.083 
DLm1 DLcpi 15.199 6 0.019 
DLm1 DLexrate 6.6356 6 0.356 
DLm1 ALL 53.456 24 0.001 
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In impulse response functions, shocks from exrate on gdp lasted for 12 months 
(Figure A13), but on cpi persisted at least in 18 months (Figure A14). 
Interestingly, in variance decomposition, exrate accounted for 13.17% of the 
variation in gdp after 24 months. 
 
Figure A13: Impulse Response of GDP in Exchange Rate Channel (2007-2013) 
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Figure A14: Impulse Response of CPI in Exchange Rate Channel (2007-2013) 
 
 Asset Price Channel 
Table A9 shows that share had no Granger Causality for both gdp and cpi in the long 
run. Interestingly, cpi, exrate, m1 were found to have a strong Granger Causality 
impact on share. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A9: Granger Causality test for Asset Price Channel (2007-2013) 
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VAR estimation results confirmed the significant impacts from share on other 
variables: gdp (L4), cpi (L5), m1 (L2, L4). 
 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
     
DLgdp DLcpi 17.269 6 0.008 
DLgdp DLshare 4.6771 6 0.586 
DLgdp DLexrate 1.2075 6 0.977 
DLgdp DLm1 15.562 6 0.016 
DLgdp ALL 41.678 24 0.014 
     
DLcpi DLgdp 7.7353 6 0.258 
DLcpi DLshare 8.6139 6 0.196 
DLcpi DLexrate 19.165 6 0.004 
DLcpi DLm1 5.4732 6 0.485 
DLcpi ALL 50.43 24 0.001 
     
DLshare DLgdp 8.1815 6 0.225 
DLshare DLcpi 22.419 6 0.001 
DLshare DLexrate 15.487 6 0.017 
DLshare DLm1 16.65 6 0.011 
DLshare ALL 55.697 24 0.000 
     
DLexrate DLgdp 4.1214 6 0.66 
DLexrate DLcpi 2.3322 6 0.887 
DLexrate DLshare 13.146 6 0.041 
DLexrate DLm1 16.346 6 0.012 
DLexrate ALL 36.094 24 0.054 
     
DLm1 DLgdp 9.8373 6 0.132 
DLm1 DLcpi 12.071 6 0.06 
DLm1 DLshare 6.8813 6 0.332 
DLm1 DLexrate 9.0257 6 0.172 
DLm1 ALL 47.255 24 0.003 
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Figure A15: Impulse Response of GDP in Asset Price Channel (2007-2013) 
 
 
Figure A16: Impulse Response of CPI in Asset Price Channel (2007-2013) 
 Appendices 198 
 
In impulse response functions, shocks from share were likely to last for over 18 
months on gdp and 12 months on cpi. It is worth noting, that during those periods, 
the shocks experienced negative impacts between the 6
th
 and 7
th
 months, other than 
the positive ones in other intervals. 
Variance decomposition showed that, after 24 months, share accounted for 4.62% of 
the shocks for gdp, but only 4.69% for cpi. 
FINDINGS  
The results from the VAR estimation for transmission monetary channels in Vietnam 
produced the following key findings: 
 Interest showed some meaningful linkage with gdp during 1995-2006. It had 
a significant impact on gdp in Granger Causality test and gdp wa influenced by L6 
by interest. However, those linkages vanished between 2007-2013, and no significant 
relationship was found between those variables.   
 Interest had no impact on cpi during 1995-2006, both in the long-run and in six 
lagged months. For 2007-2013, there was no also significant Granger Causality 
impact in the long-run, and gdp was found to only be impacted by L3 of interest. 
 There was no statistical evidence to support the linkage between credit and gdp 
in both the long run and short run during 1995-2006. However, in the later period of 
2007-2013, credit had a strong connection with cpi in the long run and exerted 
effects on both gdp and cpi in the short run (L3).  
 Compared to other monetary forces, shocks from credit on gdp took a longer 
time to be effective. During both periods, the first significant response from gdp only 
occurred after five months (Figure A3& Figure A11). 
 Regarding the impact of credit on cpi, while the former period between 1995-
2006 showed the effect to be quite smoothly mild, the later period between 2007-
2013 displayed a much more fluctuated impact. Particularly, credit quickly 
accounted for 24.5% of the variation of cpi after eight months.  
 Exrate had a strong impact on gdp, but no connection with cpi in the Granger 
Causality in 1995-2006. The later period of 2007-2013 showed the significant 
impacts from exrate on both gdp and cpi. In short run, exrate also had a strong 
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influence on gdp and cpi in both periods. This means that a devaluation of the 
exchange rate had a positive effect on output in both the short and long run. The 
exchange rate also played a minor role in explaining the fluctuation in inflation as 
well. Despite confirming the connection, after 24 months, shocks from exrate only 
accounted for 3.66% and 8.7% in the shocks to cpi in former and latter periods.  
 As the securities market was established in 2000 and only became active from 
early 2006, it is no wonder that for 2001-2006, the asset price channel provided no 
significant estimation. In the later period of 2007-2013, it is interesting to note that 
shocks from share exerted mixed impacts on gdp and cpi in the short run (there was 
no connection between share and gdp, cpi in the long run). However, counting up to 
24 months, the volume of effects were relatively minor (share only accounted for for 
4.62% and 4.69% of the variation in gdp and cpi respectively).  
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APPENDIX C: TESTS FOR STRUCTURAL BREAK IN TRILEMMA 
ANALYSIS 
This study used Chow Test to examine whether there was a structural break in the 
estimation of the Trilemma indices between 1998m1 and 2013m12. The equation for 
the test was as follows: 
                     
As the date 1 January 2007 was chosen as the break point, the whole sample was 
divided into two sub-periods: 1998M1 to 2006M12; and 2007M1 to 2013M12.  
The general idea of the test was to run the two following estimations separately: 
                          
for t from 1998M1 to 2006M12 (108 observations) 
                          
for t from 2007M1 to 2013M12 (84 observations) 
Following this, the null hypothesis   =  ,   =   ,   =   would be tested. If the null 
hypothesis was rejected, the two estimations would have different coefficients; and a 
structural break would exist.  
The more convenient way would be to regress a dependent variable on regressors, a 
dummy indicating the different sub-periods and their interaction terms such as: 
                                                 
where d is the dummy variable (0,1), takes (0) in first period, and (1) in second one. 
After estimation of above equation, by testing the significance of coefficients   ,   , 
  ,  , would indicate whether there was a break between two periods.   
This study utilised the Chow test developed by Shehata (2011) for STATA package 
to check for the existence of a structural break in the data series. The outcomes of the 
test are given in the below table: 
(1) If d is omitted from estimation: 
The result shows that individually the coefficients   ,   of     ,      were both 
significant at 99% while    of     was only significant at 90%. Overall, the Chow 
test criteria value suggest that it could not reject the null hypothesis of no structural 
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break. In other words, the chosen divided point between the two periods was a valid 
structural break. 
 
 
(2) If d is included in the estimation: 
In this case, the result was unchanged.    was still only significant at 90%, but   ,    
and    were significant at 99%. Overall, it could not reject the null hypothesis of no 
structural break. 
- Chow Test                =  233.0354      P-Value > F(3 , 186)  0.0000
- N2: 2nd Period Obs       =   84
- N1: 1st Period Obs       =  108
  Ho: no Structural Change
==============================================================================
* Structural Change Test: Y = X + DX
==============================================================================
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  3,   186) =  233.04
 ( 3)  Dx_FO = 0
 ( 2)  Dx_ES = 0
 ( 1)  Dx_MI = 0
                                                                              
       Dx_FO    -2.502011   .2063652   -12.12   0.000    -2.909129   -2.094894
       Dx_ES     .4650113   .1278743     3.64   0.000     .2127409    .7172816
       Dx_MI      .357489   .1935694     1.85   0.066    -.0243847    .7393628
          FO     4.301971   .1540061    27.93   0.000     3.998148    4.605794
          ES     .4520608   .0517991     8.73   0.000     .3498715    .5542501
          MI     .2749549   .1434147     1.92   0.057    -.0079737    .5578834
                                                                              
         Two        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total           768   192           4           Root MSE      =  .08899
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9980
    Residual    1.47290905   186  .007918866           R-squared     =  0.9981
       Model    766.527091     6  127.754515           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   186) =16132.93
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     192
==============================================================================
* Structural Change Regression *
==============================================================================
. chowreg Two MI ES FO, dum(108) type(2) nocons
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- Lagrange Multiplier Test =  151.6523      P-Value > Chi2(84)    0.0000
- Likelihood Ratio Test    =  299.5125      P-Value > Chi2(84)    0.0000
- Wald Test                =  721.6580      P-Value > Chi2(84)    0.0000
- Fisher Test [N2,(N1-K)]  =    8.5420      P-Value > F(84 , 105) 0.0000
- Chow Test   [K, N-2*K]   =  233.0354      P-Value > F(3 , 186)  0.0000
- N2: 2nd Period Obs       =   84
- N1: 1st Period Obs       =  108
  Ho: no Structural Change
==============================================================================
* Structural Change Tests:  Y = X + D0 + DX
==============================================================================
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  4,   185) =  316.06
 ( 4)  Dx_FO = 0
 ( 3)  Dx_ES = 0
 ( 2)  Dx_MI = 0
 ( 1)  D0 = 0
                                                                              
       Dx_FO    -4.301971    .230458   -18.67   0.000    -4.756635   -3.847307
       Dx_ES    -.4520608   .1304681    -3.46   0.001    -.7094574   -.1946641
       Dx_MI    -.2749549   .1619566    -1.70   0.091    -.5944743    .0445645
          D0            2   .1829206    10.93   0.000     1.639121    2.360879
          FO     4.301971   .1203561    35.74   0.000     4.064524    4.539418
          ES     .4520608   .0404811    11.17   0.000     .3721968    .5319248
          MI     .2749549   .1120789     2.45   0.015     .0538379    .4960719
                                                                              
         Two        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total           768   192           4           Root MSE      =  .06954
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9988
    Residual    .894735868   185   .00483641           R-squared     =  0.9988
       Model    767.105264     7  109.586466           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   185) =22658.64
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     192
==============================================================================
* Structural Change Regression *
==============================================================================
. chowreg Two MI ES FO, dum(108) type(3) nocons
